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
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

THE MORALS OF SUICIDE

THE MORALS OF SUICIDE

BY

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"I held it truth, with him who sings
To one clear harp in divers tones,
That men may rise on stepping-stones
Of their dead selves to higher things."

In Memoriam.

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PREFACE

THERE are at least two aspects under which suicide may be regarded and discussed. First, its moral and religious aspect; and secondly, its social aspect. Of course, the latter is dependent on the former; for nothing can be sound socially which is not also sound in point of morals and religion. In considering, therefore, the subject of suicide, whether under its moral or social aspect, the first thing to be done is to ascertain the real ground of moral conduct. This, it seems to me, is to be found in Personality as the one fact which all must admit, no matter to what school of philosophy or system of religion they may belong. And here I wish to express my great obligation to the Rev. J. R. Illingworth for his valuable work, *Personality, Human and Divine.*

I am aware that the subject of suicide is an uninviting one. But I approach it from the standpoint of a Christian Socialist. To him suicide, as

a symptom of the sin and misery which is seething beneath the surface of society in all its classes, is a subject which demands his reverent, earnest, and sympathetic attention. And my purpose has been not to write a metaphysical essay, but only to offer to earnest-minded Christians a few thoughts and suggestions which, by God's blessing, may help to abate some of those evils from which society is suffering, and which so frequently lead the sufferers to the awful act of self-destruction as the only means of escaping them.

J. G.

November 14, 1899.

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

Statistics from Registrar-General's reports—Concurrent increase in suicide and insanity — Significance of the increase of suicide—The sadness of death by suicide as compared with other forms of death.

IN his 58th Annual Report for 1895 (England and Wales), the Registrar-General made the following significant statement (p. xvii.) :—

"The deaths attributed to suicide numbered 2797, and were equal to a rate of 92 per million of the population, which is the highest rate on record."

And a comparison between the returns for 1888 and 1895 disclose the following items of increase :—

TABLE I.—Showing (1) the Number of Suicides, and (2) the Rate per Million of Persons living in England for each of the years 1888–1897.

Year.	Number of Suicides.			Rate per Million.		
1888–1897.	Total.	Males.	Females.	Of all Persons.	Of Males.	Of Females.
1888	2308	1732	576	82	127	40
1889	2170	1626	544	76	118	37
1890	2205	1635	570	77	117	38
1891	2483	1863	620	85	132	41
1892	2583	1907	676	88	135	44
1893	2599	1940	659	87	133	43
1894	2729	2052	677	91	141	44
1895	2797	2071	726	92	141	46
1896	2656	1979	677	86	133	43
1897	2792	2090	702	90	139	44

We see from the above table that during the last ten years the annual roll of suicides has increased by 484, and the number per million of the population by 8. This gives us an average annual increase in suicides of 48·4, and an annual increase of ·8 per million.

TABLE II.—Showing Deaths from Suicide per Million during periods of five years from 1861–1895.

Years 1861–1895.	Rate per Million.	Increase or Decrease per Million.
1861–65	65·2	
1866–70	66·4	+ 1·4
1871–75	66·0	− 0·4
1876–80	73·6	+ 6·6
1881–85	74·8	+ 1·2
1886–90	79·4	+ 4·6
1891–95	88·6	+ 9·2

Thus it appears that since the quinquennium 1861–5, the increase per million amounts to 23·4; while from that of 1881–86, only three quinquenniums back, the increase is no less than 13·8 per million.

In the United States the annual increase has assumed even more alarming proportions. It was stated in the *Chicago Tribune* that suicides had increased from 978 in 1885 by nearly 500 a-year to 5750 in 1895.

Concurrently with this increase in suicide, we have also to deplore a corresponding increase in insanity. The two will always go hand-in-hand, for the very sufficient reason that they proceed to a large extent from the same cause. From the Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy for 1898, it appears there were in England on January 1, 1899, no less than 105,086 lunatics, being an increase of 3114, the largest annual increase yet recorded. The above figures are equivalent to one lunatic for every 302 inhabitants, as against one for 308 on January 1, 1898, and one for 337 on January 1, 1889. Intemperance in drink is assigned as one of the chief causes; no less than 22 per cent. amongst males and 9·1 amongst females being due to it.

Now it must be remembered that the above

statistics relate only to those cases in which the attempt at self-destruction has been successful. And if to their number we add all those cases in which the attempt has been ineffectual, the numbers and percentages will be enormously increased. Thus we see at once that the Registrar-General's returns, startling as they are, fail to afford us a true criterion of the prevalence in our midst of the suicidal tendency. And as my object in the present volume is to regard this tendency from a moral, social, and religious standpoint, and to offer some considerations and suggestions for its abatement, cases of attempted suicide are of equal weight and significance with those in which the attempt has actually resulted in death.

But even thus we have by no means arrived at a true measure of the extent and depth to which the conditions favourable to suicide exist beneath the surface of society. Besides those who through stress of circumstances are urged to attempt self-destruction, there is, we are sure, a broad margin of others who are brought through similar conditions of mind, body or estate, to the very verge of suicide, but who as yet have been deterred from the attempt either by fear or some other moral or religious influence. And all these,

in making our diagnosis of suicide, and the means which may be adopted for diminishing the frequency of the crime, must be taken into account.

The fact that there is such a large and increasing number of deaths through suicide is indeed one of grave significance, however we may regard it, whether from a social, moral, or religious point of view. It is one, moreover, which demands the reverent and systematic attention of every Christian Socialist and philanthropist.

It is not merely that a large number of lives are thus sacrificed which might otherwise have been useful to society. Lives must be sacrificed, and will be sacrificed year by year in pursuit of the various duties and pleasures and enterprises of mankind. But the gravity and the sadness of the situation arise from the thought that each of these suicides represents the failure of a human life, and the wreck of a human soul. Each one of them has preferred death to life ; and because death did not come to him unsought, he has sought death, and, in spite of the strongest instinct of our nature, has cut the thread of life which ought to have been woven into a pleasing tapestry for the delight of God and man, and dashed to the earth the bowl at the

fountain when it ought to have been brimming over with the water of life.

It may be the fault was his own: that his sin had found him out, and he feared to face the consequences. It may be that some vicious habit had undermined the supports of life, and disturbed his mental equilibrium. Or it may be that he found the conditions of his existence so trying and severe through poverty or misfortune, infidelity or disease, that he could bear the burthen no longer; so he issued his own "Exeat," and sought to escape from his misery by a voluntary act of self-destruction.

But whatever the cause may have been, the final *dénoûment* is one of inexpressible sadness. Death under almost any circumstances is a sad and solemn event. But of all deaths that of the suicide seems the most terrible and hopeless. We must all die; nor should the prospect of death fill us with alarm, if only we are making a proper use of life. But to die by one's own hand, to become one's own murderer, what is this but to violate even the sanctities of death, and to cut ourselves off from every hope either in this world or that to come, and close the gates of mercy against our own souls? It is sad to lose our

friends even in the ordinary course of nature, by the stroke of accident or disease. But in all these cases there is no shame, no disgrace. And while we mourn our loss, we cherish their memory, and bow with submission to the inevitable decree. We lay our brother or sister to rest in God's acre, we commend their souls and bodies to the safe-keeping of a merciful Creator, in hope of a joyful resurrection to eternal life.

But oh! when our brother perishes by his own hand, there seems hardly any ray of light to relieve the horrible darkness of the tomb, and even faith and hope must sit by with folded wings. Had our sister fallen a victim to some disease contracted while visiting the poor, or nursing the sick in the fever-ward of a London hospital, then we should have said she had died a noble death, and one to be coveted. Had our brother been struck down by the enemies' bullet while fighting his country's battles, or leading some forlorn hope in a foreign land, then how we should have honoured and cherished his memory, and spoke of him to our children as having added lustre to his name and family, and glory to his Fatherland. But he failed in the hour of trial—he deserted his post of duty—and even our grief for

his death is covered by the darker pall of shame for the way in which it was brought about. His name must never more be mentioned, except with bated breath and averted eye. He must be as one who never was, and for whom it would have been better had he never been born.

If we can avert so sad and terrible a fate from any brother or sister who is ready to perish, surely in the name of Christian love and sympathy it is our duty to do so.

CHAPTER II.

SCHOPENHAUER AND SUICIDE.

Schopenhauer the apologist of suicide—His pessimism as a system of philosophy—Thelology [1]—The soul and psychology—Sin and suffering—Summary of his *Essay on Suicide*—Mistaken notions of Christianity—Review and conclusions.

A Comparative Estimate of Pessimism and Christianity.

WE may justly call Schopenhauer the great Apologist of Suicide. There is no doubt that his justification of suicide was the result of his philosophy of life—if, indeed, that can be called a philosophy of life, which might more truly be styled the policy of despair.

Like Buddha, he was overwhelmed by the vast amount of misery and suffering he saw in the world around him, and he jumped to the conclusion that when a man finds himself hard pressed by the ills and sorrows of life, it is both right and wise of him to escape therefrom by a voluntary act of self-destruction.

[1] This term, denoting the science of "Will," may be found useful to indicate the keystone of Schopenhauer's system.

But was this a legitimate conclusion to draw, even from Schopenhauer's view of life? I scarcely think so.

In endeavouring to become acquainted with it, the reader can scarcely fail to be struck both with admiration and astonishment: with admiration for the great metaphysical truths he enunciated; with astonishment at his inability to combine and correlate them, to draw from them their legitimate inferences, in short, to build up out of his materials a consistent system of philosophy and morals worthy of the name. He reminds one of a quarryman, who, having hewn out great blocks of granite from some giant cliff, then leaves them unheeded in shapeless masses at his feet, instead of cutting and fitting them for their proper place in the Temple of Truth.

Let me illustrate my meaning by one or two examples, which I shall leave my reader to ponder for himself.

1. *Thelology.*—"*Will*," he says,[1] "*is the lord of all worlds.*"

[1] "*Will* is the lord of all worlds: everything belongs to it, and therefore no one single thing can ever give it satisfaction, but only the whole which is endless. For all that, it must arouse our sympathy to think how very little the *will*, this lord of the world, really gets when it takes the form of an individual. Usually only just enough to keep the body together. This is why man is so very miserable."—*Studies in Pessimism*, p. 37.

"*Will*, as *the thing in itself*, is the foundation of all being: it is part and parcel of each creature, and the permanent element in everything. Will, then, is that which we possess in common with all men, nay, with all animals, and even with lower forms of existence, and in so far we are akin to everything—so far, that is, as everything is filled to overflowing with will."—*Further Psychological Observations*, pp. 66, 67.

Here we have the enunciation of a grand truth, which really lies at the very foundation of Christian monotheism. But Schopenhauer makes no use apparently of the proposition he states. He is content to leave it as an abstract metaphysical truth; nor does he appear to have grasped the further truth to which it ought to have led him on, namely, that "will" is a personal attribute; that "will," apart from a person who wills, is an inconceivable idea.

And so, in spite of his noble conception that "Will is lord of all," Schopenhauer remained an atheist, while all the while he ought to have been a monotheist, and deified and personified his Supreme Will; instead of this he was content to regard it as a blind, impersonal impulse, a truer name for which would have been either Chance or Necessity.

2. *The Soul.*—Schopenhauer speaks of man—that is, the soul or spirit of man—as the individualization of the Supreme or Universal Will.

"For all that, it must rouse our sympathy to think how very little the will, this lord of the world, really gets, when it takes the form of an individual."[1]

Here, again, we have in embryo the Christian belief, that the soul of man is the offspring of God. But, again, the theory or proposition is not worked out. It is left in its crude abstract form. He does not proceed to draw the inference that these two "wills"—the Supreme, to which we give the personal name of God, and the Individual, which we call the Soul of Man—must be co-related to each other. Yet, if the "will" of man be a part of the Supreme and Universal "Will," as we are bound to believe, then the two "wills" must resemble each other in being free personal agents. The will of man must be capable of opposing itself to the "Will of God," which is sin; or of allowing itself to be brought into harmony with it, which is holiness.

The inferences we are compelled to draw from the above quotation are: (1st) That the human soul is the highest and only form of an individualized and personified will, and consequently (2nd) that the soul of man is unconditioned by any

[1] *Studies in Pessimism*, "The Vanity of Existence," p. 37.

moral relationship to another and higher personal will.

It is not very easy to make out what his views were on the subject of human psychology. I doubt much whether he could be said to have had any. At any rate, I do not know that he ever reduced them to a definite form. Perhaps we may best gather what they were, or would have been had he definitely expressed them, from his oft-repeated description of human life as a state of either "*want*" or "*boredom*," and in either case one of misery.

"Life presents itself chiefly as a task — the task, I mean, of subsisting at all, *gagner sa vie*. If this is accomplished, life is a burthen, and then there comes the second task of doing something with that which has been won—of warding off boredom, which, like a bird of prey, hovers over us ready to fall wherever it sees a life secure from need. The first task is to win something; the second to banish the feeling that it has been won, otherwise it is a burthen."[1]

To escape as soon as possible from the misery of *want* on the one hand, or of *boredom* on the other —this is the wisdom of man.

Doubtless there is some truth in all this. It is a

[1] *The Vanity of Existence*, p. 37.

fact that men are tempted to destroy themselves owing to the misery of their lives, and that this misery arises in some cases from unsatisfied want, and in others, from a sense of satiety or boredom. They are causes, and important causes, which must come under consideration in the chapter on "Christian Therapeutics."

3. *Sin and Suffering.*—"There is nothing more certain than the general truth that it is the grievous *sin of the world* which has produced the grievous suffering of the world." [1]

Here, again, Schopenhauer makes a statement which both Judaism and Christianity are ready to endorse.[2]

But he does not attempt to analyze the fatal sequence, and, by showing what sin [3] is, why it should logically and inevitably produce such bitter fruits. Still less, of course, does he advance to the inference that escape from the sorrow and suffering of this world—so far, that is, as escape is now possible—is only to be found in victory over sin,

[1] *Studies in Pessimism*, p. 24.

[2] "The sole thing that reconciles me to the Old Testament is the story of the Fall."—*Ibid.*

[3] The A.S. *syn* has lost the final *d*, which appears in other cognate forms, *e.g.* Icel. *synd*, Germ. *sünde*, O.H.G. *sundja*. According to Skeat, it is the abstract substantive answering to the Latin *sons*, guilty.

which really means the bringing of the human will into harmony with the Divine.

Schopenhauer's argument is virtually this: "The misery of this life is so great and unsurmountable that the only way of escape is through the denial of the will to live."

Christianity, however, speaks in an altogether different key. While admitting to the full the misery and suffering which is more or less the lot of all in this world, it points us to the prolific cause, which is sin, and cheers us with the hope that by removing the cause we may escape the consequence. "Be not overcome of evil; but overcome evil with good." You need not destroy your will to live, but only restrain and chasten it, and *bring it into harmony* with the will of Him who is its Source, and in Whom alone your will can secure both its freedom and its happiness. Nor need you despair. There is One, nearer to you than you think, Whose will is your sanctification. He will help you to win the victory if only you do not wilfully thwart His purpose.

We have called Schopenhauer the great apologist of suicide. And in his *Parerga* we find an essay expressly devoted to this subject, and containing his views thereon. Let us hear what he

has to say, and he shall speak as far as possible for himself.

1. Suicide is not morally wrong, because—

"It is quite obvious, that there is nothing in the world to which every man has a more unassailable title than to his own life and person." [1]

But the truth of this statement can only be admitted after proof that the life and person of man are unconditioned by ownership or relation claimed by a Being higher than himself. And since Schopenhauer has not attempted to give any such proof, the statement above made amounts to nothing more than his own personal opinion.

2. Schopenhauer is very angry with Christians, especially the clergy, because they will persist in preaching and teaching that suicide is a crime morally indefensible.

"I am of opinion that the clergy should be challenged to explain what right they have to go into the pulpit, or take up their pens, and stamp as a crime an action which many men whom we hold in affection and honour have committed; and to refuse an honourable burial to those who relinquish this world voluntarily. They have no

[1] *Studies in Pessimism*, selected and translated by T. Bailey Saunders, M.A., p. 43.

Biblical authority to boast of as justifying their condemnation of suicide—nay, not even any philosophical arguments that will hold water; and it must be understood that it is arguments we want, and that we will not be put off with mere phrases or words of abuse." (p. 44.)

But it is evident that Schopenhauer fails entirely to understand the Christian standpoint.

"The inmost kernel of Christianity," he says (p. 48) "is the truth that suffering—*the Cross*—is the real end and object of life. Hence Christianity condemns suicide as thwarting this end."

What a grotesque, perverted notion of Christianity have we here! True enough it does condemn suicide because "it thwarts the object" which Christ had in view regarding man. But that object is not the Cross, asceticism, and suffering. These are only the means whereby the real object is to be attained, which is the highest welfare and happiness of the human race. In proof of this, I need only remind my reader of one saying of Jesus: "Ask, and ye shall receive that *your joy may be full*." And, if He warned His followers that "through much tribulation they must enter into the Kingdom of Heaven," that Kingdom is still the end and object for which they were to

hope and strive.[1] It is, indeed, difficult to say, whether ignorance, or prejudice, or a desire to throw over Christianity the mantle of his own hopeless pessimism, is at the bottom of Schopenhauer's pitiable mis-statements. At a loss to understand "the extraordinary energy and zeal with which the clergy of monotheistic religions attack suicide," he is driven to hazard a conjecture, which, were it not that the subject is so serious, would be simply ludicrous.

"May it not be this—that the voluntary surrender of life is a bad compliment for Him who said that *all things were very good?*"

3. Schopenhauer quotes from a number of heathen writers, as, for example, Pliny, Valerius, Maximus, Stobæus, Seneca, and others, who have expressed approval of suicide under certain conditions. He refers also to the practice of self-immolation amongst Hindoos: widows leaping on the funeral pile of their husbands, and religious devotees casting themselves under the wheels of the car of Juggernaut. He alludes also to Hume's Essay on Suicide as affording the most thorough-going refutation of the arguments and sophisms advanced against suicide by the clergy (p. 47).

[1] Cf. Rom. viii. 18.

It must be remembered, however, that we are approaching the subject of the morals of suicide from a Christian standpoint. And we can scarcely be expected to frame our conclusions from ancient classics, or take as models for imitation the practices applauded in pagan religions. We have, or, at least, we believe we have, clearer and truer light to guide us. And as for Hume, he was not a Christian, and it is admitted that "the morals he understood were simply calculations of visible consequences." Great, intellectually, as Hume may have been, it is now acknowledged that his unrelenting scepticism drove from the systematic philosophy of his day all recognition of energy in mind and personality in man. We can hardly be expected to attach much weight to the opinions of such a thinker on the morals of suicide, whatever they may have been.

4. In the following passage, Schopenhauer's pessimism and its influence in moulding his views on suicide, come into bold relief.

"Perhaps there is no man alive, who would not have already put an end to his life if this end had been of a purely negative character, a sudden stoppage of existence." (p. 49.)

What he says, however, about the state of

mental agony in some cases overcoming the natural repugnance to death and self-destruction, is, I believe, true—

"Great mental suffering makes us insensible to bodily pain," and "It is this pain which makes suicide easy; for the bodily pain, which accompanies it, loses all significance in the eyes of one who is tortured by an excess of mental suffering." (pp. 49, 50.)

Undoubtedly this is the sad and secret history of many suicides. But that it is so, affords no argument in defence of suicide; rather should it impress upon us the need to use every effort and safeguard to protect ourselves and others from falling into so deplorable a condition. And, besides, we know that suicide results from many other causes besides this one of specific mental agony.

5. The "experiment" theory.

"Suicide," says Schopenhauer, "may be regarded as an experiment—a question which men put to Nature: 'What change will death produce in a man's existence and in his insight into the nature of things?' It is a clumsy experiment, for it involves the destruction of the very consciousness which puts the question and awaits the answer."

In other words, according to Schopenhauer, death is the destruction of the human personality. May we not reply, that all those who have terminated their life here through curiosity to know what it will be hereafter—though, I confess, I have not come across a single instance of this—give the lie to his conclusion? For, had they been convinced that death was the destruction of their self-consciousness, they would never have asked so foolish a question.

As to the contention of "*unassailable right*," which demands, as we have already remarked, the proof that the soul is entirely unconditioned by relation to a Higher Power, it will be our duty to deal with this in the chapter on "Christian Psychology," and therefore it is needless to discuss it here.

The conclusion, then, to which we seem to be brought by this brief review of Schopenhauer's arguments is, that they will only carry weight with those who are prepared to accept his pessimistic philosophy and views of life.

No wonder that, holding these views, Schopenhauer should have justified suicide. In his philosophy there was no room for psychology, in the true sense of the word. His pessimism led him in

the directly opposite direction. It settled like the gloom of despair upon his soul; like a murky mist it floated before his eyes, till he could see only the sorrows and sufferings of this life, without any means of relieving or hope of overcoming them; and therefore to escape from them as soon as possible was man's only true wisdom. Such a world as this, in which there is so much imperfection; such a life as this, in which the lot of all is sorrow and suffering—almost too heavy to be borne—cannot be the work of a Creator at once supreme and good.

Thus the soul of man is left like a derelict on the ocean of life—the sport of wind and wave; a miserable orphan, who has never known and never can know its spiritual Parent, even if such there be. The sooner, therefore, its miserable existence comes to an end, and it falls back again into the nothingness from which it sprang, the better for it.

If this system of philosophy be true, then every child of man who is born into this world is foredoomed to a life of misery, only to be terminated by a death of despair.

But is it true? Do not the convictions of our inner consciousness, and those moral and spiritual phenomena, which in some way or other we have

to account for, give it the lie? Is it not rather the fine-spun web of a disordered imagination, which could see good in nothing, but evil everywhere?

We may summarize the results of Schopenhauer's philosophy, then, under the following heads:—

1. A vague, impersonal quality or essence called "Will" is his highest conception of a God or Soul of the universe.

2. The soul, or psychè, in man is but some portion of this *will* assuming an individual form. Man does not possess a soul at all as a deathless personal spirit, but only a will. And moral freedom, which is the highest ethical aim, is only to be obtained by a denial of this will.[1]

3. Life is but a fitful, unpleasant dream, an uneasy oscillation between want and boredom. Therefore the sooner a man is delivered from it the better, even though it be by his own voluntary act.

4. Death is the destruction of the human organism and of all that is contained in or implied thereby, such as self-consciousness, the will to live, etc.

Such is a brief summary of the pessimist's view of human life, its origin, its nature, and its end. Can we wonder, that, being such, he should contend

[1] *Vanity of Existence*, p. 48, note.

for the moral right of a man to destroy himself?—*Cui non placet vivere licet mori;* or, further, that he should imagine that perhaps there is no man alive who would not already have put an end to his life, if this end had been of a purely negative character, a sudden stoppage of existence, and nothing more?

Let us turn from such a dismal creed to those bright hopes and promises which Christian Psychology holds out for our encouragement as we traverse, whether in joy or sorrow, this brief space between the two infinities.

CHAPTER III.

MATERIALISM AND PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Mr. Mallock on the results of materialistic and positive philosophy—Professor Burdon-Sanderson—Physiological psychology—Evolution only a *modus operandi*—Two methods of investigating psychological phenomena: experiment and introspection.

I HAVE endeavoured to show in the last chapter that Schopenhauer and the pessimists are disqualified from pronouncing judgment as to the moral aspect of suicide, because their system fails to afford the requisite data for so doing. By which I mean, that their system gives us no satisfactory explanation of those psychological phenomena which invest, and, as we may say, form the very essence of man's being here upon earth. "A vague impersonal will is lord of all worlds, and the soul or psychè of man is the highest individualization of that will of which we have any knowledge or experience." If this be so, then the soul of man is unconditioned by relation to any higher personality

than his own, or that of his fellow men. He is free to say, "I have no master or owner. I am an irresponsible being, and, therefore, I am free to do what I please; and if I chose to destroy myself, no one can say that it is morally wrong for me to do so."

Such in brief is the result of pessimism in regard to the moral aspect of the act of suicide.

The same objection must be brought against the materialists. They, too, fail to give us any satisfactory system of psychology.

Mr. Mallock, in his book entitled *Is Life worth Living?* discusses the probable effect of positivism on modern thought and religious belief. First of all, he gives us a *résumé* of the results claimed by the physicist in regard to the connection between physiology and psychological phenomena, or, as we may put it in simpler terms, between mind and matter. He then proceeds to point out the disastrous effect which this teaching, if true, must have on faith and morals.

"Science claims to have placed the universal lifeless matter in a new position for us, and to exhibit all forms of life as developed from it through its own spontaneous motion. Thus for the first time, beyond the reach of question, the

entire sensible universe is brought within the scope of the physicist. Everything that is, is matter moving. Life itself is nothing but motion of an infinitely complex kind. It is matter in its finest ferment." [1]

"The details of the discoveries made by the physical sciences are so various and so intricate, that it might seem a hopeless task to attempt any comprehensive dealing with them. But so far as they have any general—any human meaning—so far as they are more than the toys of a specialist, or the tools of a physician or a manufacturer, their result is very simple. They have at last connected, completely and indissolubly, *so far as observation can carry us*, mind with matter. The great gulf between the two has at last been spanned. The bridge across it, that was so long seen in dreams and despaired of, has been thrown triumphantly—a solid, compact fabric on which a hundred intellectual masons are still at work, adding stone on ponderous stone to it. Science, to put the matter in other words, has accomplished these three things. Firstly, to use the words of a well-known writer, '*It has established a functional relation to exist between every fact of thinking, willing, or feeling, on the one side, and some molecular change in the body on the other side.*' Secondly, it has connected, through countless elusive stages, this organic human body with the universal lifeless matter. And, thirdly, it claims to have placed the universal

[1] *Is Life worth Living?* p. 161.

matter itself in a new position for us, and to exhibit all forms of life as developed from it, through its own spontaneous motion.

"Thus for the first time, beyond the reach of question, the entire sensible universe is brought within the scope of the physicist. Everything that is, is matter moving. Life itself is nothing but motion of an infinitely complex kind. It is matter in its finest ferment. The first traceable beginnings of it are to be found in the phenomenon of crystallization. We have there, we are told by the highest scientific authority, '*the first groupings of the so-called vital force;*' and we learn from the same quarter, that between these and the brain of Christ there is a difference in degree only, not in kind; they are each of them 'an assemblage of molecules, acting and re-acting according to law.'"

Again, p. 162—

"Faith, doubt, sanctity, sorrow, and love, could conceivably be all gauged and detected by some scientific instrument—by a camera or a spectroscope; and their conditions and their intensity be represented by some sort of a diagram."

"These marvellous achievements," says Mr. Mallock, "have been often before dreamed of.[1] Now

[1] The resemblance, we might almost say the identity, between the boasts and claims of modern materialists and the teachers of the Epicurean philosophy in the time of St. Paul is very striking. The following is Bishop Ellicott's description: "In the world of physics, Epicurus has been claimed as anticipating some of the results of modern science. The ideas of creation and control were alike excluded. Matter had existed from eternity, and the infinite atoms of which it was composed had, under the action of attractive and repelling forces as yet unknown, entered into manifold combinations, out of which had issued, as the last stage of the evolution, the world of nature as it now lies before us."—New Test. Comm. (Acts xvii. 18).

Then, as now, the result of this philosophy was the destruction of faith. And Lactantius, in singing the praises of Epicurus, writes—

> "Faith in its turn lies trampled underfoot,
> And we through him have triumphed over Heaven."

If it was fatal to religion, it was no less fatal to morality, for it has bequeathed to us the word "epicure," as denoting the man who is given up to indulgence in the sensual pleasures of the table.

they are accomplished. As applied to natural religion, the effect of them is as follows:—

"Firstly, with regard to God, they have taken away every external proof of His existence, and, still more, every sign of His daily providence. They destroy them completely at a sudden and single blow, and send them falling about us like so many dead flies. God, as connected with the external world, was conceived of in three ways—as a Mover, as a Designer, and as a Superintendent. In the first two capacities He was required by thought; in the last He was supposed to be revealed by experience. But now in none of these is He required or revealed longer. So far as thought goes He has become a superfluity; so far as experience goes, He has become a fanciful suggestion.

"Secondly, with regard to man, the life and soul are presented to us, not as an entity distinct

from the body, and therefore capable of surviving it, but as a function of it, or the sum of its functions, which has demonstrably grown with its growth, which is demonstrably dependent upon even its minutest changes, and which, for any sign or hint to the contrary, will be dissolved with its dissolution."

Such, according to Mr. Mallock, are the results claimed by the teachers of the materialistic and positivist school.

And truly the outlook is one of grave significance, if, indeed, it portends the decay of religious belief and then, as a necessary result, of all morality higher than what selfishness and Socialism may beget. With the loss of faith in a personal God, who is also the Moral Governor of the universe, all sense of moral responsibility, in the higher sense of the word, ceases.

Such teaching as this will prove fatal to everything in the moral world (not to speak of the religious) which has hitherto commanded our greatest admiration and afforded the strongest stimulus to noble and generous action. Its only word to mankind is one of sensual and selfish gratification—"Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Get as much pleasure out of life as you

can; for that is the only thing worth living for. Let no thought about your soul trouble you, for you have not got one. Let no fear of God disturb your peace, for there is none. So long as life is pleasing to you, live; and when trouble or pain, dishonour or sickness threaten to overtake you, you will easily escape their grasp. One sip of the fatal drug, one prick of the sharp knife, one bold plunge into the eddying stream, and all is over, and you sink back again into the nothingness from which you sprang.

Such is the teaching of materialism and physiological psychology, and such the future they open out for humanity.

A state of mind like this is no dream. It is a malady of the modern world—a malady of our own generation, which can escape no eyes that will look for it. It is betraying itself "every moment around us—in conversation, in literature, and in legislation."[1] And surely, we may add, as the final result, *in the vast increase in suicide.*

"This condition, however, is so portentous, that it is difficult to persuade ourselves that it is what it seems to be, and that it is not a dream. But

[1] *Is Life worth Living?* p. 149.

the more steadily we look at it, the more real will its appalling features appear to us."[1]

God annihilated, the soul slain, religion scoffed at as a childish superstition, conscience a mere phantom, the grounds of morality completely undermined—such is the prospect in store for humanity if modern materialism, with its system of physiological psychology, be allowed to dominate the mind of man.[2]

All that the materialist, he being an epicurean, can make of man is an epicure at the social board of life: a creature bereft of God, bereft of soul, a mere automaton of flesh and blood, whose only object in existence is sensual pleasure and personal gratification. If that teaching is accepted, would it be possible, I ask, to imagine anything more appalling?

But Mr. Mallock's forecast was, perhaps, needlessly gloomy and despondent. It is one thing to make claims; it is another to support them.

[1] *Is Life worth Living?* p. 150.

[2] "Never in the history of man has so terrific a calamity befallen the race as that which all who look may now behold, advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless in might, uprooting our most cherished hopes, engulphing our most precious creed, and burying our highest life in mindless desolation."—*A Candid Examination of Theism*, by Physicus.

And many things in this age of scientific research and rapid discovery have happened since Mr. Mallock wrote his book, or even since Huxley broached his famous theory of automatism. And there are evident proofs that even amongst scientific men themselves a strong reaction from crude, soulless materialism has set in.

Professor J. S. Burdon-Sanderson, in his presidential address delivered at Nottingham in 1893, showed that students of the materialistic school find it desirable to take up fresh ground in order to investigate the connection between psychic and physiological phenomena.

"In pursuing this course of inquiry, the physiologist finds himself as he proceeds more and more the coadjutor of the psychologist, less and less his director; for whatever advantage the former may have in the mere technique of observation, the things with which he has to do *are revealed only to introspection, and can be studied only by methods which lie outside of his sphere.*"

Statements like these sound the death-knell of materialism, for they contain the admission that behind matter there is a range of spiritual and vital energies with which the physicist and materialist are incompetent to deal.

Let us see, then, first, what the materialist has to say on this important subject of Psychology.

Physiological Psychology.

He has invented a special term by which to express his conception of the soul, or psychè, of man. He calls it *Physiological Psychology*. It is a name with a fine scientific ring about it, to be sure, but we must not allow it to pass muster on that account alone. What does it mean?

"The chief dogma of the new [materialistic] school," says Dr. J. M. Winn,[1] "is that mind and all its faculties—perceptions, memory, will, reason, and imagination, as well as all the moral emotions —are the result of bodily functions, as if they were merely secretions, like those of the liver or kidneys. They have various unintelligible modes of describing the phenomena of the mind. Its operations are spoken of by some as the product of the caudate cells of the brain; by others, as a disturbance of the nervous power; as expressions of material changes in the brain; as cerebral vibration; as emanations from the brain."[2]

Such is the cardinal doctrine of materialistic

[1] *Materialistic Theory of Physiological Psychology*, p. 11.

[2] According to the materialistic nomenclature, poetic emotion becomes "the thrill of a ganglion;" thought is "cerebration;" life, "molecular force;" creation, "Evolution."

phrenology; while, as regards the origin of the soul and psychical phenomena, we are to regard them as the collateral product of evolution, apart from which neither body nor soul could have been brought to their present state of perfection.

What a wonderful thing, then, must this Evolution be! And truly it is. The materialist swears by it. In his hand it is as the magic wand, by which he can unravel the mysteries of creation and almost all physiological facts. And as the marvels of man's bodily frame are to be in this way explained, so now all those phenomena which we associate with the mind and soul of man must be brought under the influence of this great magician—Evolution—and receive a similar explanation.

What, then, is this wonderful thing our modern scientists call Evolution, and to which they attribute such marvellous power. On examination, it turns out to be nothing more than a *modus operandi*, a method of working, which, *apart from the power which works by means of it, can produce nothing.* Let me illustrate this statement by a familiar illustration. Suppose a little child, seeing the hands of the great clock on the stairs moving steadily round its face, were to come to us and ask us to

tell him what makes those hands move? And we took him by the hand, and opening the door showed him the great pendulum swinging backward and forward with measured beat, saying at the same time, "See, my child, the secret power which makes the hands of the clock move round its face hour by hour and day by day."

Would that be a true answer to his question? Of course it would not. The pendulum does but regulate motion, but in no sense is it the cause. To get at this we must show our little friend the mainspring, which, in its effort to relax itself, sets all the machinery to work, and gives the pendulum its measured swing. And this perhaps will be as far as our little inquirer would be able to follow us in tracing back the effect to its cause. We ourselves, however, will go a step further. That spring did not wind itself up. The force was supplied by my vital energy, and that energy was called into play by an act of my "will."

It was Aristotle who said, a thing is what it becomes when the intention of its maker has been fully realized. It must be regarded *in esse* as what it is *in posse*. The house whose foundation only has been laid, but of which the plan and style of architecture have been thought out and prepared

for, must be regarded as what the architect intends it to be. The seed *in esse* is the tree *in posse*. The egg *in esse*, though it be no more than a speck of amorphous jelly, is the full-grown animal *in posse*. The seed and the egg alike are the envelopes enfolding the design and energy of the Divine Mind —the incarnation of a Divine idea, and the first step towards its realization. But throughout the whole course of their evolution there flows the sap of a Divine purpose and potency; never from first to last is its connection with the stem and root of all vital energy severed, until it has reached its complete development and its purpose been fulfilled. And so throughout the whole range of vital phenomena, from the medusa to the man, the same *process* may have been going forward. But to think and speak of evolution as though it were the potent factor in the conception and elaboration of those phenomena, seems to the writer both irrational and unphilosophical. We are bound to get at that which is behind evolution—that is, to the mind and power of the Evolver.

That Mind we Christians call God; He is the true Soul of the universe, the Power which we behold in nature, making for beauty, beneficence, and righteousness. He is greater than our greatest

conception of Him; all nature is but the reflection of His attributes. And matter is the plastic substance in His hand, which He is ever moulding, as the potter moulds the clay on his wheel, into fresh forms of utility and loveliness. But if He works in Nature, He does not lose His Personality in her; and if on matter, He is not to be identified with it.

We give the materialist full credit for being, like ourselves, an earnest and candid inquirer after truth. There is, perhaps, a little need to warn him of the danger of taking up an illogical and untenable position. Even he must submit to the rules of logical consistency and common sense. He cannot be allowed to assume the existence of effects without causes, whether physical, moral or spiritual. Neither must he trifle with us by asking us to accept a mere *modus operandi* for the hand and skill of the operator. We would remind him there is such a thing as metaphysical conjuring. Doubtless we have all seen in our childhood the marvels accomplished by the professor of legerdemain. We watched him in admiring astonishment as he produced out of his magic hat all kinds of heterogeneous things, from a bowl of gold fish or a couple of pigeons, to a hot pancake or a hundred yards of

ribbon. But we knew all the time the effect was illusory, and that nothing really came out of that hat but what was first put in. And so it is with philosophy, which is really the effort to account for and explain phenomena. The highest results, whether reached through evolution or not, and whether physical or psychological, are but the outward manifestation of that Creator-Spirit, who worketh all things after the counsel of His will, but who must ever be greater than His greatest works.

And so the materialist needs to be reminded once more of the old dictum, still as true as ever: *E nihilo nihil fit;* and that whatever be the phenomena of man's nature, whether bodily, mental or spiritual, they postulate a sufficient cause, a Personal Spirit, in short, not to be confounded with inert matter, and which matter could never produce; a Spirit, who is not only "the Author and Giver of life," but who is Himself the inexhaustible Source of all those qualities, faculties, and powers, such as vital energy, moral and spiritual perception, and the like, which alone render evolution possible.

And to come back again to the starting-point, if by physiological psychology the materialist wishes

only to connote his belief that physiological and psychological phenomena are interdependent, and act and react on each other, then we have nothing to object.

But if, on the other hand, he wishes to imply by this term that the personal soul of man is only a collateral product of evolution, and cannot exist apart from the bodily frame, then we must part company with him, for he is making demands which reason and philosophy compel us to refuse.

Psychology which is merely physiological is no psychology at all, but rather a contradiction in terms, unless matter and spirit be convertible terms. It reduces man to the nature of an automaton, and wipes out his name as a personal, moral and responsible agent.

But while condemning materialism and physiological psychology in its cruder sense because it is unphilosophical, and because, in failing to offer any satisfactory theory of human personality, it destroys the ground of morality, we must guard against a misconception of the aims and work of those who are engaged in the study of experimental psychology.

Beyond all doubt there is a close connection and

interaction between the functions of the body and mind. And it would be a great mistake to accuse those who are honestly endeavouring to ascertain more clearly the mode and measure of those physiological processes by which mental and psychical changes are accompanied with the *arrière pensée* of trying to destroy our faith in the separate entity of the soul.

On this point I shall again venture to make one or two extracts from the address of Dr. J. S. Burdon-Sanderson, to which reference has already been made.

Thus, on page 20, he says—

"Although, therefore, experimental psychology has derived its methods from physical science, the result has been not so much that physiologists have become philosophers, as that philosophers have become experimental psychologists. In our own universities, in those of America, and still more in those of Germany, psychological students of mature age are to be found who are willing to place themselves in the dissecting-room with beginners in anatomy in order to acquire that exact knowledge of the framework of the organism, without which no man can understand its working. Those, therefore, who are apprehensive lest the regions of mind should be invaded by the *insaniens sapientia* of the laboratory, may, I think, console

themselves with the thought that the invaders are for the most part men who, before they became laboratory workers, had already given their allegiance to philosophy."

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"In pursuing this course of inquiry, the physiologist as he proceeds becomes more and more the coadjutor of the psychologist, less and less his director. . . .

"He that is skilled in the methods of introspection (*i.e.* of philosophical inquiry) looks at the same thing from an opposite point of view to that of the experimentalist. It is, therefore, good that the two should so work together that the tendency of the experimentalist to imagine the existence of mechanism where none is proved to exist—of the psychologist to approach the phenomena of mind too exclusively from the subjective side—may mutually correct and assist each other."

What we have to guard against is the assumption or conclusion that because mental conditions and emotions are translated into conscious perceptions by means of physiological processes, such as molecular changes in the brain, that therefore the spirit, or soul, which receives and acts upon these perceptions is not a real entity, but only a function of highly-organized matter.

This is the soul-destroying heresy of materialism,

which reduces man to a mere automaton, and effectually closes the door to any further progress, whether in morality or religion. Against such an assumption or conclusion as this we must never cease to enter our most emphatic protest.

CHAPTER IV.

CHRISTIAN PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS BEARING ON THE MORALS OF SUICIDE.

Soul and Psychè—The psychic myth—Christian psychology—Personality—Its five attributes—Character—Human personality postulates the Divine—Union and communion between the two—Self-limitation of the Divine Personality in the Incarnation—The Incarnation a revelation of Divine character—Christian psychology in its bearing on the morals of suicide—Responsibility—Character.

THE charge we bring against materialism is that it breaks down in the presence of the facts and phenomena of the soul or psychè of man. In other words, it has no psychology to offer us worthy of the name. Psychology is the science of the soul. And the physiological psychology of the materialist, which regards the soul and spiritual phenomena as the outcome of physiological action and development, the mere result of evolution, must be condemned and discarded for this simple reason—that it is philosophically unsound. Self-consciousness and personality are

facts not less real because spiritual. But they are facts which lie in a sphere of investigation which quite transcends that of physiology or materialism.[1] And yet no system of psychology can be regarded as satisfactory, even *in limine*, which declines, or is unable to deal with them.

Let us see, then, how Christianity deals with this important subject. What is Christian Psychology as contrasted with Pessimism on the one hand, and Materialism on the other?

Psychology is, as we have already observed, the science of the soul or psychè. Words are but names for things; but if we can trace them back to their root they not infrequently throw light on the radical idea or conception of those by whom they were first coined and applied. This is true to some extent of the words soul and psychè. The latter is evidently a verbal substantive, signifying "*breath*," from the Greek verb "to blow," or "breathe."[2] Thus we see that the ancient Greeks, mythologists and philosophers, conceived

[1] "The things with which the psychologist has to do are revealed only to introspection, and can be studied only by methods which lie outside the sphere of the physiologist."—Prof. J. S. Burdon-Sanderson.

[2] Ψυχεῖν, whence comes metempsychosis μετα-εν-ψυχή-οω = change in soul I make.

of the soul or spirit of man as a breath, or wind; but whence coming, or whither going, they knew not. Again, in the psychic myth we ought doubtless to see indications of the traditional belief of the ancients regarding the soul. It represents Psychè as a nymph, and the daughter of a king, of such surpassing loveliness that she awoke even the jealousy of Aphrodite. To effect her ruin the latter sent Eros (Cupid) her son, to inspire her with love for some ordinary man; but Eros was himself taken captive by her beauty and carried her off to a fairy palace, where, except for the one restriction that she was never to look upon him, they were perfectly happy. Unfortunately the temptation proved too strong. She yielded to her curiosity. One night she went to the couch on which Eros was sleeping, but some drops of hot oil falling on his shoulder awoke the god, and in his anger he left her. Into her subsequent wanderings in search of Eros we need not follow her. Suffice it to say that she arrived at last at the palace of Aphrodite, who imposed many hard tasks upon her, and finally sent her to bring up from the lower world a box of Persephone's ointment. She brought up the box, but when she opened it the odour overpowered her, and she fell

lifeless at the feet of Aphrodite. And now Eros had pity on her, and interceded with Zeus to restore her again to life. The jealousy of Aphrodite was appeased, and Eros and Psychè were married amid the rejoicing of the gods. All this reads like an allegory. And I hardly need remind the thoughtful reader how closely analogous it is in many respects to the traditional Christian belief concerning the soul, the psychè of man.[1]

Psychè is represented symbolically with the wings of a butterfly: first, to denote the beauty and brightness of the soul; and secondly, its renewed life after death in a brighter sphere of existence. For the latter reason, doubtless, we find it represented on the mural paintings of the Egyptian tombs, as hovering over the body of

[1] The soul, or psychè, of man, both individually and collectively, is a king's daughter, and she is "all glorious within." For the possession of her the powers of Light and Darkness have ever been waging the fiercest warfare. Through her disobedience she forfeited the favour, but not the love, of her Lord. The wanderings, with tasks imposed by Aphrodite, may represent the fruitless efforts of human religion and philosophy to find out God, and the overpowering odour of the box of ointment may symbolize sin producing stupor and death. But love again intervenes, and, interceding with God in her behalf, raises the soul from spiritual death (as also the mortal body hereafter) to a new life of purity and holiness. And Psychè, the soul of man, becomes again the bride of love, "the Lamb's wife," destined to dwell with Him for ever in endless life and happiness.

the dead, rising from his mouth to indicate the departure of the soul, or its return to reanimate the body at the resurrection.

When we come to the word "soul," with a view to ascertain the radical idea which underlies it, we have to confess that etymologists have failed hitherto to give any satisfactory account of the word. That it comes to us through the A.S. "*sáwel*" or *sáwle*, of which the earliest form in the Teutonic family of languages is the Gothic *saiwala*, is clear enough.

But what is the origin of *saiwala?* Professor Skeat says it is unknown, but he adds—

"The striking resemblance between the G. *saiwala*, soul, and *saiws*, the sea, suggests a connection between these words. Perhaps the word *sea* may be connected with the root *su*, to press out juice, which appears to be identical with the root *su*, to generate, produce. The Skt. *su* has the senses to produce, generate, express juice (esp. the *Soma* juice), and *soul* may thus signify 'life' as produced by generation."

This, however, is nothing more than conjecture, and throws little, if any, real light on the origin and radical idea latent in the word soul. But, at any rate, it is clear, that the Gothic *saiwala*, the A.S. *sáwle*, and the English *soul*, are the exact

equivalent for literary purposes of the Greek (ψυχή) psuchè.[1]

The cardinal passage which is usually quoted as defining the Christian belief with regard to the origin and nature of the soul of man is Gen. ii. 7: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." I know that this expression "living soul" is in the Hebrew and Septuagint[2] the same as that which, in ch. i. 20, is translated "the creature that hath life," and, in ver. 24, "the living creature," *i.e.* all animals lower than man.[3] But, in spite of this, the expression "God breathed into," etc.,

[1] The question in Mark viii. 37: "Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" is thus rendered in Gothic: "Aippau wa gibip manna inmaidein saivalos seinaizos?" and in the A.S., "Oððe hwylc gewryxl sylp se man for his sáwle?"

[2] Heb. *nephesh* = animal soul; Sept. ψυχή.

[3] The fact that the same word is used to designate all forms of animal life, up to and including man himself, is one of much significance. It teaches us the *solidarity of animal life* throughout all its forms, genera, and species, and the close relationship which exists between man and the lower orders of the animal kingdom. They all in some measure possess the living soul. This fact was fully recognized by Schopenhauer, and he brings it as a charge against the Christian religion, in this respect inferior to Buddhism and Brahminism, that Christians practically ignore the fact, and forget that sympathy and kindness which ought ever to be displayed by man towards every creature which shares with him, though in different degrees, "the living soul."

though anthropomorphic, seems clearly to indicate that the soul of man differs from the soul in all the lower orders of creation by being due to the direct inspiration—in-breathing—of the Spirit of God. Of no other animal is this said to be the case. And this view is further borne out by what is said of the creation of man, Gen. i. 26: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." And, again, ver. 27, to the same effect. No other species of "living soul" was thus created. Of no other psychè is it said it was made in the image and likeness of God.

And this doctrine that the human soul or psychè is in some mysterious manner the direct offspring of the great Creative Spirit or Soul of the universe, and stands to Him in the relation of a child to its parent, is either stated or assumed in many other passages in the Old Testament.[1]

[1] Thus, Isa. lvii. 16: "For I will not contend for ever, neither will I be always wroth: for the spirit (πνεῦμα) should fail before Me, and the souls (πνοὴν πᾶσαν) which I have made."

Prov. xx. 27: "The spirit of man (πνοὴ) is the candle of the Lord."

Eccles. xii. 7: "And the dust shall return to the earth as it was, and the spirit (πνεῦμα) return unto God who gave it."

In this latter passage Solomon, in spite of what he had already said, ch. iii. 19–21, about men and beasts having our breath (πνεῦμα) and all going to the same place, states distinctly that the spirit or soul of man is the gift of God, and that to Him it returns at death.

This, then, is the conclusion to which as Christians accepting the inspiration of the Old Testament Scriptures, we are brought.

1. All animals up to, and including man, possess "a living soul" or psychè.

2. In man this soul, by whatever name we call it, is of a higher order, and is the direct result of the in-breathing of the Great Creative Spirit of the universe. Man's spirit or soul is akin to that of God, Who stands to him in the relation of "parent to his child." Thus there is a true and real affinity between the two.

3. The spirit or soul of man resembles the Spirit of God.

Personality.

The essential inalienable attribute of soul is personality. We may go even a step further and say that personality is the expression for the soul in activity—the soul regarded as a living self-conscious agent, acting, and fitted to act, on the stage of human experience.

But are we sure we possess a clear idea of the exact meaning to be attached to this word personality? What is a person, and what is

implied in personality? How have we got the words? Let us see.

In the Greek and Roman drama the actors from the earliest times were disguised by wearing masks. Now, the Latin word for a mask is *persona*, so called because through it the actor (per-sonat) speaks.[1] These masks, moreover, were of various kinds, sometimes covering not the face only, but the head and shoulders, and suited to the particular part the actor had to sustain in the play. The transition, by metonymy, from the mask (*persona*) the actor wore, to the actor himself, speaking through it, was easy enough. And so at length the players themselves came to be designated by the masks (*personæ*) they wore as *dramatis personæ*.[2]

Such is the origin and literal meaning of person and personality. And when we say of the soul that it is a person, and invested with personality as its chief and inalienable attribute, we mean nothing more and nothing less than

[1] The corresponding word in the Greek drama was προσωπεῖον whence πρόσωπον = a face, which then, by the same figure of speech as above, came to denote the person acting and the dramatic part he had to play.

[2] To impersonate a character is to put on the mask (*persona*) appropriate, or belonging to that character.

that it is an actor on the stage of human life and experiences, or, to put it in the words of our greatest poet—

> "All the world's a stage,
> And all the men and women merely players;
> They have their exits and their entrances,
> And one man in his time plays many parts."[1]

Such is the meaning and history of the words "person" and "personality." And very proper terms they are by which to denote the soul of man. For the soul of man is a person in the acquired and secondary sense, that it *personat*, or speaks and plays its part through the "*persona*," or mask of its bodily and material envelope.

But, after all, words are but the names and symbols of things. What, then, is this thing which *personat*, speaks and acts through its *persona*? What is personality?

It is the realest thing in earth or heaven. It is the one fact which neither the materialist nor the pessimist can ignore. They must either admit it, or they must deny the verdict of our deepest and most innate conviction, and thus place themselves out of the court of further inquiry. If I am certain of anything, it is that I have a personal

[1] *As You Like It*, act ii. sc. 9.

existence, which I term egoism. If I am not certain of this, then there is nothing of which any assurance remains.

"Personality," says Dr. R. C. Moberly,[1] "involving as necessary qualities of its being, reason, will, love, is incomparably the highest phenomenon known to experience, and as such has to be related with whatever is above it and below it."

But not only is personality "the highest phenomenon known to experience," the greatest fact with which we have to deal: it is, moreover, one ready to our hand, one which submits itself to the keen reflective analysis of the self-conscious soul.

As the result of such an analysis, we find that the human personality possesses five principal attributes or qualities—

1. Self-consciousness. 2. Reason.
3. Free will. 4. Conscience.
5. Love.

By virtue of the first, the soul knows that it exists. The second constitutes man an intelligent being. The third marks him a free, self-determining agent. The fourth enables him to discern the difference between right and wrong, and entails moral responsibility; while the fifth (love) is that

[1] Church Congress, 1891.

faculty which makes man the creature of desire, and by which he is attracted to, or repelled from, those objects which constitute for him his outer world—his *Non-ego*.

Character.

Again, each several personality is stamped with a separate impress which we call character,[1] that is the sum total of the action or influence upon the soul of those several attributes or qualities which together constitute its personality. Where these attributes are duly developed, and are working in an orderly and harmonious manner in connection with the proper objects of their regard, there ensues that good character which we may call the true music of the soul. Where they are undeveloped, uninstructed, not brought into exercise with reference to the rightful objects of their regard, but allowed to wander away and expend themselves on those objects which are not, there necessarily ensues that character which we call bad.

And this shows us what education in its highest sense really is. It is the formation of good character, by instructing, training, and regulating the attributes and capacities of the personal soul with

[1] Gr. χαρακτήρ, from χαράσσειν, to engrave; cp. χαραχθὲν νόμισμα = stamped money, coin. See also note, p. 102.

reference to the true and worthy objects of their regard. But we shall have occasion to revert to this subject hereafter; we need not, therefore, insist upon it now.

Human Personality postulates a Divine Personality.

And now what are we to say about this personality of man? We have seen that it is a real fact, a spiritual phenomenon, of which we have the most convincing assurance. But facts and phenomena in the spiritual sphere demand a cause and explanation no less than those in the material and physical. To say that this fact of human personality exists without a cause would be unphilosophical and unreasonable. To say that it is the only and highest form of personality in the universe is so highly improbable as to be nothing short of absurd. Can I believe that I am the only being in the universe that is conscious of its own existence? Are reason and intelligence only to be found in the soul of man? Is *his* conscience the only arbiter of right and wrong? Is he alone capable of saying, "I will," or "I love"? The folly of such an idea could only be equalled by its vain conceit.

Or, again, am I to believe that this personality of mine, of which I am so conscious, which is to me

the one thing, and the only thing, I am certain of, a solitary isolated spiritual phenomenon, un-correlated to any other personality, un-co-ordinated in any more comprehensive system of psychology?

My reason, my spiritual instinct, simply refuses to accept such a view of my own personality.

Thus it comes to pass that self-introspection and analysis, and a probability so great that it virtually amounts to a positive proof, bring me to the conclusion which I cannot escape, that there must be another Personality similar to, but infinitely greater than my own, and at once its origin and its archetype. My own personality is not an isolated solitary fact in the universe of being, whose beginning, end, and object are alike unknown; but the offshoot, the child, of the Great Personal Soul of the universe, whom we call God.

And this conclusion to which we are brought by *a priori* reasoning, is precisely that which is dogmatically taught in the sacred records of the Old Testament. Starting from the universal life-giving Spirit which in the beginning brooded over Chaos, we are told (Gen. ii. 7) that the Lord God breathed, as a Spirit, into man's nostrils "the breath of life, and man became a living soul."

Nor is this the only point in which the conclusions

of *a priori* reasoning on the fact and attributes of human personality agree with Holy Scripture.

Thus, for example, the only and highest form of personality of which we have conscious experience is our own. And the fact that we possess such a personality postulates, as we have pointed out, the latent existence of a still higher form of personality. But this is not all. The nature and constitution of my own personality enables me to form some conception, however imperfect, of that latent Personality which I am certain must exist.[1]

Is the personal soul of man in his little workshop of this world a poet or a painter, an architect or a sculptor, an intelligence capable of forming a design and carrying it into execution? Can we, then, predicate less of the Personal Soul of the universe? Not less, surely, but more. And it is thus that the human personality becomes, not the model, but the reflex of the Divine; a mirror, in which we see it faintly and feebly, it may be, and

[1] "It is not that human personality is a realized completeness, to which we desire to make our conceptions of Divine Being correspond, but rather that human experience gives us indications of what personality, in its fuller realization, would mean. . . . Only the Supreme Being, then, can attain the full idea of Personality. The ideals which hover above and behind human experience, are suggestions, are approaches, more or less, towards that."—R. C. Moberly, Church Congress, 1891.

yet with truthful outlines, imaged forth for our instruction.

And this is exactly what is stated in the inspired Record respecting the soul of man. Not only is it the result of a Divine inbreathing, it was made in the likeness of God. "And God created man in His own image; in the image of God created He him" (Gen. i. 27). Thus again do *a priori* reasoning and the dogmatic utterances of Inspiration coincide. And if in the human personality we find the constituent attributes of self-consciousness, reason, conscience, will, and affection, we may be sure that nothing less than these will be found in the Divine.[1]

Union and Communion between Human and Divine Personalities.

If, as we have every reason to believe, the Divine and human personalities are cognate and similar, then union and communion between the two must also be possible.

We may go further, and say that the perfection and happiness of the human personality can only

[1] The triune nature of personality, whether human or Divine, is a subject I do not feel called to enter on in these pages. Our inquiry is a definite one, that, namely, into the ultimate ground of moral conduct as regards suicide. And only so far as they are necessary or conducive to this end, have I allowed the inquiry to trench on the regions of Metaphysics and Theology.

be realized by its being brought into union and communion with the Divine.

The personal soul of man asks for and expects no less than this.[1] And every system of religion or philosophy which has ever exalted or degraded mankind, is more or less a proof of it.

What mean those heart yearnings expressed with such pathetic eloquence by prophets and psalmists of old?

"Oh that I knew where I might find Him! that I might come even to His seat!"[2] "As the hart panteth after the waterbrooks, so panteth my soul after Thee, O God. My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God: when shall I come and appear before God?"[3] "Whom have I in heaven but Thee, and there is none upon earth that I desire in comparison of thee. My flesh and my heart faileth; but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever."[4]

[1] Man's religious instinct points to a Person informing and sustaining material things. His reason and conscience justify this instinct, by demanding a first and final Cause and a moral Governor. He anticipates that this Person will reveal Himself to man in proportion to man's capacity for receiving His revelation. And when faced by an event (the Incarnation) which claims to be that revelation, and which, while baffling his every forecast, more than fulfils his every hope, he is prepared to accept it as true; and, if true, as the final vindication of all his previous processes of thought."—*Personality Human and Divine*, p. 205.

[2] Job xxiii. 3. [3] Ps. xlii. 1, 2. [4] Ps. lxxiii. 25, 26.

The soul of man is an orphan and an exile until it is brought into communion with the Parent Soul of God. And what the personal soul of man yearned for, what his reason led him to expect, God has been pleased to vouchsafe through the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.

Self-limitation of the Infinite Personality of God out of Condescension to the Finite Personality of Man.

But is this union and communion between the finite soul of man and the Infinite Soul of God really attainable? Is it anything more than a dream of the religious enthusiast, beautiful indeed, but incapable of realization?

It might seem improbable at first sight, and even those most conscious of this spiritual yearning were at the same time most conscious of the mighty barrier in its way, the unbridged chasm which must for ever separate the Infinite from the finite soul of man.

"Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is high as heaven, what canst thou do? Deeper than Sheol, what canst thou know?"[1]

The Personality of the Soul of God seemed to

[1] Job xi. 7, 8.

Job in danger of being lost—etherealized—in its infinite extension and perfection.

Again the Psalmist:[1]

"Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it. Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit; or whither shall I flee from Thy presence?"

And so, indeed, it would have been had not the Infinite Personality of God, incomprehensible by the finite personality of man, condescended to self-limitation, in order that on the stage of human experience He might make Himself known to the finite faculties and comprehension of man, and render terms of union and communion between them possible.

This great doctrine of the self-limitation of the Divine Personality is very distinctly set forth in numerous passages of the New Testament.

"The Word became flesh and dwelt among us; and we beheld His glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth."[2] "No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared him (ἐξηγήσατο)."[3] "God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets

[1] Ps. cxxxix. 6, 7. [2] St. John i. 14. [3] *Ibid.* 18.

by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in His Son."[1]

So also St. Paul—

"Have this mind in you which was also in Christ Jesus: who being in the form of God, counted it not a prize (ἁρπαγμὸν=a thing to be grasped at) to be equal with God, but emptied Himself (ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε), taking the form of a servant."[2]

And what was thus doctrinally and dogmatically stated by the apostles of Jesus Christ respecting His Incarnation, was no less emphatically claimed by Himself—

"I and the Father are One."[3] "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father. How then sayest thou, Shew us the Father."[4] "I am the way, the truth, and the life. No man cometh unto the Father except by Me."[5]

Thus by His Incarnation does Jesus become the expression for the needs of man of the Personality of God: the bridge which spans the abyss between the Finite and the Infinite: and the means whereby union and communion between the Divine and Human Personalities become attainable.

[1] Heb. i. 1, 2. [2] Phil. ii. 5–7. [3] St. John x. 30.
[4] St. John xiv. 9. [5] *Ibid.* 6.

The Incarnation a Revelation of Divine Character.

But if in the Incarnation we see a self-limitation of the infinite Personality of the Divine Soul in order to accommodate itself, if we may so speak, to the finite personality of man, the Incarnation is no less a revelation to man of Divine character.

Calling to mind what has already been said as to character, that it is the impress or stamp made on the personality of the soul by the combined influence of its attributes; and, secondly, that the human personality is the reflex of the Divine; we should expect that any revelation of Divine Personality would also be at the same time a revelation of Divine character as a model for the imitation of man. And this conclusion is borne out by the words of the Master Himself, when He said, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father who is in Heaven is perfect."

The five great attributes of personality, as we have seen, are: (1) Self-conscious existence, (2) reason or intelligence, (3) will, (4) conscience, (5) love or affection.

All these were pre-eminently claimed and exhibited by Jesus.

1st attribute.—Self-conscious existence: "Before Abraham was I am."

2nd.—Reason or intelligence. Jesus claims for His Father, with Whom He is One, that He is the Author and Sustainer of Nature—

"He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." (Matt. v. 45.)

"Behold the birds of the heaven, that they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; and your Heavenly Father feedeth them." (St. Matt. vi. 26.)

The 3rd attribute of personality is will.

"Will is lord of all," says Schopenhauer. And so says Jesus Christ. But how vast the difference! In the one case, a vague, unconscious, impersonal will, which is a mere unthinkable abstraction. In the other, the self-conscious pre-determining will of a Personal Soul—"your Father who is in Heaven."

"Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? And not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father: but the very hairs of your head are all numbered." (St. Matt. x. 29, 30.)

And Jesus is the revelation of God's will, not only by doctrine and precept, but also by His example in action and passion.

"I came not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me." "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me, and to finish His work." "Father, not My will but Thine be done."

The 4th attribute is conscience, which we may define as a tender and supreme regard for truth.[1] And what did Jesus say on this point?

"For this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth." "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (St. John xiv. 6). "If ye continue in My word . . . ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." (St. John viii. 31.)

The 5th and last attribute is love. And, if Jesus revealed one attribute of the Divine character more clearly than another, surely that attribute was love. We need not multiply passages to prove this. Two or three will suffice.

"Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (St. John xv. 13).

"God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have eternal life." (St. John iii. 16.)

"A new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another." (St. John xiii. 34.)

[1] See note B on Conscience.

Thus does Jesus reveal love as the essential feature of the Divine character, devising means whereby the banished ones may be restored to Him again, and the terms of mutual love be re-established through the co-operation of the Son and Holy Spirit.[1]

For this end the Son of God became incarnate, that He might exhibit to man for his imitation the features of the Divine character, thus "leaving us an example, that we should follow His steps."[2] (1 Pet. ii. 21.)

And now what is the teaching of Christian Psychology as thus outlined on the subject before us, the Morals of Suicide?

It teaches us two lessons, the importance of which it would be difficult to over-estimate.

The first is the lesson of human responsibility.

The second is the duty of the formation of character.

The personal soul of man is not an isolated fact, a spiritual abstraction. It is related to the

[1] See 1 St. John iv. 13, and Gal. iv. 6.

[2] "At length, as is meet, from the holy place comes forth the Holy One: guiding man into the life of love, wherein his true perfection lies; and revealing God as the source of love, and Himself as God Incarnate; in union with Whom our finite imperfect personality shall find in the far eternity its archetype and end."—Illingworth, *Personality*, p. 215.

Personal Soul of the universe as a child to its parent. And in this relation between the two is to be found the only sure ground of moral, that is, rightful, conduct.

How far-reaching in their consequences are these two lessons of responsibility and conduct, I hardly need to point out, nor how close their bearing on the subject before us. In view of them, what becomes of the "unassailable right" of man to destroy himself? And what of the physiological psychology of the materialist, or the automatism of the physicist? As working theories, capable of dealing with the complex phenomena of human personality, they melt into the thin air. The soul of man is not his own in the sense that he has the right to destroy it; or that he is not responsible to another person if he does so. The truth is thus expressed for us by St. Paul—

"For none of us liveth to himself, and none dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord, or whether we die, we die unto the Lord; whether we live therefore or die, we are the Lord's." (Rom. xiv. 7, 8.)

And again—

"What, know ye not that your *body* is the

temple of the Holy Ghost, and ye are not your own? For ye were bought with a price." With the practical conclusion, "Therefore glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are God's." (1 Cor. vi. 19, 20.)

God in His love made us for Himself, that in union and communion with Him we might share the life and happiness of God.

This is the purpose and intention of God concerning man. And he that turns his hand against himself, defeats this intention, and sins not only against God, but against his own soul. The man who in a state of mental sanity destroys himself, has failed to recognize the relation in which his own personal soul stands to the great Personal Soul of the Creator, and the responsibility which that relationship entails.

The act is immoral, as regards himself, because it is not right, and cannot be, that he should sin against his own soul by cutting it off from its true welfare and happiness.

It is immoral, as regards God, because it is not right, and cannot be, that he should defeat God's purpose concerning him.

It is immoral, because it is an act of cowardice in deserting the post of duty; of impatience and

rebellion in setting up and following our own will in defiance of that of the Almighty.

It is immoral, because it is a departure from that good character which, as we have seen, God has revealed for our guidance in the Incarnation of His Son, Jesus Christ.

It is a sin against the State, because it is a dereliction of social duty.

It is a sin against the family of which the suicide is a member, because it brings on them sorrow and shame.

Lastly, it is immoral, because it is an infraction of the express command, "Thou shalt do no murder." I have no right to take my own life, and destroy my own soul, as I have none, to destroy that of my neighbour. "Behold, *all* souls are Mine . . . the soul that sinneth, it shall die."

Such, according to the teaching of Christian Psychology and Christian Revelation, are the morals of suicide. Full well I know that in many cases of suicide—perhaps the majority—neither the dictates of reason, nor the precepts of philosophy, or religion, come into operation. Sometimes, alas! sin, suffering, and sore distress of mind or body, completely destroy the mental equilibrium, and render the unhappy victim

deaf alike to the voice of reason and conscience. All such cases demand our profoundest sympathy, and appeal to our tenderest charity. But it is none the less true, that the more a man is imbued with sound views as to the moral aspect of suicide, the less likely is he in time of trial, temptation, and distress, to have recourse to that deadly crime. He has a safeguard in his own bosom. He will not harbour the thought for a single moment; for he will be armed by the firm conviction that it could only lead to sin, first against God, and then himself. Rather will he say, "My sorrows and sufferings may indeed crush my perishable body, but they shall not ruin my immortal soul. They may destroy my peace and happiness in this world, but never, with my consent, shall they separate me from Him in union with Whom is my only hope of life and happiness in that to come."

CHAPTER V.

EXAMINATION OF DR. MORSELLI'S WORK ON SUICIDE.

Statistics—Continental nations—Seasons—Ethnological influences—Social influences—Religion—Culture and instruction—Urban and rural life—Sex—Age—Causes—Alcoholism—Children and suicide.

THE most exhaustive treatise on the subject of suicide, and that which I believe still holds the foremost rank, both on the Continent and in this country, is that of Dr. Henry Morselli, Professor of Psychological Medicine in the University of Turin. It is entitled *An Essay on Comparative Moral Statistics*, and has been published in an excellent translation as one of the International Scientific Series by Messrs. Kegan Paul and Co. I think I shall not be misrepresenting the character of Morselli's great work if I say it is essentially statistical and sociological. In the fact that it is

so, its chief value consists. As to the moral aspect of suicide, he has little to say, and still less as to its religious aspect.

Unfortunately the statistics do not reach further than 1875, nearly a quarter of a century ago; and the latest edition, I believe, was published so far back as 1881. Even since the latter date, vast changes have taken place either for better or worse in the social and economic condition of the peoples of Europe, and no less so amongst the inhabitants of our own country.

The work, therefore, wants bringing up to date, to make it really valuable for present investigation even from a statistical point of view.

On page 371 we find a passage which perhaps better than any other discloses to us Morselli's real standpoint.

"The real cure of the evil of suicide could not be initiated or foreseen until its true nature and extension were known. And here it is that statistical researches are useful, which yet at first sight appear so little productive of practical results. Religion and morals have never reached the root of the calamity; they were ignorant of its growth, and therefore the really essential element to undertake the only cure possible was wanting—that of prophylactics. Sociology, on the contrary, teaches

us what are the true psychological and social characteristics of suicide, explains its mechanism to us, and can put us on the right road better than any speculative discipline to prevent and cure this fatal tendency of civilized society. To science alone will belong in future the functions of regulator and moderator of public morals."

The reader is not asked to endorse the views which are here expressed. Their soundness, from a moral and religious point of view, will come under discussion later on ; and I quote the passage simply as showing Morselli's opinion of the paramount importance of statistics and sociology in dealing with the difficult and complicated problem of suicide.

I scarcely need say that anything like an exhaustive review of Morselli's work is quite out of the question. I shall make no attempt to reproduce his statistics, but only to record some of the more important conclusions to which, in his opinion, they inevitably lead.

Thus, for example, from the data he has collected he thinks it possible to deduce a general law that "*in the aggregate of the civilized States of Europe and America, the frequency of suicide shows a growing and uniform increase greater than the geometrical augmentation of the population, and of the general mortality.*" (p. 29.)

In chapter ii. Morselli discusses what he calls the cosmico-natural influences acting on suicide, such as (1) climate, (2) telluric conditions, (3) seasons and months, (4) meteorological changes and lunar phases, (5) days and hours.

Many of the statistics are of a very ambiguous character, and too much reliance should not be placed on the inferences drawn. Nevertheless, in some cases they serve to remove certain mistaken notions into which men had fallen.

Thus, England was at one time regarded as the classic land of suicide, and that because of its damp, cold climate. Both these ideas must now be relegated to the limbo of exploded, though once popular, fallacies. On page 20 we have a table of proportional increase of suicides per million in various countries of Europe. And in 1875 these numbers were for—

Ireland	97·4.
England	165·5.
France	314·6.
Prussia	413·9.
Galicia	792·2.

The south of Europe gives the minimum proportion of suicides, and the centre, the great Germanic plain, at about lat. 50°, the maximum.

Seasons and Months.

For a long time it was supposed that suicide was more frequent in damp, cloudy, and dark weather, especially in the month of November in England. This also is found to be a mistake.

"In the season of the year in which the earth is in aphelion the average proportion of suicides reaches its maximum limit; it falls, on the contrary, to its minimum when the earth is in perihelion. In other words, the transition period between spring and summer, and especially the month of June, exercises the most positive influence on suicidal tendency, whilst that of winter, particularly that of December, would be negative." (p. 55.)

In other words, it is not so much the intense heat of summer, or the intense cold of winter, which tries the human constitution, and especially the nervous system, as the transition from the one to the other.

Lunar Phases.

It is generally supposed that the moon exercises considerable influence on mental maladies, and

therefore on suicidal tendency. But the evidence of statistics is, to say the least, of a very ambiguous character. The data for Prussia in 1869 would seem to show that suicide increases during the second and fourth lunar phases, and decreases during the first and third.

Hours of the Day, or Night.

Statistics seem to show that the number of suicides occurring during the day exceed those during the night, the hours of maximum being from 6 to 12 a.m., the minimum being reached at the hour preceding sunrise. It is noteworthy, too, that—

"the daily distribution of suicides is parallel to activity in business—that is, when the mental strain is greatest to occupation and work; in short, with the noise which characterizes the life of modern society, and not with silence, quiet, and isolation." (p. 79.)

Ethnological Influences.

These are discussed in chapter iii.; but, whatever their effects, they are beyond the reach of modification and remedial treatment, and therefore

they need not detain us. The same remark also holds good with regard to Anthropological Characteristics, page 100.

Customs.

Morselli asks—

"May not the extraordinary increase which suicide has undergone during the last forty or sixty years be ascribed to the changed habits, the new customs and ideas, which now rule civilized nations? . . . Rome and Athens saw suicide come into fashion when effeminacy, ambition, and the desire of riches prevailed amongst them; and modern Europe, having trod in the same steps as the Pagan world, sees that fatal disease, self-destruction, reappear, and to a greater and more serious extent, and its habits resembling, in so many respects, those of the Greeks of Alcibiades, and the Romans of Augustus." (p. 112.)

Social Influences.

These influences have a very important effect on suicide, and come under consideration in chapter iv. They embrace: (1) Civilization, (2) Religion, (3) Culture and Instruction, (4) Public Morality, (5) Economic Conditions, (6) Political and Psychological Conditions, (7) Population, (8) Urban and City Life.

A few short extracts under some of these heads of inquiry may be found interesting and useful.

1. *Civilization.*

"To our mind it is indisputable that madness and suicide are met with the more frequently *in proportion as civilization progresses*, for the comparative statistics of the last fifty years tend to prove it. . . . Savage peoples do not resort to suicide except under stress of hunger or through fanaticism. . . . Civilized people, on the other hand, have a thousand more motives for it—motives which are caused by psychical (cerebral) needs caused and multiplied by the natural relations of highly organized society." (pp. 117, 118.)

"To those who admit the primary cause of progress and evils to be in the struggle of man with nature and with himself, suicide shows itself what it really is—a social phenomenon inevitable and necessary in the process of civilization." (p. 118.)

The following statement with regard to the effect or consequence of civilization in England, will be to many of my readers somewhat startling, and demands our earnest consideration:—

"Suicide has become more frequent in England since she put herself at the head of European civilization by the great conquest of political and

individual liberty, and gathered in her hands the threads of the commerce of the world." (p. 23.)

That the further a nation advances in civilization the greater should be the proportion of suicides, is a saddening reflection, if true. Yet statistical facts seem to show that such is the case. Why it is so, and whether the fatal connection between civilization and suicide is an inevitable necessity, or whether the fault be not due to defective views of what civilization really is, are questions with which it will be our duty to deal later on.

2. *Religion.*

Under this head of inquiry the results are again surprising.

"In countries of mixed religions, the inclination towards suicide diminishes in direct proportion to the predominance of Catholicism (or Orthodoxy in the Greek or Eastern Church). Looking at the aggregate of statistics [see table iv.] it is inferred that the frequency of suicide is as follows:—

"In States of Catholic religion, average proportion . .	58	per million.
"Protestant States	190	" "
"United or non-united Greek	40	" "
"States of mixed religions .	96	" "
"Jews	48·4	" "

This means, when put into plain language, that the number of suicides amongst adherents of dogmatic forms of religion is far less than amongst those who call themselves Protestants, and points to the fact that dogmatic teaching and forms of faith afford a support for the mind and soul, which is wanting in Protestantism.

Morselli himself offers the following explanation:—

"Protestantism, denying all materialism in external worship, and encouraging free inquiry into dogmas and creeds, is an eminently mystic religion, tending to develop the reflective powers of the mind, and to exaggerate the inward struggles of the conscience. This exercise of the thinking organs, which, when they are weak by nature, is always damaging, renders them yet more sensible and susceptible of morbid impressions." (p. 125.)

Protestantism, in other words, fosters a subjective frame of mind; while Catholicism and Orthodoxy relieve it of anxious inquiry and doubtful speculations, and teach it to rest on the great dogmatic utterances of the Christian Church.

3. *Culture and Instruction.*

These form the chief factors in civilization, and Morselli's conclusions will be to many surprising.

They are not, however, the less significant on that account.

"It is those countries," he says, "which possess a higher standard of general culture, which furnish the largest contingent of voluntary deaths." (p. 131.)

"Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Bavaria, Saxony, Alsace, and Champagne take the lead in popular education, and also in frequency in suicides." (*Ibid.*)

"Saxony, amongst the German countries, is the most advanced as to schools and spread of education, and we have seen already that it was the focus of irradiation of suicide in all Central Europe." (p. 132.)

". . . any country with Protestant inhabitants is always pre-eminent both in instruction and suicide." (*Ibid.*)

"Brouc many years ago asserted that it was possible to deduce the average of voluntary deaths in a given country from the number of pupils in the public schools." (p. 137.)

In the city of New York the proportion of scholars to inhabitants was as 1 to 7, and the number of suicides as 1 to 12; while in Russia the proportion of scholars is as 1 to 367, and the number of suicides as only 1 to 30.

4. *Crime and Suicide.*

As to the connection of crime with suicide, and its effect in producing it, Morselli's statistics do not seem very conclusive. My own opinion, however, formed from observation and my own statistics, is that crime and immorality are amongst the most potent factors in leading to self-destruction.

5. *General Economic Conditions.*

One of the marks of civilization is the perfecting of the industrial arts by science, and the improvement of the general economic conditions of the people. For agriculture, commerce, manufacture, and trade, are, like education and culture, only expressions in detail of what we understand by civilization. We have already seen how education and culture, instead of diminishing the number of suicides, as we might have expected and hoped, only tend to increase it. And, unfortunately, the same seems to be true of any improvement in the economical conditions of mankind. Thus the French departments with the greatest economical development are also most afflicted with voluntary deaths.

"The relation between the number of suicides and the general economic conditions is demonstrated by the continuous growth of the former in the century which, beyond all others, has witnessed the development of commercial relations and the perfecting of the industrial arts by science. It seems as if the character of our epoch is reflected in that phenomenon of social life, namely, psychical aberration; nay, this reflection is such that by the variable average alone of the mad, or suicides, or of criminals, the economic well-being of a year or a country can be determined. The years of agricultural distress and misery, and of financial crises, constantly raise the proportion of mental diseases, and all that causes retrogression in a state or in a class of men is a cause of suicide." (p. 152.)

"Again, the high premium on paper money (in some countries) appears to coincide with a remarkable increase in suicides, such as took place in Austria soon after the Italian war of 1859." (p. 153.)

But is not Morselli guilty of a slight logical inconsistency here? Years of agricultural distress will come, and financial crises will arise from time to time; but surely they can scarcely be regarded as marks of an improvement in the economical conditions of the people, but rather the reverse. They may represent the rebound from an inflated condition of agricultural, commercial, or industrial

prosperity, but can hardly be held to be the direct and legitimate effects of economic improvement. And if it is found that the age which more than any other has witnessed the development of commercial relations and industrial activity, has also been characterized by the continuous growth of suicide, we must be careful of placing the two phenomena in the position of cause and effect, and arguing *post hoc propter hoc.*

Nevertheless, it is no doubt true that dearness of food (in Protectionist countries), want of work, commercial stagnation, bankruptcy, strikes, and lock-outs, all of which are incidental to a state of high economic development, do, by causing privation, poverty, and distress, exercise a very considerable influence on the increase of suicide.

6. *Psychological Conditions.*

Under this head we find, on page 161, a remarkable statement which is at once saddening and significant, if true. After observing that in each historical epoch, civil society has been characterized by some current psychical phase, which has ever had suicide for its ultimate expression, he goes on to say that "for the pantheism and epicurism of the Romans and the Greeks we have

substituted a form of melancholia, a *tædium vitæ* (boredom), which is idealized in *Werther*."

"Our generation, moreover, has arrived at a complete indifference in the matter of religion, without giving sufficient authority to positive philosophy, which would tend to replace it, and without faith in the new moral utilitarianism, on which human society must sooner or later be based. But, meanwhile, sensibility has become refined, while the brain, in almost a constant state of functional excitement, endures with greater damage those sufferings more profound than our fathers knew, and which lead political men of modern times so frequently to the threshold of the asylum and of the jail, or to the morgue."

If this be a true description of modern society in Italy, I would fain hope it is not so in England, and trust it never will be. I do not think it can be said of Englishmen in the present generation, "that they have arrived at a complete indifference in the matter of religion." And God grant it never may be so! If the only substitute for its positive teaching, whether in faith or morals, is to be found in "positive philosophy," or "the new moral utilitarianism," then the outlook is a gloomy one indeed.

It is not these to which we must look for a solid

foundation on which the fabric of human society may be built up in the future; but Christian ethics and Christian Socialism.

7. Population. 8. *Urban and Rural Life.*

With regard to density of population as a determining factor, it appears that suicides are more frequent in the crowded centres of town and city life, than amongst our rural population.

Biological Influences.

1. Sex.

Morselli's statistics under this head are very minute. Suffice it to say that in England the number of suicides amongst men is about three times greater than that amongst women.

2. Age.

"The fatal tendency of brain diseases, and the readiness to commit suicide, increases *with age*, both amongst males and females." (p. 293, note.)

As to suicide amongst children and young people, the following passage is significant:—

"The education which is now given to children assists a premature development in the new generation of the reflective faculties, and of the passions; hence we need not be astonished if in the

towns especially the suicides of young men and young women hardly on the threshold of puberty are constantly multiplying." (p. 224.)

3. Social Conditions.

The statistics as to the relative influence of the various occupations, trades, and professions in producing suicide do not relate to England, and are, therefore, hardly of sufficient interest to reproduce here. The following statement, however, with regard to suicide in the British army is worthy of attention.

From 1862 to 1871 the mortality by suicide was 0·379 per thousand of the forces; and comparing it with that of men between twenty and forty-five years of age, which, during that period was 0·107, we find it of more than *triple* intensity. This intensity, moreover, augmented as time advanced, and even reached 569 per million in 1869, when the total British forces were estimated at 162,000, the actual number of suicides at home and abroad being ninety-two.

On January 1, 1896, the British army, including all forces, amounted to about 650,000, say, $\frac{13}{20}$ths of a million. So that, if the proportion of suicides per million be anything like 500 per annum, the

annual loss would be about 325. Taking the last fifty years, this might easily represent a loss to the nation of an army of 15,000 men.

Physical and Moral Causes of Suicide.

On page 278 we have a table (xxxvi.), containing a list of certain groups of "motives," together with certain statistics for several countries, showing the number of suicides which are attributable to each. Unfortunately, England is not included amongst the countries selected, and therefore the statistics are only of modified interest to us. For it is a remarkable fact that the relative number of suicides in different countries, due to any specific cause, varies considerably.

The list, however, is valuable, apart from statistics, as showing the chief causes which lead to self-destruction.

List of Determining Causes.

(1) *Mental Disorders*, including melancholy, religious scruples or exaltation, political fanaticism.

(2) *Physical Diseases:* painful illnesses—long, desperate and incurable.

(3) *Weariness of Life*, discontent, etc.

(4) *Passions:* crossed love, jealousy, avarice, anger.

(5) *Vices:* libertinism, drunkenness, and alcoholism.

(6) *Afflictions, domestic troubles*, including indignation at reproof, whether just or unjust.

(7) *Financial disorders*, whether caused by loss of employment, or by gambling, reverse of fortune, disappointment, expectations, etc.

(8) *Misery*, and the fear of it; lack of food and work, etc.

(9) *Remorse, shame, fear of condemnation.*

(10) *Despair*, including all cases not included in the preceding categories, and the large number of the "unknown."

On comparing the above list with my own, which is the result of a careful analysis of the cases brought under my own observation, it will be observed that there is a general resemblance between the two, though at the same time points of difference. It will also be observed that my method of classification according to diseases is also different.

Investigation into causes leads us to the conclusion, that in an overwhelming number of cases, suicide is due to some kind of disease, either of

the bodily, mental, or spiritual functions; and that the cases were very rare where a man in perfect health of body, mind, and soul resorts to self-destruction. Where such is the case, the cause will generally come under the heading of "Disorders in the social estate of the individual."

One cause, not to mention others, to which in these modern days of fierce competition a large proportion of suicides must be attributed, namely, overwork and the worry resulting from it, does not find a place in Morselli's category.

I proceed to make a few extracts from Morselli's observations on specific causes; but as my own classification will really bring the same causes again before us, though under a different arrangement, they must be brief.

Tædium Vitæ (Boredom).

"The numerous cases of weariness of life, or nostalgia, discontent with one's own state, disgust for life, fatigue of physical suffering, and lost hope of cure, approach without doubt to the melancholy conditions. In all these a uniform base is found: depression of the sensitive faculties, exaggeration of the egoistical sentiment, perversion of general sensibility, by means of which life is changed into an insuperable load, and all the affections become dead. Antipathy to existence is a real illness of

the brain: it is a morbid modification of the conscience and of the affections which . . . weakens the character and debilitates the moral sense." (p. 283.)

Sorrow and Grief.

"Every excitement caused by grief, whether it is created by the conscience or not, whether it arises from external influences, or from internal sensation, always modifies the physico-chemical condition of the nervous centres; and the change is expressed by the different actions of the functions, which may be by tears, sobs, delirium, religious susceptibility, blasphemy, crime, or suicide, according to the temperament and education of the individual." (p. 286.)

Alcoholism.

Morselli's remarks under this head are very significant.

"The number of violent deaths in France is, according to the works of Lunier, in direct ratio with the consumption of alcohol" (p. 288).

"It seems that the abuse of alcohol is more hurtful than that of wine, and that the alcohol of cider is more hurtful than that of the grape, beetroot, or barley, since in the north of France, where suicide and alcoholic frenzy prevail, the use of spirit and the fermented juice of apples is the most common." (p. 289.)

"In Germany, according to Böttcher, 56 per cent. of the suicides were owing to the use of alcohol." (*Ibid.*)

Injured Affections and Domestic Troubles.

"Injured affections, sufferings of the heart, are the domestic troubles whose influence on suicides is among the most powerful—arising from ill-assorted marriages, from family discord, often from misery which irritates the temper, and is sufficient to extinguish every feeling of affection during the cruel trial which by means of privation it causes individual egoism to endure." (p. 301.)

Morselli does not mention "thwarted affections," but beyond all doubt they are most powerful in their disturbing influence on the mind, and therefore in increasing the annual number of suicides.

There is one great defect, as it seems to me, in Morselli's review of "Causes." It is that he assigns too large a sphere of influences to "general averages," and those social and biological conditions over which the individual has but slight control, and too small an influence to those special causes which, to a large extent, are capable of modification or removal. Thus on page 271 we read—

"Since humanity, as long as the actual conditions remain permanent, must pay its tribute

every year, it is natural that each man quits life from motives peculiar to himself. But these motives or 'causes' are regularly and constantly the same for man or woman, for young or old, for Italian or English, for the physician or the peasant."

And he quotes the theorem of Quetelet and Buckle, that, "Given a certain condition of a social society, a determinate number of individuals must put an end to their own existence." Again—

"Let us observe a little more closely the causes of suicides, and we shall find that they can only be those produced by the law of averages, nature, and differences." (p. 271.)

This, it appears to me, is a somewhat fatalistic and hopeless view to take of the matter. On the contrary, should we not rather regard suicide as we do small-pox, or any other fatal disease? Investigate the causes, and then, exactly as you can alleviate or remove them, you will lessen the number of deaths. For further remarks under this head I must refer my readers to the chapter containing my own analysis of causes.

There is yet another point in his discussion of causes in which I feel unable to agree entirely with Dr. Morselli. It is that he shows a strong

inclination to deny the effect of moral causes, and as a necessary corollary thereto, moral responsibility in respect to the crime of suicide. Thus on page 272 we read—

"The physical causes undoubtedly exclude all individual spontaneity (in the metaphysical sense). . . . The very existence of so many actions *not free* renders questionable also the spontaneity of those caused by presumed 'moral causes,' amongst which, after diligent inquiry, we can find none which might not be reduced to morbid modification of the mind."

And again, page 273—

"We believe, that, if it were possible to know exactly the physiological temperament of all self-destroyers, and, above all, the hereditary transmission, direct or indirect, of the morbid germs, we should be able to trace back the fatal determination of their last act to its true and efficient cause."

This, I need hardly point out, is the language, and these are the views, of the physiological psychologist. The subject has already been discussed at some length, and I will do no more now than enter my respectful but earnest protest against views which are destructive of all moral

responsibility, and make the personal soul of man the slave of cerebral automatism.[1]

Children and Suicide.

"Those who think that (children) and adolescents are urged on to this act by frivolous causes, err in the sense that these causes make as much impression on the mind, and excite the brain matter of a child, as much as strong passion in the case of a young man, or a chronic malady of an old one.

"The education which is now given to children assists the precocious development of the reflective faculties, of vanity, and of the desires." (p. 307.)

The Relative Proportion of Suicides amongst Males and Females.

Morselli states (p. 298) that "only a fourth or fifth of the suicides are committed by women." In England, however, the proportion is as much as one-third.

[1] The subject of sub-conscious and involuntary action opens a wide and intricate field of inquiry. Doubtless many of the functions of body and mind are of the sub-conscious and involuntary order, and so far are the result of cerebral automatism. In some cases, too, the idea of suicide appears to arise suddenly, uncalled for, and unpremeditated, and the individual seems drawn, as by an evil spirit, to obey the impulse. But these cases must be regarded as exceptional and abnormal, and not as invalidating the facts of free-will and moral responsibility.

Tædium Vitæ.

"Tædium vitæ"—or, as Schopenhauer calls it, boredom—"is a suffering, even the characteristic negative suffering, of privileged races and classes, among whom there are suicides even in the midst of all the gifts of fortune, and apparently without any cause of suffering, so that those who are wearied would appear to wish to fly from the monotony of existence by artificially exciting their own sensibilities." (p. 299.)

CHAPTER VI.

MORSELLI ON THE NATURE AND THERAPEUTICS OF SUICIDE.

Morselli on "The Nature and Therapeutics of Suicide," Part II.—Suggestions: (1) Malthusian method; (2) Social conditions; (3) Formation of moral character—Elementary education in Board Schools with regard to the formation of character—The religious difficulty--A suggestion—The formation of Christian character.

IN the second part of his book, Morselli discusses "The Nature and Therapeutics of Suicide," but we must not follow him further than to ascertain what he has to propose by way of remedial or preventive measures. It is almost needless to say that these are such, and no more, than we might expect from one who regards the subject from the point of view of the physiological psychologist.

As he holds suicide to be the result of failure in the battle of life in consequence of the competition caused by the excessive multiplication of combatants, the sole preventive against madness

and suicide would consist in diminishing the struggle for life amongst men. And for the attainment of this desirable end he makes the following suggestions.

1. *The Adoption of the Malthusian Method.*

"How is it possible," he asks, "to diminish the struggle for life, except by a method as difficult to put in practice as it is badly received in general, if only utterance is given it—we mean by checking the excessive multiplying of combatants?"

2. *Improvement of Social Conditions.*

Recognizing the utter hopelessness of the first and direct remedy, Morselli concludes that—

"we must content ourselves with the indirect, that is to say, with those means which ameliorate the conditions of the struggle for existence, and tend to neutralize the inequality placed by nature between the various combatants." (p. 373.)

With this conclusion there are few who will not agree.

3. *Formation of Moral Character.*

This is the third and last remedy which Morselli has to propose.

"The whole cure," he says, "is preventive, and is contained in this one precept—

"To develop in man the power of well-ordered sentiments and ideas, by which to reach a certain aim in life: in short, *to give force and energy to the moral character*.

"When we speak of development of character we mean, to put into operation the best system of education, the improving the moral condition of the proletariat classes, the moderation of egotistical tendency, the bridling of the passions. Misery, intemperance, dissoluteness, are powerful causes of weakness, and consequently of suicide. . . . It is certain that suicide will diminish amongst civilized peoples only by establishing a balance between individual needs and social utility; when, that is to say, each one will act with a view to the association of all the powers, vital, intellectual, and moral, and when in the struggle for life every man will carry in his conscience the feeling of duty, which is that of sacrificing his own egoism to the well-being of the whole race." (p. 374.)

These are noble words, and wise words, and true. But do they go to the root of the matter? True, the formation of sound moral character is the only real remedy. But what, we may be permitted to ask, are the materials which Morselli points out to us for the formation of such character? Let us hear what he has to say on this point.

"Religion and morals have never reached the root of the calamity; they were ignorant of its growth, and therefore the really essential element to undertake the only cure possible was wanting, that of prophylactics. Sociology, on the contrary, teaches us what are the true psychological and social characteristics of suicide, explains its mechanism to us, and can put us on the right road better than any speculative discipline to prevent and cure this fatal tendency of civilized society. To science alone will belong in future the functions of regulator and moderator of public morals." (pp. 371, 372.)

It is not quite clear in what sense Morselli uses the word science in this passage, seeing that science merely means knowledge; and therefore there must be a science of every subject of which we are ignorant. I suppose, however, he means the science which commonly goes by that name, namely, natural and physiological science. But I respectfully ask if the claims herein set forth on behalf of sociology and science can be assented to without demur by those who have not yet quite lost faith in a revealed religion?—nay, by philosophers and metaphysicians, who recognize in the personal soul of man facts and problems which neither sociology nor science can either fathom or explain? Sociology, doubtless, is a most useful

branch of human knowledge. It has helped us much in the past, and can help us still more in the future; but to assert that sociology is to be the regenerator of society, and science the regulator and moderator—or, in other words, the teacher and arbiter—of public morals, is to make too large a draft on our credulity.

True, the formation of moral character is the true remedy. But what is character? Character is the expression or reflex of personality.[1] A man is what his character is. It is clear, then, that before we can arrive at a really satisfactory knowledge of what character is, or should be, we must know something about personality in its relation to character.

Personality, we have been told, "is the name of the unity in which all a man's attributes and functions meet, making him an individual self."

Mr. Illingworth, in his *Treatise on Personality Human and Divine*, says (p. 41)—

[1] Greek χαρακτήρ (from χαράσσω, to cut, or engrave), which denotes the impress or stamp on coins, seals, etc., and then, metaphorically, the mark or token impressed on a person or thing, by which it is distinguished from others; in a word, its character. So letters are still called characters, because they were originally cut or engraved in stone or other material. A man's character, then, to follow out the metaphor, is the stamp or engraving impressed or cut on the surface of his personality.

"The chief attributes of personality are: individuality, self-consciousness, self-determination (free-will), love, and, as the result of their interaction, character."

Other students in this field of inquiry have stated the chief features or attributes of human personality to be four in number:[1]

(1) Reason.
(2) Conscience.
(3) Will.
(4) Love.

A good character is that wherein these functions are working in an orderly, healthy manner, with reference to the proper objects of their regard.

Is the reason exercising itself in the pursuit of truth and knowledge? Is the still small voice of conscience listened to and obeyed? Is the will free to choose that which reason and conscience declare to be right and good? Is the love, or affection, free to attach itself to those objects of beauty and goodness which are best worthy of its regard?

Where this is the case, there we have the good character.

[1] See also p. 54, where Self-consciousness is given as the first attribute in addition to the above four.

But the importance of personality in respect to character is still further evident when we come to consider the question of duty, in regard for which good character may be said chiefly to consist.

"Duty," according to Morselli, "is the sacrificing of a man's own egoism to the well-being of the whole race." Again I ask, Is this a sufficient and satisfactory definition of duty? If, indeed, we are to look to "a sense of duty" as affording the strongest safeguard against suicide, then it becomes a matter of the highest importance to ascertain what duty means for man, in its truest and most constraining form.

What is duty, then? It is something that I owe to myself and other persons. But who are those to whom I owe it? Morselli says, "those persons with whom I am brought into social relationship of one sort or another." Or, in other words, the sense of duty, like character, is the product of Socialism.

I ask, Is this an adequate conception of duty? Surely not.

If duty be that which my personality owes to other personalities, we must first ascertain who those personalities are. And as theists and Christians, we shall at once reply, There are two—the Divine and human.

Without entering into theological subtilties regarding the Trinity, we acknowledge, first, the Divine Personality of God, and secondly, whether in the individual or collective form, we are aware of the personality of man. And an adequate sense of duty for me means, not merely what I owe to the personality of my fellow-man, which we call social morality, but what I owe also to the Divine Personality of God, which constitutes morality in the only complete sense of the word. To us as Christians there can be no escape from this position, for to deny or ignore the Divine Personality is at once to become atheists or agnostics.

We have seen now what character is. It is the stamp or impress on my personality, made by the four chief attributes of that personality—reason, conscience, will, and love. And we have seen, in the second place, what duty is. It is the discharge of those obligations which the relation of my personality to that of others, whether human or Divine, entails upon me.

As the impress varies through the action of the several attributes, so does the character. And it is good or bad according as the debt of obligation is paid or not.

To apply these principles to the formation of

character, and especially to train the young in the knowledge and practice of them, is essentially the work and office of the Church of Christ.

The State cannot do it, even if it would ; for this reason, that Religion is the only foundation of sound morality, and it is not the function of the State to teach Religion.

But though the State cannot do this, it takes great interest in education, of which there is no more important part than the formation of the character ; it is therefore bound in duty to afford all possible facilities that it may be done. But can we say this is the case ?

The education of the young is falling year by year more and more into the hands of School Boards, and the State has been content to leave the teaching of religion and morality entirely to their discretion, making one condition only : that the recognized and accredited teachers of religion shall on no account be permitted to enter the school ! Can this be right ? Have we any guarantee that this important work of the formation of moral character is going forward in our Board Schools ? He would be a bold man who would say it was ; and yet it is a terrible misfortune for the rising generation, and the future of

this country, if it is not. In some instances the work may be going on, but in others, it certainly is not. At any rate, we have no security afforded that it shall be. School Boards are not fond of inquiries into moral and religious teaching. They much prefer, as a rule, to leave the matter in the hands of their teacher, and what he is, whether Christian, Unitarian, or Agnostic, such will his teaching be.

We must remember that for Christendom the formation of character must mean nothing less than the Christian character. And to suppose that this can be effected by reading a few chapters out of the Bible without comment, and learning a few isolated texts of Scripture, only betrays the ignorance of those who entertain such an idea.

Doubtless the religious difficulty in Board Schools, owing to sectarian strife and jealousy, is very great. But is there really no way out of it, except by sacrificing the very highest interests of those who come to be educated ? I venture to think there is. Look how the difficulty has been overcome in Switzerland. There the religious differences, if less numerous, are equally pronounced ; but for all that, a solution of the difficulty has been found by permitting the recognized

teachers of each Denomination to instruct the children of that denomination in religion and morality. And if this plan is found to succeed in Switzerland, as I am credibly informed by one who was educated in one of the Cantonal Schools of Geneva, it does, why should it not succeed in England? At any rate, the experiment is worth a trial, for it seems to present the only practical solution of the religious difficulty.[1] It must be borne in mind that State education will never be more than secular, and secular education does not

[1] It would seem, from some remarks made by Sir J. Gorst, Vice-President of the Council, in his speech in the House of Commons on Feb. 27th, 1899, respecting the Northampton School dispute, that the only real obstacle which stands in the way of the above solution is caused by the Nonconformists themselves. The following are his words, as quoted in the *Standard* of Feb. 28th, 1899:—"In 1896 the Government tried to induce the House of Commons to assent to a real Conscience Clause, which would have allowed children not only to be withdrawn from the religious instruction, but would allow them to have *such religious instruction as their parents approved of*. Who opposed that clause? *It was bitterly opposed by the Nonconformist party*, who now complained of the inefficacy of the existing Conscience Clause." Why should they oppose such a solution, so tolerant and impartial? Was the real reason a secret fear that they themselves would not be able to take advantage of it? And shall we have to confess, to our shame and sorrow, that such is the rancour and bitterness of sectarian jealousy, here in Christian England, amongst the professed followers of Christ, that if the Denominations cannot, or will not, impart religious instruction to their own children in the Board Schools, they are resolved that *no other religious body shall do so for theirs?* If this be the true explanation, we are compelled to ask, almost in despair, "Where, then, is the Spirit of Christ?"

contain the necessary elements and conditions for the formation of character in the higher sense of the word. This must ever be the work of the Christian Churches, and theirs alone. The State cannot do it, but it can at any rate afford facilities that it shall be done by those whose proper duty it is to do it.

The words of Canon Gore, on the importance of the formation of character as the strongest deterrent to suicide, are so weighty and apposite, that I venture to reproduce them below.[1]

[1] "Everywhere the duty to God is as primæval, as original, a part of human nature as any other department of duty. Each develops as man acquires better knowledge of himself, better knowledge of society, of social ideals, and better knowledge of what God is, by experience, by further thought, by the deliverance of prophets; but all together form part of the original equipment of our human nature, of the original equipment of conscience. Of course, if you look lower down in the race of history, you see plainly enough that wherever you get a high morality, it altogether arises beyond what is required by our duty to ourselves and our duty to our neighbours. It rises up and realizes itself in relation to God in its secret heart. You cannot even conceive of applying to St. Paul, to Francis of Assisi, to Luther, to any of the noblest of our race—most of all, you cannot conceive applying to the Son of man—the idea that duty is limited by what we owe to ourselves and what we owe to our fellow-men. If you penetrate but a little way beneath the surface of our nature, there in our secret heart is the claim of God for a moral purity which altogether transcends any outward sign—the purity of heart. We owe purity of heart to ourselves, indeed; but to ourselves only because we are face to face with God, Who is holier and higher than we; with God, before Whom we lie naked and open, and with Whom we have to do. Take an ordinarily good man in great misery, and when he is beset with incurable sickness: he is tempted to suicide. He might easily

Moreover, the truth of these words becomes still more evident if we will be at the trouble to consider how this Christian character is to be formed and maintained.

(1) It is the result of imitation: the copy of a Life the purest and noblest which the world has ever seen.

(2) It is the effect and product of a Divine indwelling.

The model on which it is framed is the Life of the Incarnate Son of God. Its secret and sustaining power is His Presence within the heart of His followers, whereby His Life is reproduced in them, an imitation and an indwelling. These are the two mainsprings of the Christian's moral character. It is nothing short of a moral and spiritual

commit it, so that no man, none of his fellow-men, should know how he had died. Why will he not do it? It is because he knows himself in relation to God, Who has given him his life, and Who alone can rightly deprive him of this mortal life of his. Depend upon it, if for a very little while the sense of our relation to God were to vanish from any great part of the human race, there would be—what at times, and in our own time there have already been indications of—an extraordinary increase in the sin of suicide, an extraordinary increase in those sins which have no obvious bearing upon social well-being, which, on the merely social point of view, may be argued about one way or another, but which are inexorably forbidden then and then only—when we realize that we are in relation to a God Who demands truth and purity of heart, and for Whom and to Whom alone we are responsible for our life."

transformation; and to effect this transformation the Son of God became the Son of man, that on the plane of human experience He might afford us an example, brought down to the level of the humblest comprehension, of what the human character should be.

Touched by a Divine compassion for human sin and sorrow, He bade all to come to Him: "Come unto Me, all that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." But why should they go to Him? That they might learn of Him as the Teacher come from God. "Take my yoke upon you, and learn of Me." Copy My example, obey My precepts, for in so doing you shall find that which you so greatly need—"rest for your souls."

And if we turn to the example of Christ, which was in truth the expression of the character of Christ, what do we find it to be?

We find it was dominated by a twofold desire:

(1) To work for God.

(2) To suffer in submission to His will.

First action: "I must work the works of Him Who hath sent Me while it is day; the night cometh, when no man can work."

Then suffering: "I came not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me." "The

cup which My Father hath given Me, shall I not drink it?"

Such were the two constraining sentiments of which the character of Jesus was the expression. And the true Christian's character must ever be framed on the same model, must be the embodiment of the same conviction of duty. First to work for God, and then to suffer in patient submission to His will. And in learning of Jesus to live His life of benevolent activity and patient endurance is to be found the secret of His promise, "And I will give you rest."

How many a self-destroyer would have been kept from the fatal abyss had he not been too proud to learn. And how often is the suicide's death but the final result of an ill-informed, ill-regulated, and unchastened moral character, prompting its owner to say, "I will not work for God, Who has sent me here;" or, "I will not bear this cross of trial and suffering He has laid upon Me." Had that man's character been built up from childhood on the recognition of the duty of doing the will of God, he would not have drifted into that vicious course of self-indulgence and sin which has ended in making his life intolerable. Had this young woman been taught to recognize

the duty of patient endurance and submission when God calls us to endure pain or loss, she would not in a moment of petulance and rebellion have rushed on her own undoing.

Yes, and many a storm-tossed, ship-wrecked soul would have made a fair voyage across the sea of life, and reached at length the haven of rest, which Jesus speaks of, had he only been humble enough "to learn" of Him.

But the Christian, or Christlike character is more than an imitation or copy of the example of Christ. It is the product of a Divine indwelling, even of Him Who left us His example that we should follow His steps.

"Without (apart from) Me, ye can do nothing." And that His followers might never be without Him, He promised them His perpetual Presence through the Holy Spirit, and the Sacrament of His Body and Blood.

We cannot believe that true moral character will ever be learned in the school of Comte or Huxley. On the contrary, we maintain that the only school for its formation is that over which Jesus Christ—the Divine Psychiatrist, the great Physician of souls—presides. That school is the Catholic Church, the academy of applied

metaphysics for the people. Sociology and science may do much in providing the remedy we seek; but in themselves they are insufficient. They need to be supplemented by Christian Socialism as the only basis of a sound and progressive sociology, and by the Christian religion as the only permanent foundation of morals.

CHAPTER VII.

COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF CASES.

THE Registrar-General's Returns in regard to suicide are defective in one respect, in that while they state the methods adopted for terminating life, together with the numbers attributed to each, there is no attempt made to ascertain the various causes. The defect, perhaps, is one which could not easily be remedied, seeing the difficulty there is in many cases of ascertaining the cause. If, however, it could be remedied, the value of the returns from a moral and social point of view would be considerably enhanced. For it is perfectly evident that, if anything is to be done towards abating the crime of suicide which is so rife in our midst, it must be done by attacking, and either removing or at least mitigating, the causes which lead to it. A knowledge of those causes, then, is absolutely necessary.

I cannot for one moment adopt those fatalistic notions which some writers on suicide have done: that it is an evil inherent in, and inseparable from, large communities of men; as though it were one of the laws of nature, that a certain percentage of deaths must be due to self-destruction. I would much prefer to regard suicides in precisely the same light as I would any other form of disease, such as cholera or small-pox; namely, that they are all due to specific causes, which it is at once the duty and the glory of science and philanthropy to discover and remove. Small-pox is not now the scourge which once it was, owing to the discovery of vaccination. It is now many years since we had a visitation of cholera, because the laws of sanitation are now better understood and observed.

I hold, then, that the only method by which we can hope to reduce the mortality due to suicide is by removing or mitigating the causes which lead to it. A knowledge of these causes, therefore, is the first thing necessary. And as the Registrar-General's Returns do not afford any assistance in this respect, I have endeavoured to supply the defect, in a partial and imperfect manner it may be, by collecting, analyzing, and classifying one

hundred cases of suicide, or attempted suicide, as they were reported in such daily newspapers as I had access to.

With regard to these cases I will merely observe, that I have not selected them from among others, but taken them just as they came, only rejecting those in which the cause was either misstated, or unknown. The collection of these hundred cases was, alas! neither a lengthy nor difficult matter, a single newspaper—usually *The Standard*—sometimes containing no less than three or four cases. But the analysis and classification has been by no means so easy a task. If sometimes the case did not seem to admit of doubt, at others, it appeared only possible to surmise the nature of its chief contributory cause.

With regard to the system of classification I have adopted, my observations have shown me that it is only when men fall into trouble and distress of mind, body, or estate, that they think of and have recourse to a violent and unnatural death. And it is this undeniable fact which first suggested to me the arrangement of the cases under the four headings of bodily, mental, psychical and social or domestic disorders. And I think I may say that I have not met with one case

which may not easily be classed under one or other of these categories.

This arrangement, moreover, consorts well with the ulterior object we have in view, which is not only to discover the causes, but also the possibility of removing or alleviating them by the application of such remedies as Christianity and Christian Socialism can supply.

I should also observe that the cases I have collected embrace not only suicides, but cases of attempted though ineffectual suicide. My reason for doing this is because, regarded from a moral and religious point of view, an attempted suicide is to all intents and purposes much the same as one in which the attempt has been successful. It is only accident or ignorance, or, perhaps, fear which frustrated the intention at the last moment.

For another reason it is desirable that this coupling together of suicides and attempted suicides in my table of collected cases should be borne in mind.

The Registrar-General's Returns gave us the number of actual deaths through suicide in England in 1897 as 2792. But supposing his returns had embraced all the cases of attempted suicide during the same period, what would the

total have been? Probably not much less than four thousand. If, then, it should be desired to make use of my table and analysis for ascertaining approximately how many people are brought to that awful condition in which a violent death seems preferable to life, through any specific cause, the number which corresponds with it must be multiplied not by 27·92,[1] but probably by not less than forty. Thus, for example, the percentage of suicides shown in Table III. as due to alcoholism is thirteen. Multiply this by forty, and we get 520 as the approximate number of suicides and attempted suicides caused by drink in England in a single year.

It must also be borne in mind that the gravity of specific causes, and the extent to which they are operative in the great social body, is by no means to be gauged by the number of cases in which they urge their victims to self-destruction. The roll of suicide only gives us the extreme cases. But the same causes are operating only in a less degree in the sad experience of thousands of our suffering fellow-creatures. Happily, the same remark holds good of whatever remedial measures may be adopted with a view to reduce the annual

[1] *I.e.* one per cent. of 2792.

TABLE III.—DISEASES AND DISORDERS RESULTING IN SUICIDE.

Class I. Of the Body—Physical.		Class II. Of the Mind—Mental and Nervous.		Class III. Of the Soul—Moral and Psychical.		Class IV. Of the Estate—Social and Domestic.		Total of all classes.	
Specific nature of causes.	Total.	Specific nature of causes.	Total.	Specific nature of causes.	Total.	Specific nature of causes.	Total.		
(a) Cancer ... 4 (a) Other incurable ailments ... 6		(a) Neurasthenia, nervous collapse, and mental depression	7	(a) Alcoholism ... 13 *Love of Money.*		(a) *Love Affairs*— Disappointment, jealousy, and despair ...	4	Class I. 18 ,, II. 19 ,, III. 46 ,, IV. 17	
(b) Influenza ... 2		(b) Worry and overwork		(b) Betting, gambling, and speculation... 5					
(c) Prostration caused by hot weather 2		(c) Want of employment	1	(c) Forgery ... ... 1 (d) Dishonesty ... 2		(b) *Family Affairs*— Domestic unhappiness, poverty, and trouble ...	4		
(d) Insomnia 2		(d) Boredom (tædium vitæ)		*Debauchery and Lust.*					
(e) Overtaxing of physical energies in athletics ... 1		(e) Wanton contempt of life	3 1	(e) Connubial infidelity, fornication, and adultery ... 9		(c) *Money Affairs*— Financial troubles Borrowing ...	6 3		
(f) Loss of sight ... 1		(f) Suicidal mania ...	5	(f) Bigamy ... ... 1 (g) Dissipation ... 1					
				Ungoverned Passion.					
				(h) Frenzy and quarrels 4					
				(i) Malice and scandal 3					
				Other Crimes.					
				(j) Murder 3					
				(k) Burglary ... and felony ... 2					
				(l) Loss of character 2					
Total ...	18		19		46		17		100

number of suicides in our midst. We shall be ministering not to them only, but to that *vast multitude* whom sin and sorrow and suffering may at any moment urge over the precipice.

In proceeding to analyze the contents of the above table, we must remember, in the first place, that, in the great majority of cases, the causes so called are not immediate but indirect. In many cases of mental disease—such as suicidal mania—the unhappy sufferer has ceased to be responsible for his actions, and unable to give any reason for them. In other cases of vicious indulgence and excess, there has ensued such a deterioration and weakening of brain and nerve tissue, that the victim becomes morally, mentally, and physically unable to endure the strain and burthen of life, even though there be nothing unusually severe in either of them. In the great majority of cases, however, the action of the cause has been different. It has become operative through the moral sentiments or mental emotions it has called forth.

Thus, on the one hand, acute bodily disease and pain, injured affections, domestic and family troubles, failure in the struggle of life, beget *impatience* and *despair*, which urge their victim to self-destruction. On the other hand, the causes under

Class III., consisting of moral and physical disorders, vices, and crimes, for the most part produce their effect through the sentiment of *fear*—fear of disgrace and punishment.

It appears, then, that where the suicide is accountable for his act, it is probable that he has been driven thereto by one of three sentiments, either—

(1) Disappointment at failure in obtaining some desired object.

(2) Despair, which seems to shut out all chance of recovery.

(3) Fear, which makes him choose death, of which he knows nothing, rather than face the discovery and consequence of his guilt.

But though the causes which lead to suicide are not final, but become effective through the emotions they produce in the mind, they are not the less on that account to be regarded as the true operating causes. So long as they remain, so long will they produce those morbid states of mind—disappointment, despair, fear—which eventuate in self-destruction. And it is only by severing this connection, that is, by removing, or at least mitigating, the causes—bodily, mental, psychical, and social—that we can hope to reduce the annual death-roll through suicide. Moreover, it is this consideration which

sets our feet in the true path of discovery, if we would find a satisfactory remedy. No system of therapeutics, we may be sure, will be of any avail which does not prove itself equal to grapple with the various classes of concrete causes which are enumerated above.

One fact which seems to emerge from my analysis will hardly fail to surprise my readers, as it certainly surprised me. I allude to the extraordinary preponderance of suicides under Class III. arising from moral and psychical disorders. Thus, while domestic and social disorders are responsible for 17 per cent., bodily and physical disorders for 18, and mental and nervous disorders for 19 per cent.; no less than 46 per cent., or nearly one-half, are due directly or indirectly to moral and psychical causes. This fact, to my mind, is one of the greatest significance, as I shall endeavour to show when we come to consider the scope and influence of Christian therapeutics.

There is yet another fact of the utmost significance brought out by my analysis, to which, in passing, I desire to call my readers' attention. It is the large percentage of suicides due to alcoholism. Amongst the special single causes this stands *facile princeps*. While all bodily diseases together

are chargeable with 18 per cent., and all social and domestic disorders with 17 per cent., this *alone* produces no less than 13 per cent. The reason of this fatal pre-eminence, and the means to be adopted for its reduction, we shall have to consider later on.

"The wages of sin is death," says an apostle. And is not the truth of the statement abundantly corroborated by the contents of Class III. in the above table? Nay, if the apostle had never said anything of the kind, have we not here enough to prove it? Yes, in these mournful returns the veil is lifted which shrouds the lives of thousands, and we seem to catch sight of the hydra-headed monster Sin, preying upon the vitals of men, poisoning the secret springs of life, and blasting with its deadly virus the bodies and souls of its hapless victims!

In several of the cases above tabulated, letters had been written, intended to be read after the writer had carried out his purpose of self-destruction. And some of these are of a very pathetic and significant character. They come to us almost as voices from the dead. They are the last despairing cry of men and women for whom, it may have been through their own fault, life has proved a failure. They disclose sometimes the motive which

led the writer to commit the rash act; sometimes the awful misery which rendered life no longer tolerable; sometimes the dread of shame and punishment; or, lastly, the false notions entertained as to the moral aspect of suicide. They speak of ruined fortunes, of disappointed hopes, of blighted reputations. They raise the veil, as we have said, though it be for a moment, which is cast over the surface of society, and throw a lurid glare on what is going on beneath in the private life, in the domestic circle, and the social experience of thousands.

As forming typical examples of some of the causes enumerated in the above table, I shall have occasion to refer to them more particularly hereafter.

CHAPTER VIII.

CHRISTIAN THERAPEUTICS.

SECTION I.: *Bodily and Mental Diseases.*

SECTION II.: *Moral and Psychical Diseases.*—Sin the disease of the soul—Christ the Physician of Souls—The Church a spiritual infirmary and school of character, in respect of (1) Intellect, (2) Will, (3) Conscience, (4) Love—Christ's method—The Church and intemperance—Effects of alcohol on body and mind—Testimony of experts—Are Christians doing their duty? Need for legislation.

SECTION III.: *Disorders arising from social or economic conditions and domestic surroundings; love affairs, and miscarriage of affection.*—Money affairs—Borrowing—Duty of Christians with respect to social and industrial problems.

SECTION I.

With reference to Cases in Classes I. and II.—Bodily and Mental Diseases.

"AND Jesus went about all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom, and healing all manner of disease, and all manner of sickness among the people.

"And they brought unto Him all that were sick, holden with divers diseases and torments, possessed with devils, and epileptic, and palsied; and He healed them." (St. Matt. iv. 23, 24.)

This passage, occurring in one of the biographies of Jesus, the Prophet of Galilee, discloses to us the view which He Himself took of His mission to mankind, and the way He went about performing it. He came to heal the diseases of men: diseases of the body and mind as well as the soul; wherever He found sorrow, suffering, and distress, there to exercise His healing power.[1]

Yes. It is impossible to say that Jesus left any doubt in the minds of His followers as to the nature and objects of His mission amongst men. "The Son of man," He told them, "is come to seek and to save that which was lost;"[2] to show Himself, in short, the Lover and Friend of mankind. He came and found them ignorant of the way of life, so He taught them, saying, "I am the way, the truth, and the life."[3] He found them sick and sorrowful; so He came to heal their sicknesses, and comfort their sorrows, saying, "Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest."[4] Nor did He restrict Himself to words of comfort and doctrine

[1] Gr. *θεραπένων πᾶσαν νόσον* (St. Matt. iv. 23). Hence the origin of Christian Therapeutics. And our Anglo-Saxon forefathers, in the language quoted above, call Jesus Se Hœlend, "*The Healer.*"

[2] St. Luke xix. 10. [3] St. John xiv. 6.

[4] St. Matt. xi. 28.

only. His whole life from first to last was one consistent expression of that Divine love which was the ruling sentiment of His soul.

"To Him no form of human suffering appealed in vain. Miracle after miracle in His wondrous history tells of His compassion and pity for sickness and sorrow and pain. To express that never-failing sympathy it is said of Him, 'Himself took our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses.'"[1]

And, further on, in the same biography, we read how, having called together His twelve disciples,[2] and given them "authority over unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to heal all manner of disease, and all manner of sickness," Jesus sent them forth, and charged them to preach, saying, "The kingdom of heaven is at hand. Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out devils: freely ye received, freely give."[3]

Now, if the former passage reveals to us the view which Jesus of Nazareth took of His own mission, this latter passage discloses with equal clearness the mission He committed to His chosen followers. It was nothing less than to carry forward His work of loving self-sacrifice, and, like Him, and in His name, to dispense to mankind the

[1] Dean Church, *Pascal and other Sermons*, p. 236.
[2] "Leorning-cnihtun," A.S. Version. [3] St. Matt. x. 1, 7, 8.

healing medicines of the soul. "Freely ye received: freely give." Jesus was the great Psychiatrist. His twelve apostles He constituted His delegates and assistants. But in giving them their commission—an act which He solemnly repeated on a later occasion, when He said, "As My Father hath sent Me, even so send I you"—He stamped with an indelible and perpetual impress the character of that Society which it was evidently His intention to form, and of which the apostles were only the nucleus and representatives. That society is the Catholic Church, and upon that Church, and upon every faithful member of it, rests the responsibility—should we not rather say the privilege?—of ministering to the manifold diseases and sicknesses of men.

Repudiating the somewhat fatalistic notion that suicide is a kind of social necessity, an inevitable, although a lamentable, form in which the debt we all owe to nature is in a certain percentage of cases paid; and believing, as I do, that in the great majority of cases, it is due to specific forms of disease[1] and sickness, whether of mind, body, or

[1] "Disease" originally meant nothing more than "trouble," or distress. This is evident from its use in the Genevan version of St. Mark v. 35: "Thy daughter is dead; why *diseasest* thou the Master any further?"

estate, the first question we have to ask is this, namely, "How do these specific causes, these various forms of disease and sickness, fall within the range of Christian therapeutics?"

In the last chapter, I endeavoured to show that the causes of suicide may be summarized under four general classes:

(1) Bodily diseases.

(2) Mental disorders.

(3) Spiritual and moral ailments.

(4) Disorders of the estate, in which are included personal, social, and domestic troubles.

Let us proceed, then, by taking the various classes in the above order, and consider in each case what remedy or alleviation can be derived from Christian therapeutics.

First Class of Causes.

Diseases and Disorders of the Body.

(*a*) Cancer, and other incurable ailments.

(*b*) Physical prostration, caused by hot weather.

(*c*) By influenza, neuralgia, etc.

(*d*) Insomnia.

(*e*) Overtaxing of the physical energies in athletics, etc.

(*f*) Loss of sight.

Some of the cases which have come under my notice in this class are inexpressibly sad, and call for our sincerest sympathy. What could be more touching than the following extracts from a letter left by one of these sufferers, and addressed to the Coroner?—

No. 1.—"My weak eyes are the cause of my suicide, and I fear to become a burthen to others. . . . My feet are trembling. I feel I am going to do wrong, but it must be done. It is my last effort in this world."

Or this—

No. 100.—"No friends in the world. I have lost my sight—my all. May the Lord forgive me!"[1]

(*a*) *Cancer and other Incurable Diseases.*—Unfortunately, these are cases in which human sympathy and Christian therapeutics are able to afford but little relief. At present they are beyond the reach of medical skill, and the knowledge of this fact produces in some cases that condition of

[1] The following note is appended to this case:—"The jury considered that deceased committed suicide whilst of sound mind, and returned a verdict of *Felo de se*. This is the first verdict of the kind that has been returned in the West London District during the whole time Mr. Drew has been in office."—Date, Oct. 10th, 1898.

impatience and despair which urges the sufferer to terminate his sufferings by self-destruction.

But is there nothing which can be done in this class of cases, if not in actually removing pain and suffering, at least in strengthening the patient to endure them? Has the Great Physician no prescription for such as these? Is there no ministration of mercy for them entrusted to His ministers? Surely we may not say this. Whose accents are those we hear in "The Order for the Visitation of the Sick"?

"Dearly beloved, know this, that Almighty God is the Lord of life and death, and of all things to them pertaining, as youth, strength, health, age, weakness, and sickness. Wherefore . . . know you certainly, that if you truly repent you of your sins, and bear your sickness patiently, . . . submitting yourself wholly unto His will, it shall turn to your profit, and help you forward in the right way that leadeth unto everlasting life. . . . And there should be no greater comfort to Christian persons, than to be made like unto Christ by suffering patiently adversities, troubles, and sicknesses."

What is all this but the voice of Jesus speaking through His Church, and calling His brethren to "take up their cross and follow Him" along the path which will bring them at last to eternal joy?

Then, again, there is the comfort springing from the assurance of that earnest sympathy with suffering in all its forms, which Jesus ever displayed, and in which it is the bounden duty of His members collectively and individually to resemble Him.

Let me only know that in my sufferings and privations I am not alone; that others, whom I know not, are sympathizing with me, and ready to help me if they could; that I am not forgotten in their daily prayers before the mercy-seat of God. Let me only know this, I say, and I shall feel comforted and strengthened under my heavy trials.

And is not such indeed the case?

You, dear brother, are not alone or forgotten. Day by day, in solemn litany and intercession, the prayer goes up for you with "all who are any ways afflicted in mind, body, or estate," that you may be "comforted and relieved;" that "patience may be given you under your sufferings, and a happy issue out of all your afflictions."[1] Or, again, when the great Commemorative Sacrifice is offered, think not that you are forgotten. "And we most humbly beseech Thee of Thy goodness, O Lord, to comfort

[1] "Prayer for all Conditions of Men," in Book of Common Prayer.

and succour all them who in this transitory life are in trouble, sorrow, need, sickness, or any other adversity." [1]

Thus are the merits of Christ's Sacrifice pleaded in your behalf. And surely in these expressions of sympathy by His Church Christ Himself is ministering to human woe.

There is yet one more consideration which surely should prove comforting and helpful in such cases as we are now considering. It is that which is suggested by the moral discipline of pain.

Great indeed is the mystery of pain. How can we reconcile it with the existence of a Being all-powerful and loving? We know not. But, mysterious though it be, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that pain has its beneficent as well as its awful and mysterious side. Full often, as we know, it is the result and Nemesis of our own misdeeds; and then it serves as the flaming beacon to warn others from the hidden rocks and shoals of sin. But sometimes the connection between sin and suffering is not so easy to trace, and then it is when men are tempted to seek deliverance in self-destruction. But pause a moment, brother, if such a thought has ever crossed your mind, and hear

[1] "Prayer for the Church Militant."

what has been said by one whose words should carry weight.[1]

"Our experience tells us that pain, though so terrible, is one of the most salutary—in the end the most beneficent—of the conditions of our nature and state here. It does not account for its mysterious presence, but it reconciles the wise and the thoughtful to what is in itself so hard to understand, to consider, how pain has been the occasion and groundwork of some of the greatest of human virtues, and the most glorious of human actions; how it has called forth in the human soul energies, affections, sweetness, strength, goodness, which only its awful but mighty touch could have quickened into life; how under it discipline, character—even common-place character—has been elevated and made beautiful, heroes have been created, martyrs have triumphed, saints have been made perfect. The world and life require *pain* to make them as noble as they may be, as noble as they have been. We look in vain for anything to take the place which in the dispensations of Providence it has held in schooling men to higher things. If fortitude, courage, patience, endurance, resignation are among the parts of human perfection, it is pain under whose benignant severity they have grown—it is pain which has been the schoolmaster who has taught them."

To these noble words I would only add the

[1] Dean Church, *Pascal and other Sermons*, pp. 228, 229.

exhortation which comes to us from a yet higher authority. "My son, despise not thou the chastening of the Lord, nor faint when thou art rebuked of Him. For whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom He receiveth."[1] "And let us not be weary in well doing: for in due season we shall reap, if we faint not."[2]

Causes (*b*) (*c*) (*d*) (*e*) *Physical prostration.*—It would appear that about 7 per cent. of suicides, or attempted suicides, are due to purely physical prostration or exhaustion.

It springs, as we see, from various causes, and doubtless from many others that have not come under my own limited observation. The lesson which such cases teach is obvious, but frequently disregarded. It is that *our reserve of physical and nervous energy is limited*, and if we draw too largely upon it, Nature is sure to be avenged.

Case 2 has its special warning to young men in these days of excessive devotion to athletics. The coroner found that the deceased's death was caused by his own hand during temporary insanity, and he added that the insanity, which in this case would mean nervous collapse, "was owing, in all probability, to exhaustion, consequent upon the

[1] Heb. xii. 5, 6. [2] Gal. vi. 9.

excessive physical training he had been undergoing" previous to a meeting of a certain gymkhana club.

St. Paul had, not improbably, been an athlete, when as a young man he was reading Law in the school of Gamaliel. At any rate, he knew a good deal about the rules and regulations of the stadium and the arena; nor is there any reason to think he would have spoken disparagingly of athletic sports and contests. But he had learned to assess them at their proper value in respect to other and far higher contests, in which, as intelligent and immortal beings, we are called to take part.[1] This is evident from the admonition we find him giving to his son in the Faith, Timothy: "For bodily exercise (*gymnasia*) profiteth for a little, but godliness for all things, having the promise of the life which now is, and of that which is to come."[2]

Second Class.

Mental and Nervous Disorders; Specific Forms and Causes.

(*a*) *Melancholy and mental depression.* — The

[1] 1 Cor. ix. 24–27. [2] 1 Tim. iv. 8.

connection and interaction existing between bodily and mental function is so intimate that distinction between bodily and mental disorders becomes in many cases well-nigh impossible. Mental ailments are very frequently the result of physical disorders, and specially is this the case in disorders of the nervous system and the organs of digestion. Dyspepsia affects the mind to such an extent that suicide is sometimes the result (case 71). And this was fully recognized by the ancients, as is proved by the very nomenclature they employed to denote various forms of mental disease.

"For the corruptible body," says the writer of The Wisdom of Solomon, "presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things."[1]

The commonest words used to denote mental depression are *melancholy* and *hypochondria*. But what does *melancholy* mean but "black bile,"[2] which was anciently believed to cause sadness and dejection of spirit?

Similarly with *hypochondria* as denoting the soft parts of the body situate below the chondros (χόνδρος), or cartilage of the breast-bone, such as

[1] ix. 15.

[2] From Gr. μέλας, black, and χολή, bile.

the liver, gall-bladder, spleen, etc., supposed to be the seat of melancholy and "vapours."[1]

What we call nervous depression, and the doctors *neurasthenia*, is in many cases, no doubt, due to physical and bodily disorder. And the first step to be taken towards the recovery of mental health is to be found in the removal of the physical cause. And my investigations point to the fact that about 7 per cent. of suicides are due to melancholy or nervous depression arising from some bodily ailment.

But it must not be supposed that melancholy and mental depression proceed only from physical causes. Worry and overwork, want of employment, and the resulting boredom—or *tædium vitæ*—have also a powerful effect in causing that state of mental unrest which frequently ends in suicide.

(*b*) *Worry and overwork. Case* 68.—A pupil teacher, through excessive study in preparing for an examination, becomes depressed in mind, and drowns herself. She had previously said that she would "sooner drown herself than go on teaching." It is much to be feared that the case is only a typical one, and that there are many young people,

[1] "Thus raising the vapours in their hypochondrias, they were every night dreaming that they heard it thunder."—De Foe, *Systematic Magic*, I., iv. p. 97.

especially females, who are injured in mind through the extreme pressure of competitive examinations.

(*c*) *Want of employment;* and (*d*) *Boredom* (*tædium vitæ*).—I have coupled these two causes together because they so frequently stand to one another in the relation of cause and effect. Men are bored with life for want of healthy and useful employment. They will work desperately hard merely to gain a fortune and *have nothing to do.* And when they have succeeded, they find that life is insipid, its pleasures pall on the palate, its allurements cease to attract, and they become bored and weary. And all because they have lived for themselves only, and have never entertained and cultivated those objects which alone can render life happy, useful, and dignified.

Case 42.—This is the case of a retired solicitor, not in any financial difficulty, and the following is an extract from a letter he addressed to the coroner previous to his death :—

"I have no wife, no children, no home, no means, nothing to do, and can see nothing but miserable, and dirty, and poverty-stricken existence in the future. . . . To live for oneself is too trying and tiring for me, and so I have retired. I wish there was something to do, and *it is nothing to do that kills me.*"

There is nothing which calms and sustains the mind, and raises it above the reach of morbid depression, so much as the feeling that we are doing, or trying to do, something for the glory of God, something for the welfare of others who may be worse off than ourselves, in our day and generation. Let but a man forget the love of self in the nobler love of humanity, and he will not have much time for melancholy, or depression, or *tædium vitæ.* He will find that *Christian Altruism* is something more than a fine metaphysical expression : that it has a moral and psychical force of which he had no previous conception.

It is here where Christian Therapeutics, as I venture to call them, afford such valuable assistance to all those who are suffering from the milder forms of mental disorder, such as hypochondria, or melancholy and nervous depression ; namely, in providing mental and spiritual stimuli of the highest order.

People who have not suffered from these milder forms of mental disturbance are apt to regard them as light and trivial, as the result of a fanciful and self-centred imagination. And the sufferers themselves often meet with a scanty share of sympathy. A fanciful, morbid disposition is certainly

a thing not to be encouraged. But it is true, nevertheless, that in some of these cases the pure mental agony endured without any assignable cause, is terrible beyond description.

Let me give one or two extracts from some of my collected cases.

Case 96.—In the pocket of the deceased a letter was found, stating that he could see nothing but ruin before him: that he "had suffered the torments of hell," and "prayed for strength to guard against the horrible deed."

Case 72.—It came out in evidence that the unhappy man condemned suicide as an act of folly, but had said a short time previously, "I feel so miserable, I don't know what to do with myself."

Here is an extract from another letter, written by a young naval officer to his father and mother shortly previous to the act of self-destruction.

"I trust I shall be forgiven for the great trouble I shall bring upon all of you; but I feel I cannot longer live. . . . When I look back on life, I see that, *if I had exercised only a little self-control*, I should never have done this."

Examples of this kind might be multiplied indefinitely, but these are sufficient for my present purpose, which is to call attention to the intense

suffering which attends severe nervous and mental disorders. With regard to this suffering, it is not too much to say, that it often amounts to an insupportable anguish. It is not bodily or physical pain. Neither does it spring from any assignable cause, such as remorse, disappointment, or fear. The sufferer seems unable to give an account of it. He knows not its cause, nor its nature, any more than a patient who is suffering from some acute bodily disease of the nature of which he is ignorant. In a word, it is a pain *sui generis*, terrible to endure, and if continued, intolerable.

But why do I mention this? I mention it that it may serve as a warning of the intense suffering which frequently accompanies severe mental depression: suffering so intense, that it may, and often does, compel the sufferer to destroy himself *in spite of himself*, in spite of his efforts, his prayers, and his fears.

May God, of His mercy, preserve you and me, dear reader, from ever falling into this desperate condition. And the knowledge of all this, I say, should serve as a solemn admonition to keep a most careful watch against those causes, such as worry and overwork, want of employment, etc., to which it is due.

As regards these letters, of which I have given one or two specimens, it will perhaps be said that they supply us with the ghastly details of a ghastly subject. To read them is like looking into some Acherontian lake, whose dark and fathomless depths have engulfed the soul of a brother or sister—a picture only fit to illustrate some weird passage in Dante's *Inferno*. Their intense reality and pathos is my excuse for reproducing them, and because we seem to hear in them the last despairing cry of the lost.

And then the question rises to our lips—Has the Great Physician, Who came to heal all manner of disease and all manner of sickness among the people, no prescription for such as these? Are there no medicines to be drawn from the dispensary of His Word to suit their sad case?

Surely there are, if only men would seek them out and use them. Even in pre-Christian times it was recognized that there was nothing better to strive and pray for than the *mens sana in corpore sano*. And I can imagine nothing more calculated to secure this than the restful teaching of Hebrew prophets and psalmists, repeated and emphasized as it has been by Christ and His Apostles. Take for example such passages as these—

"Cast thy burden on the Lord, and He shall sustain thee." (Ps. lv. 22.)

"Great peace have they that love Thy law, and they are not offended at it." (Ps. cxix. 165.)

"Thou wilt keep him in perfect peace whose mind is stayed on Thee, because he trusteth in Thee." (Isa. xxvi. 3.)

"Who is among you that feareth the Lord, that walketh in darkness, and hath no light? Let him trust in the name of the Lord, and stay upon his God." (Isa. l. 10.)

And then come the words of the Master, so fitted to soothe and calm the mind amid the worries and perplexities of this troubled life:

"Take no thought for the morrow"—*i.e.* no anxious, distressful, or distrustful thought—"for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."[1] (St. Matt. vi. 34.)

"But seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you." (St. Matt. vi. 33.)

Let it not be thought that these words are the mere pietistic utterance of a devout-minded enthusiast. They contain within the limits of a few brief sentences the true philosophy of human life—aye! and if men would but believe them, and put

[1] Genevan Version, "The day hath enough with its own sorrow."

them to the test, the panacea for a thousand ills, and a healing balm for sorrow-stricken souls.

SECTION II.

Christian Therapeutics with reference to Moral and Psychical Diseases.

THIRD CLASS.

Diseases of the Soul, Moral and Psychical.

TABLE IV.

Specific Nature of Disease.		Number of Suicides per cent.
I. Intemperance ...	Alcoholism	13
	Dissipation	1
II. Lust	Adultery and fornication	9
	Bigamy	1
III. Covetousness and theft ...	Betting, gambling, and speculation ...	5
	Dishonesty	2
	Forgery	1
IV. Murder ...	... ...	3
V. Other crimes ...	Burglary	1
	Felony	1
	Loss of character ...	2
	Frenzy and quarrels	4
	Malice and falsehood	3
	Total	46

N.B.—The arrangement in the above table is somewhat different to that of the corresponding Class in Table III., but the statistics are the same.

Intemperance, lust, covetousness and theft, murder and other crimes, are the causes of nearly one-half of the suicides, or attempted suicides, which annually occur in this country. And there is one word which embraces them all—the little word "Sin."

What, then, is this thing we call Sin, which seems to be such an awful reality, and makes such frightful havoc among men? Etymology does not help us much. We trace the word to the Anglo-Saxon *syn*;[1] but it disappears in the Gothic, where its place is taken by *fravaurhts*,[2] that which undoes, or counterworks, and so entails forfeiture.

In other languages which have become the vehicles and channels of sacred literature—*e.g.* Hebrew, Greek, and Latin—we find not a few words and synonyms presenting to us different ideas and aspects of sin.[1] And on some of these aspects the Rev. Aubrey Moor, whose seemingly

[1] The A.S. *syn* has lost the final *d*, which appears in other cognate forms, *e.g.* Icel. *synd*, Ger. *sünde*, O.H.G. *sundja*. According to Skeat, it is the abstract substantive answering to the Latin *sons*, guilty. (See note A on Sin.)

[2] A verbal substantive of *fra-vaurkjan*, which, according to the analogy of the German *verwirken*, would mean to forfeit, *i.e.* in consequence of being guilty. Comp. *verwirkung* = forfeit. This is the true character of sin. First it is a counter-working against God, and then a forfeiture of His favour, entailing punishment.

premature death was so much to be deplored, has discoursed in a very instructive and impressive manner.

One of these aspects is "Sin as disease."

"Sin," he says, "as the disease, the disorder of our natures—how common and how natural is the thought in Old Testament Scriptures! In the Psalms of David, so close is the association of the disease of the body and of the soul, that we cannot mark the transition from the one to the other. All through the earlier history of the Jews, sickness and sin had been associated as effect and cause; God had taught them by that association the real kinship which we know exists between the two. And disease had come to be the natural analogue of sin, the visible symbol of the invisible, till they came to look forward to their Messiah as a Great Physician of souls, a Sun of Righteousness, which should arise with healing in His wings. And when the Christ came, He gave His *imprimatur* to that association of ideas. He healed every sickness and every disease among the people; but His mission was to heal the broken-hearted, to seek and to save the lost."[1]

It is true. The words, with the ideas they connote, which have been used in various languages to designate "sin," may differ. Sometimes we find one, sometimes another word, made use of,

[1] "Some Aspects of Sin," p. 73.

according to the aspect which appeared the predominant one; but whatever the word may have been, and whatever the idea it conveyed, whether of *forfeit*, or *missing the mark*, or *stumbling*, or *wandering away*, or *debt*, we are brought back at last to the radical truth which underlies them—that all sin is a disease: a functional disorder of the soul, a discord amongst those faculties and attributes, such as reason, will, conscience, and love, which constitute the personality of man, and out of which, according to their working, his moral and spiritual character is built up.

Yes, sin is the disease of the soul, and in setting up upon earth a Church to be at once a spiritual infirmary and a school of character, Jesus has vindicated His claim to be the true Physician of souls.

Now, we see from the table before us that crime or vice of various kinds is the cause of nearly one-half of the suicides committed in this country. But crime and vice are the index of bad character, and therefore we may agree with Morselli, that the most valuable (but by no means the whole) cure of suicide is preventive, and consists "in giving force and energy to the moral character."[1]

[1] Morselli, p. 374.

But to what sources are we to look for this regenerating, energizing power? What, in other words, are the agencies to be employed for the formation of character?

Morselli can point us to no higher source, no more potent agencies, than those of sociology and science.[1]

To expect either science or sociology to afford us the medicines we need to preserve the soul in health, or heal it when diseased, would be like digging for gold in a coal mine, or looking for grapes on a bramble bush.

How great is the contrast to all this when we turn to consider the Church of Christ as the infirmary of souls, as the school of character, and Jesus Himself as the Great Physician presiding over both.

In the first place there is to be observed the adaptation of means to an end; and, secondly, the adequacy of those means to the object in view. It has been well said that Christianity is the people's metaphysics. And the truth of the saying receives a striking illustration in the means and method employed for the formation of character.

[1] See p. 101.

The whole system of Christian ethics, while on the one hand it is eminently practical,[1] and so simple in its application, that the wayfaring man, though a fool, cannot err therein; yet on the other hand it embodies the soundest teaching and conclusions of metaphysical science.

The Intellect.

1. The understanding needs light to distinguish between true wisdom and that which is falsely so called. It needs guidance to the Pierian fount of all knowledge, even God, "in Whom we live, and move, and have our being," and "in Whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." Without such light and guidance men may go on investigating nature, and collecting scientific facts, but they will fail to take in the true perspective of knowledge and the solidarity of all science in the unity of God.

And is not this what Jesus has done? In more senses than one is He "the Light of the world." But pre-eminently is He so in revealing God to man as the Supreme Object of human

[1] St. John vii. 17.

knowledge. He was ever pointing man to God: to God immanent in Nature, potent in matter, yet not to be confounded with either; omnipotent, omnipresent, incomprehensible, and yet personally manifest through the Incarnation of His Son, Jesus Christ.[1] To know Him, as St. John tells us, is eternal life. And it is this knowledge which teaches us to co-ordinate all other kinds of knowledge.

The Will.

2. The will requires to be chastened and subdued, so as to become the obedient servant, and not the tyrannical taskmaster of the soul; and so, while not ceasing to be free, to be brought into harmony with the supreme will of God, Whose service is perfect freedom.

And has not Jesus taught us both by prayer and precept, and His own example, how this is to be done? Daily would He have us pray, "Thy will be done." And in all the trials and bereavements and disappointments of life, we have His example before us: "Father, if this cup may not pass from Me, except I drink it, Thy will be done."

[1] Cp. St. Matt. vi. 26, 30; St. John i. 18; Heb. i. 1, 2.

The Conscience.[1]

3. The conscience, again, like the delicately-poised needle of the mariner, must be adjusted and corrected by the loadstone of truth. It must be supplied with correct information from which to draw its conclusions, and true evidence on which to base its judgments. It needs education and reverence and fostering care; otherwise it will cease to be a trustworthy guide, or it will become diseased, atrophied, callous.

To say that for the perception of the functions of conscience we are indebted to Christ and His teaching, would be manifestly untrue. Even the Apostle Paul acknowledged that the Gentiles were capable of acting conscientiously, and did so.[2] Moreover, he found the word for "conscience" (*syneidesis*) already in use, and ready to his hand, with a well-recognized meaning. But it is nevertheless true, that in no other moral or religious system besides Christianity does the conscience occupy such a prominent place, as the critic and moderator of conduct.

Both St. Paul and St. Peter are amongst the

[1] See note B on "Conscience."

[2] Rom. ii. 15.

chief expositors of Christian ethics. And in the letters of both we find frequent allusions to the conscience and its influence in the formation of the Christian character. Thus, in the letters of St. Paul the word occurs twenty times; in those of St. Peter three times; and in the Epistle to the Hebrews five times. The Apostle Paul at a most solemn and critical juncture of his life, when pleading before the Roman Governor Felix, said, "Herein do I exercise myself to have a conscience void of offence toward God and men always."[1] This was his constant moral attitude. And St. Peter in speaking of Baptism, and its typical significance and efficacy, says that these consist "not in the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the interrogation of a good conscience toward God." What does all this mean? It means that the character which Christ came to beget, and does beget in His true followers, is the conscientious character. For the Christian, conscience is to be the index, the guardian, the stimulus of duty, where by duty is understood not that meagre earth-born thing which is begotten of social utility or altruism, but which springs from a sense of our total environment, and embraces first our duty

[1] Acts xxiv. 16.

to God, and then, as a necessary consequence, our duty to man.

Love.

4. Under this head must be included, for our present purpose, the affections, desires, appetites and passions which exercise such a potent influence on the life and actions of man. Their influence in the formation of character it is impossible to overestimate. Misplaced affection, unlawful desire, appetites unrestrained, passions unbridled—these are by far the most fruitful of all the moral causes of suicide. And the mere fact that they are so only proves the truth of the contention that it is to the improvement and elevation of character that we must look for the abatement of the evil.

Here, too, we see the value of Christian therapeutics, because to nothing is their attention more steadfastly and systematically directed than the regulation of the affections and passions.

At the very commencement of His ministry the Great Physician taught His hearers to discriminate between worthy and unworthy objects of human desire. "Seek ye *first* the Kingdom of God, and His righteousness, and all these

things shall be added unto you." "What is a man profited if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" "Ye cannot serve God and mammon."

And as the Master began, so His disciples went on, ever teaching men the duty of self-control, of moderation, of temperance; bidding them to "set their affections on things above and not on things on the earth," and warning them, if they will only take His warning, that the certain wages of sin is death.

The long list of crimes which, as we see, so frequently end in the self-destruction of the criminal, proceed from defective character—character diseased in one or other of its four main factors: intellect, will, conscience, or affection. And in nothing has the Great Physician shown His Divine wisdom and skill more pre-eminently than in His rules and prescriptions for the formation of character. He knew how important a part the affections and passions play in this respect. And, therefore, when He appeared on the stage of human experience, He appeared as the very King of love. Not only did he make love the motive power, the keystone of His religion, but He taught men that from love, brought into

contact with, and seizing upon its proper objects, flow out that light and knowledge and power which will enable them to regulate their affections, appetites, and passions, and guide them to the attainment of their rightful end and purpose. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and mind, and soul, and strength: and thy neighbour as thyself." Here is the rule of Christian character.

Recognize the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, and you have the secret of a holy, a useful, and a happy life.

Thus is Jesus the great Physician of souls: thus does He heal the diseases of the soul by His treatment of human character, purging it from the dross of sin and selfishness, refining, moulding, elevating it until it becomes indeed a copy of "the mind which was in Christ Jesus."

And when, further, we pause to inquire by what means this mighty—for indeed it is mighty—transformation is brought about; what, to preserve our figure, are the medicines which the Great Physician prescribes, we can scarcely fail to be struck with their wonderful adaptation to the requirements of the patient. As the disease is moral and spiritual, so are the remedies. The

Christlike character[1] is not natural to us. To attain to it demands, in the first place, patient imitation on our part. And therefore said Jesus to all who would come to Him for spiritual healing, "Take My yoke upon you and learn of Me."

And, again, in words which would have been nothing short of blasphemous presumption had He not been what He claimed to be—"One with the Father"—"I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No man cometh unto the Father but by Me."

The artist needs his picture, and the sculptor his model; so Jesus came and tabernacled amongst men that He might present to them the pattern of a perfect human character, by copying which they might gradually come to be like Him.

But the production of this lofty character involves, in the second place, a great subjective transformation. It is a change in myself: in the secret principles and elements of my inmost being.

It is a change which I am powerless to bring

[1] We may find a beautiful portrayal of the character to be produced by "learning Christ" in the Epistle to the Ephesians. (iv. 20–32.)

about by my own unaided powers, however much I might desire it. And therefore it must be the result of co-operation.

But with whom must I co-operate? Surely with none other than the Saviour Himself. On this point there can be no doubt, for He plainly told His followers, "Without Me ye can do nothing."

Yes, it is Christ Himself, present in the soul through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, Who is to co-operate with ourselves in the formation of the Christlike character. For this end Jesus promised to be spiritually present with His people even to the end of time. "I will not leave you comfortless. I will come unto you." "Lo! I am with you, even unto the end of the world."

How that promise was fulfilled in the Pentecostal outpouring of the Holy Ghost we Christians know and believe. Speaking of this Holy Spirit Whom the Father would send in His name, He said, "He shall take of Mine and shall show it unto you." "He shall convince the world of sin and of righteousness and of judgment." "He shall guide you into all truth."[1]

[1] This doctrine of "Co-operation" for the formation of the Christian character was fully recognized and beautifully expressed by St. Paul in his Epistle to the Philippians (ii. 12, 13): "Work

And then, lastly, for the completion of His work in providing the means for the healing of the soul and its maintenance in health, we find the Great Physician ordaining the two Sacraments of Baptism and the Supper of the Lord as the channel and means whereby the mysterious gift of His Presence through the Holy Spirit is to be continuously imparted. "Take, eat. This is My Body which is given for you. Do this in remembrance of Me." "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, ye have not life in yourselves. He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day." (St. John vi. 53, 54.)

Thus is Jesus the Tree of Life "whose leaves are for the healing of the nations." Imitation of the life of Christ, co-operation between the spirit of man and the Spirit of God, and the reception of the two Christian Sacraments: these are the three remedies for the disease of sin, the three factors whereby the Christlike character is to be produced in us. And if it be asked, "How is it, then, we see so little of this character in the world?" we reply, the fault is not in the Physician, or His

out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God Who worketh in you, both to will and to work for His good pleasure."

prescriptions and medicines, but in those who will not use them. But so far as they ever have been, or will be, used and applied, so far has the result justified the expectation, and the diseases of the soul have been healed by the production of the Christian character.

And that any one in whom this character has been formed should wilfully destroy himself, unless indeed the mind itself gives way, is simply unthinkable.

"Time and change," says Dean Church, "have not abolished that type of human character, precarious as its hold might have looked, in the world which it came to leaven. Amid the revolutions and disasters of society, amid sins and apostasies to which the rebellions of Israel and Judah seem light, it has had a charmed life—a life, as we Christians believe, filled and sustained by the ever-present, ever-blessed Spirit; but a life as visible and certain as the life of sense and worldliness. In this 'naughty world,' amid its jostling crowds, saint to saint, in high places or low, has handed on the sacred light, the sacred fire, the 'Mind of Christ Jesus.'"

This "Mind," he goes on to say, "has been reflected in all sorts and conditions of men, from the king on his throne, an Alfred, or St. Louis, statesmen, soldiers, merchant, students of nature

and science, down to the lowly maid-servant, or labourer, whose humble and Christlike goodness, amid pain and sickness, so touched and wrought on men around them, that the popular love and reverence canonized them, and raised them into the guardian saints of their cities." [1]

The Church and Intemperance.

We come now to consider the duty of the Church of Christ, and of Christian Socialism, with respect to intemperance, which, with the exception of mental disease of various kinds, and arising from various causes, forms the most prolific source of suicide.[2]

[1] *The Discipline of the Christian Character*, pp. 122–124. Speaking of St. Francis of Assisi, he says (p. 127): "When all the world was sunk in worldliness and selfishness, he rose up, and with princely heart, as the great poet says, claimed as his spouse the poverty of Jesus Christ; his love, kindled by the love of the Crucified, overflowed the souls of men, to all that the Crucified had made, beasts of the field and birds of the air—in his 'Song of the Creatures,' with his unresting fancy fired by that love, claiming kinship and brotherhood with all things created—the sun, the moon, the wind, the fire, even with 'Sister Death;' he gave up all for Christ, and set himself, as the business of his life, to share and understand the lot of the poor, the weak, the wretched; to dignify their condition, to comfort them with his boundless sympathy."

[2] N.B.—In stating that the percentage of suicides due to intemperance is 13 (see Table III.), it must be understood as including only those cases due *directly* to this cause. The number

And I wish to point out, in the first place, that while intemperance is the most fruitful, if not the chief of all specific causes, it is, perhaps, more than any other, capable of reduction. After we have done our utmost to trace the causes of suicide to their real source, we are brought at last to this general conclusion, that it is due to a disturbance of mental equilibrium and repose.

Sometimes this disturbance will be due to external influences, social or moral, but certainly, in a vast number of cases, the cause is physiological, and due to a deterioration of the brain tissue. And it is because the excessive use of alcohol produces this deterioration, that its effect on the mind is so deadly.

I remember in my early days, when I used to attend temperance lectures, we were shown pictures of the drunkard's liver, blotched, congested, and hob-nailed like a navvy's boot, as though that were the most serious effect of drink on the human frame. But it is now proved, that no organ of the

indirectly due it would be impossible to ascertain, though doubtless it would be vastly greater.

The Rev. J. W. Horsley, Chaplain of Clerkenwell Prison, says: "I once carefully investigated 300 cases of attempted suicide that came under my notice and cure, and found that of these 145 were directly, and 27 more indirectly, attributed to intemperance."—*Workers together with God*, p. 304.

body is sooner or more seriously injured than the brain, and the nerves which proceed from it." [1]

True, it is not possible to see or to trace the connection between the physiological effect and the mental and moral results, but that the connection does exist cannot admit of a doubt. And in nothing is the effect of alcohol on the brain, and, through the brain, on the mind, more obvious than in the destruction of will force, the power, that is, not to make a resolve, but to carry it into effect.

As it is very desirable that this close connection between the effect of alcohol on the brain of the

[1] As to the physiological effect of alcohol on the brain, we are told by those who have studied this question, that there is an absence of a sufficient quantity of the grey matter, which is believed to give thinking and reasoning power, while at the same time the white matter becomes congested. "The work of the brain is to think, and to rule the body by means of the nerves. Some of the nerves carry impulses or messages *to* the brain from all parts of the body; other nerves carry messages *from* the brain. If either the brain or the nerves be injured, that part of the body governed by them becomes powerless. [First temporary, and in the end permanent paralysis.]"—*Easy Steps to Temperance Knowledge*, p. 7.

Dr. Norman Kerr, in a paper read before the members of the Society for the Study of Inebriety, July 6th, 1898, said, "It was the duty of the intelligent temperance reformer, and the enlightened medical practitioner, to teach the young, from their earliest appreciative years, the true influence of alcohol on body, brain, morals, and life; . . . that intoxicating drinks are substances fraught with dangerous risks, hostile to existence, perilous to vitality, unfriendly to health, confusing to reason, and weakening to sanity."

inebriate, and then on his mind and character, should be clearly apprehended, I venture to insert a few extracts from a pamphlet by Dr. Steele, on *Alcohol: its Effects on Body and Mind*, published by the Church of England Temperance Society.

"Alcohol seems to have a special affinity for the brain. This organ absorbs more than any other, and its delicate structure is correspondingly affected. The 'vascular enlargement' here reaches its height. The tiny vessels become clogged with blood, that is unfitted to nourish, because loaded with carbonic acid, and deprived of the usual quantity of the life-giving oxygen (Hinton). The brain is, in the language of the physiologist, *malfunctioned*."

"So marked is the effect of the narcotic poison, that some authorities hold, that 'a once thoroughly intoxicated brain never fully becomes what it was before.'"

"In time, the free use of liquor hardens and thickens the membrane enveloping the nervous matter; the nerve-corpuscles undergo a 'fatty degeneration;' the blood-vessels lose their elasticity; and the vital fluid, flowing less freely through the obstructed channels, fails to afford the old-time nourishment. The consequent deterioration of the nervous substance—the organ of thought—shows itself in the weakened mind that we so often notice in a person accustomed to drink, and at last lays the foundation of various nervous disorders—epilepsy, paralysis, and insanity."

Again, as to the effect on the mental and moral powers :

"So intimate is the relation between the body and the mind, that an injury to the one harms the other. The effect of alcoholized blood is to weaken the will. The one, habitually under its influence, often shocks us by his indecision and his readiness to break a promise to reform. The truth is, he has lost his power of self-control. At last he becomes physically unable to resist the craving demand of his morbid appetite."

"Other faculties share in this mental wreck. The intellectual vision becomes less penetrating, the decisions of the mind less reliable, and the grasp of thought less vigorous. . . . A thriftless, reckless feeling is developed. Ere long self-respect is lost, and then ambition ceases to allure and the high spirit sinks."

"Along with this mental deterioration comes also a failure of the moral sense. The fine fibre of character undergoes a 'degeneration' as certain as that of the muscles themselves. Broken promises tell of a lowered standard of veracity, and a dulled sense of honour, quite as much as of an impaired will. Under the subtle influence of the ever-present poison, signs of spiritual weakness multiply fast. Conscience is lulled to rest. Reason is enfeebled. Customary restraints are easily thrown off. The sensibilities are blunted. There is less ability to appreciate nice shades of right and wrong. Great moral principles and motives lose their power to

influence. The judgment fools with duty. The future no longer reaches back its hand to guide the present. The better nature has lost its supremacy."

"The wretched victim of appetite will now gratify his *tyrannical* passion for drink at *any expense of deceit or crime.* He becomes the blind instrument of his insane impulses, and commits acts[1] from which he would once have shrunk with horror."[2]

If statistics are to be trusted; if the verdict of our judges,[3] magistrates, and medical officers in our asylums and hospitals is to carry any weight, then it is established, beyond the reach of controversy, that of all the evils from which society is suffering there is not one which, for a moment, can be compared with that of drink. And it is vain for moral and social reformers to go on scratching away at the surface soil of humanity, to make it look tidy and respectable outwardly, while this

[1] Amongst these acts must especially be noted that of suicide.

[2] Pp. 21–23.

[3] "Nine-tenths of the crime of England, if sifted, could be traced to drink."—Sir R. Webster, Attorney-General.

"But for drink we might shut up nine out of ten of our prisons."—Late Lord Chief Justice Coleridge.

"I believe, knowing what I do, that nine-tenths of the crime in this country is engendered inside the doors of public-houses."—Mr. Justice Hawkins.

The Chief Constable of Dundee, giving evidence before the Royal Commission on the Licensing Laws, stated that "92 *per cent.* of his cases were caused by intemperance."

root of bitterness is striking its fangs deeper and deeper into the soil, and eating its way, like a foul cancer, into the heart of the nation.

It will, perhaps, be said, this is strong language to employ. But the question is, Is it true? For, if it is, then no language can be too strong. And, if it is, the further question remains to be asked and answered, What is the Church of Christ, and what are Christians, individually, doing to reduce the evil?

To begin, What are the clergy and other ministers of religion doing to fight the demon of drink? Amongst the clergy themselves, it must, I fear, be confessed that much apathy prevails. Take, for example, the diocese in which I write. I find there are some 580 parishes, but only in 70 of these is there a branch of the Church of England Temperance Society. What other religious denominations may be doing, I have not the means to ascertain.

And yet I venture to think there ought not to be a parish in this Christian land in which some effort is not being made by the clergy, and ministers of various religious denominations, to educate the people, and especially the young, in the bearing of temperance on the temporal and eternal welfare

of the individual; to expose the untold mischief and misery caused by drink; and to *unite* in wise and well-considered efforts to diminish them.[1] The question of duty, too, in this matter should be considered from no selfish standpoint, nor yet in the spirit of a narrow parochialism, but from the broad and intelligible platform of Christian Socialism. It may be true, as is sometimes urged in excuse by those who decline to engage in temperance work, "I have no need to take the pledge, for I am in no danger of exceeding the bounds of moderation, and I should think it degrading to do so." Or again, "There is no need of a Temperance Society in my parish, for there is little or no drunkenness." Such excuses and arguments as these only show a failure to grasp the magnitude of the social problem, and accord but ill with the teaching of that great Christian socialist, St. Paul—"We then, who are strong, ought to bear the

[1] The testimony of the Rev. J. W. Horsley, to which allusion has already been made, is most significant. "The chief cause of suicide, in England at any rate," he says, "is undoubtedly intemperance, which, directly or indirectly, is the chief cause of seventy-five per cent. of all crime, and certainly of half the attempts at suicide." And the moral he draws is this: "Those who are not in some way actively promoting temperance and combating intemperance, have more bloodguiltiness than others in regard to the suicides in their locality and their land."—*Workers together with God*, pp. 303, 304.

infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves."

Moreover, in the field of temperance there is abundant room and need for many workers, and a diversity of agencies. Individual example and effort, social combination, and State legislation: these represent the three chief sources to which we must look for reform. Of the first of these I hardly need to speak, for its importance will be recognized by all. As to the second, even the humblest village Band of Hope is not to be despised, if it be made the means of training those who, in a few years hence, will be the fathers and mothers of families, in habits of self-control, and showing them the dangers of intemperance.

As to the third kind of agency, that of State interference and legislation, I will here content myself by calling attention to some of the disclosures made before the Royal Commission on the Licensing Laws, 1898. Much of the evidence brought before the Commissioners proves how urgent is the need for State interference and legislation in regard to the liquor traffic. It is now established, beyond doubt, that Grocers' Licences have contributed very largely to the growth of

intemperance amongst women, by affording facilities for obtaining spirituous liquors, and that frequently in a clandestine and deceitful manner.[1]

The evidence, too, with respect to clubs was very significant, showing that in many cases they are started "not in consequence of the wants of the place, or by the desire of the members, but by traders."

"In Swindon, with a population of forty-one thousand, there are twenty clubs, which close most of the day on Sunday, and are in many cases 'tied' to brewers, some being places of much

[1] I quote a few extracts from the evidence:—

"26,074. Chairman: 'Speaking generally, first, are you of opinion that Grocers' Licenses promote secret drinking?'

"'Yes, I think so; I very strongly think so.'

"26,076. 'Do I gather that you are of opinion that the intoxicants sold by the grocer are delivered under the name of other goods?'

"'Yes; I have a distinct proof of it in one or two cases connected with the Board of Guardians.'"

Mr. Sutcliffe, a solicitor of Burnley, was asked—

"27,040. 'Do I understand that you mean that you have been consulted by men whose wives have got intoxicants at grocers' shops, and that they have been charged as something else?'

"'Yes.'

"27,041. 'Have you had any accounts before you?'

"'Yes.'"

On the seventy-third day, Mr. Riley, proprietor of a Home for Inebriates at Leicester, attended and stated that his experience of thirty years proved that ninety per cent. of the inmates of his Home owed their degradation, primarily, to the facilities for secret drinking afforded by the Grocers' Licence.

drinking. Superintendent Collett thought taverns *far preferable* to clubs."[1]

All this goes to show how necessary is legislation with regard to these places, which are really no better, in many cases, than unlicensed public-houses, in which drinking and gambling may go on without let or hindrance. They should either be suppressed or be registered, and placed under proper police supervision.

I might mention other subjects, such as "Sunday Closing," "The Serving of Children," etc.; but those referred to will suffice to show how much work there is for social reformers to do, by way of legislation, in respect to the drink traffic. Nor must they be content with mere repressive and restrictive enactments. It is surely the duty of the State to assist any well-considered efforts to elevate the tastes of the people and provide places where they can enjoy social intercourse and healthy amusement, without exposure to those temptations which are so fatal to their best interests, and, in so many cases, lead to the suicide's grave.

[1] *Analysis of Evidence*, vol. ii. p. 50.

SECTION III.

Christian Therapeutics considered with reference to Disorders of the Personal Estate, arising from Social or Economic Conditions, Domestic Surroundings, etc.[1]

Love affairs.—Our affections are the tenderest part about us, and any injury done to them immediately makes itself felt in mental agitation, recklessness, or despair, from any of which the step to suicide is but a short one. It seems probable, from the analysis of cases, that between four hundred and five hundred young women commit, or attempt, suicide in England every year from this cause of injured affections alone.

The cases, as a rule, fall under two heads—

1. *Thwarted affection:* as where parents refuse, it may be for good reasons, to sanction a daughter's engagement or marriage, or where other obstacles arise to render it impossible.[2]

2. *Betrayed affection:* arising from unfaithfulness or misconduct. Why it is usually the female, and not the male, that resorts to suicide, will be readily understood by those who think at all about the

[1] See Table III., Class IV.

[2] In the latter case double suicide is sometimes the result.

matter. The more guilty party will often get off scot-free, while all the pain and shame fall to the lot of her who may have been more sinned against than sinning. And, besides, an opportunity of marriage means more to a woman than a man. For the former it may mean the only chance of entering into the fuller life of matrimony. The latter can find other opportunities.

The only real remedy in these cases, inexpressibly sad as they sometimes are, seems to be found in a greater reverence for the sanctity of human affection. Young people are thrown together in company, it may be in the ball-room, or at some holiday festivity. They are gay and thoughtless, bent only on enjoying the present, and regardless of the future; but all the time, in the whirl of the giddy dance or the casual *tête-à-tête*, the affections are at work, like budding tendrils of the vine, reaching forth to find some mutual response in eye or heart, and it is forgotten that the issues are fraught with the destinies of life or death. Think, young man, if you are untrue to that loving, trustful girl, you may bring her to a suicide's grave, and saddle your own life with an endless remorse.

Thwarted Affection.—I have met with some very sad cases of suicide arising from this cause. They show that parents, even when they feel it their duty to oppose a daughter's marriage, should act with all tenderness and consideration, and trust rather to gentle expostulation than a stern and unbending refusal.

Money affairs—Financial troubles—borrowing.—Probably about four hundred cases of suicide per annum are due to anxiety and distress in regard to money matters; and of these, above one hundred will be attributable to debts incurred through borrowing at high rates of interest.

I append one or two examples

Case No. 19.—Letter:

"My dear darling wife,—This has been a day. I wish I could have pulled through, but I cannot. I have worried and tried for some time to get rid of my debts, but I cannot. The interest keeps me from paying off, and what I have borrowed I have paid over and over again in interest. More shame on my shopmates, charging a penny for a shilling. One man I have paid *six times* the amount in interest than what I have had. Now I clear the lot. . . . To think that we part like this! When I said good-bye this morning to you and dear little Georgie, I broke down when I got to the door. . . . Give Georgie twelve kisses for his poor old

dad. Twopence for Georgie—the last I have got. —From your loving husband."

Anything more pathetic than this it would be difficult to imagine.

No. 62.—The wife of an agricultural labourer borrows money unknown to her husband, and contrary to his expressed wishes. She cannot repay, and then, dreading the consequences and losing self-control, she drowns herself.

It may be hoped, however, that the Bill now in contemplation with respect to money-lending, will have some effect in lessening the number of suicides arising from this cause. The temptation to borrow money is doubtless sometimes very great. But those who are so tempted should be reminded that the dangers of doing so are equally great. Let them reflect, that by having recourse to money-lenders they are but exchanging one creditor for another, who will probably be more heartless and exacting.

Social, Economic, and Domestic Conditions.

As to the work which the Church of Christ may do in improving the social and industrial, and then the domestic conditions of life for the

working classes, I should like to refer my readers to the Report of the Committee appointed by the last Lambeth Conference (1897), "to consider and report upon the office of the Church with respect to industrial problems." (No. 8, S.P.C.K.)

I make one or two brief extracts:

"The primary duty of the Church is that of ministry to man in the things of character, conscience, and faith. In doing this she also does her greatest social duty." But this is not all: "Character is influenced at every point by social conditions; and active conscience, in an industrial society, will look for moral guidance on industrial matters." (p. 3.)

"Christian opinion should be awake to repudiate and condemn either open breaches of social justice and duty, or maxims and principles of an un-Christian character. It ought to condemn the belief that economic conditions are to be left to the action of material causes and mechanical laws, uncontrolled by any moral responsibility. It can pronounce certain conditions of labour to be intolerable. It can insist that the employer's personal responsibility, as such, is not lost by his membership in a commercial or industrial company. It can press upon retail purchasers the obligation to consider not only the cheapness of the goods supplied to them, but also the probable conditions of their production," etc. (pp. 5, 6.)

"They suggest, that, wherever possible, there

should be formed as a part of local Church organization, Committees, consisting chiefly of laymen, whose work should be to study social and industrial problems from the Christian point of view, and to assist in creating and strengthening an enlightened public opinion in regard to such problems, and promoting a more active spirit of social service as a part of Christian duty."[1] (p. 7.)

Such is the debt which the Church owes to society. According to its discharge the conditions of life and labour for the masses will be improved, the struggle for life rendered less severe, and the number of those who are compelled to succumb diminished.

[1] This is exactly what the Christian Social Union is endeavouring to do.

CHAPTER IX.

SUICIDE, SOCIALISM, AND CIVILIZATION.

Bishop Westcott on Social Problems—Civilization increases suicide—Christian Socialism—St. Paul the apostle of Christian Socialism—Secular Socialism and civilization insufficient—The warning from the downfall of ancient empires—The aims of Christian Socialism and the Christian Social Union.

ALTHOUGH, as will have been already seen, I am unable to agree in all points with Dr. Morselli as to the "Nature and Therapeutics of Suicide," and more especially as to the means and method suggested for the formation of character, there is one point in which I quite agree with him, namely, that of the close connection between suicide, socialism, and civilization.

"We have seen," he says, "that the question of suicide approaches closely, and in most points is identified with the gravest questions with which humanity is justly occupied—namely, pauperism, public instruction, and morality, crime, the condition of the middle classes, the struggle for life,

influence of the press, educational systems, the development of the material and living forces of civilized society. All these pages of the history of man, sometimes sanguinary, sometimes brilliant, are reflected in that of suicide." [1]

The fact is, that the causes which lead to suicide are many of them of a social character, that is, they take their rise in the unsatisfactory condition of those social problems, whether industrial, civil, or domestic, on the well-ordering of which the contentment, welfare, and happiness of the people so greatly depend. Education, employment, wages, hours and places of labour, housing of the poor, recreation, etc.—such are some of these problems. And as they are of a social nature, so only by an enlightened Socialism, it would seem, can they be satisfactorily dealt with.[2]

There is something almost startling, and at the same time both unsatisfactory and humiliating, in the fact that increasing civilization is accompanied

[1] *Suicide*, p. 372.

[2] "We cannot rightly limit the function of the State to the administration of retributive justice, or to the repression of crime, or to the furtherance of the material prosperity of a people. It must deal in some way with the circumstances of social life, with pauperism, with the unemployed, with intemperance, with impurity, with gambling, with marriage, with parental and filial responsibilities."—*The Christian Social Union*, by the Rt. Rev. B. F. Westcott, Bishop of Durham.

by a corresponding increase in suicide. That such is really the case Morselli asserts over and over again, and, moreover, he gives us the reason to account for it.[1] Civilization does but increase competition, and render the struggle for life more trying and severe. The Report of the Registrar-General for 1895, too, affords corroborative evidence that Morselli is right.

"The deaths attributed to suicide," he stated, "numbered 2797, and were equal to a rate of 92 per million of the population, which is the highest on record." (p. xvii.)[2]

And if this be true, we cannot help asking, Ought we as Christians to rest satisfied with a civilization which is accompanied by an increase in the worst form of mortality, that of self-destruction? Surely as a nation professing Christianity we are bound to see that our civilization is something better and more enduring than that of Egypt, Greece, or Rome. And if we believe that Jesus Christ had

[1] "Suicide increases amongst people according to their degree of civilization. . . ."—*Suicide*, p. 363.

"The more the activities of industry and commerce, of science and art, of material well-being and luxury are multiplied, the more are new pages of human thought opened out. On each of these pages a long and varied series of sacrifices and victims is erewhile inscribed, to which the continual arrival of new combatants contribute."—*Ibid.*, p. 362.

See also Tables I. and II. in this work.

a message of health and salvation for mankind, it is our duty to apply His principles and prescriptions to the relief of the necessities and the improvement of the conditions of social life. But can they be so applied? Surely they ought to be capable of such application; for, if not, it would form a very serious indictment against the beneficence and consistency of the Christian Religion as fitted to further the welfare and happiness of mankind.

And by such an application we do not mean that the laws of social and political economy should be violated or set aside; but that the same principles —of truth, justice, and love—which are to pervade and regulate the conduct of the individual, shall also rule the social body, and all classes of it in their transactions and relations one with another. To bring about such an application, not in a mere academic, but a practical form, is the work of the Christian Socialist.

Christian Socialism.

Jesus Christ was Himself the Prince of Socialists, for the very keystone of Socialism is found in one of His fundamental precepts: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." The spirit of altruism pervaded His every word and action. "I am

among you as he that serveth." "If I, then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet, ye ought also to wash one another's feet."

It is impossible not to be struck with the catholic nature of His mission as He conceived of it, and the entire absence of the recognition of class or privilege amongst those for whom it was undertaken. To all mankind, irrespective of birth, or caste, or wealth, or learning, are His words of loving invitation addressed. "The Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which is lost." All who labour and are heavy-laden, no matter what their burden may be, are invited to go to Him for relief and refreshment. All who suffer from the disease of sin, no matter in what particular form, are to go to Him for healing.

He gave His disciples a daily prayer in which they are taught to recognize the common Fatherhood of God, and therefore the brotherhood of man.

Such are some of the foundation lines and leading principles of the new Socialism as enunciated by Christ Himself; but for the fuller exposition of them, and their application to our social intercourse, and the concerns and duties of everyday life, we must go to the immediate followers of

Christ, the apostles whom He chose as His delegates and witnesses. "Ye are My witnesses."

And if we may call Jesus Christ Himself the Prince of Socialists, surely we may regard St. Paul as the apostle of Christian Socialism, as applied to the varied wants and circumstances of social life. Thus, to take one example out of many, Jesus Christ laid down the general principle of mutual regard, saying, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Let us hear how St. Paul interprets this precept, and makes it applicable to the intercourse of social life: "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ." (Gal. vi. 2.)[1]

And, again—

"It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak. . . . We then that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves." (Rom. xiv. 21 and xv. 1). "Let no man seek his own, but every man another's wealth." (1 Cor. x. 24.)

And as with the individual, so with the class. Each must be animated by the spirit of loving regard for the others, and all must work together

[1] So also St. Peter: "Finally, be ye all likeminded, compassionate, loving as brethren." (1 Pet. iii. 8.)

for the welfare of all. "Each for all, and all for each," this is the only true motto of Christian Socialism.

Or take, again, the subject of unity as a cardinal feature in Christian Socialism. It is evident from that magnificent prayer, which we might almost say formed the closing utterance of Christ's earthly life and ministry, that unity is the great objective of His religion:

"That they all may be one; as Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us." (St. John xvii. 21.)

How does St. Paul interpret this doctrine into the language of Christian Socialism? "Now ye are the body of Christ, and severally members thereof." (1 Cor. xii. 27.)

And how does he apply it to the duties and engagements of social life?

"That there should be no schism in the body; but that the members should have the same care one for another." (ver. 25.) "For even as we have many members in one body, and all the members have not the same office: so we, who are many, are one body in Christ, and severally members one of another." (Rom. xii. 4, 5.)

Thus does St. Paul teach us how to understand

and apply to the wants and duties of social life the great Christian principle of unity. It is that unity in diversity symbolized by the one body with many members, and it is to be attained not by an ignorant hostility between the different grades of the social body, nor yet by the obliteration of the distinctions of class, or rank, or office, but by the loving co-operation of each with others for the welfare of all.

The idea is a beautiful one; beautiful in its conception, beneficent in its operation, sublime in its completion.

There is no department of human life, social, civil, religious, political, which it will not influence, and no faculty or aspiration of human nature which it will not satisfy; for it represents the progress of humanity through sin and weakness to the final goal of the Divine perfection.

"Till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." (Eph. iv. 13.)[1]

[1] "The love of God, that love which gave His Son for all the world, broke down at once the barriers of race and polity and religion, all privileges of a chosen seed, or an imperial citizenship, all the most deeply rooted distinctions of caste or blood, and made all men brethren, all men one in Jesus Christ, Greek and Jew, Barbarian, Scythian, bond or free—all one in the unity and in the common hopes of the human race."—Dean Church, *The Discipline of the Christian Character*, p. 101.

That there is another Socialism besides this we know full well; a secular Socialism, which makes no secret of its hostility to Christianity, and, indeed, all revealed and supernatural religion. But such a Socialism is unphilosophical, because it cannot satisfy the spiritual needs of the soul, and is powerless to produce character in the highest sense of the word, seeing that its moral teaching is only the product of a refined sense of social utility.

Such a Socialism as this may perhaps lead men to a high state of civilization and culture, but the thoughtful student of humanity will do well to remember that a civilization and culture which are merely secular have never been able to preserve a state.

Babylon, Egypt, Greece, and Rome were all civilized. In some of them, perhaps in all, education and culture were carried to a high degree.[1] In all of them social, municipal, and political life had become completely organized. But all these civilizations fell victims to the canker of social and

[1] The recent discovery of schoolboys' letters amongst the Egyptian papyri seems to show that under the Pharaohs public school life was much the same as it is with us.

moral corruption. And so will it be with ourselves, and every Christian state, unless we look to it that our boasted civilization is leavened with the principles of *Christian Socialism*, and unless *our culture pass on through the merely intellectual and æsthetic stages to the moral and psychical.*

Chief among the causes which led to the downfall of the Roman Empire was the want of a true Socialism, the drifting apart of the upper and lower classes, and the entire absence of sympathy between them. We see liberty and self-government dying out, poverty and wealth increasing side by side, and the middle class rapidly disappearing. The aristocrat Symmachus, we are told, did not think £80,000 too much to spend on the games got up to celebrate the nomination of his son to a Prætorship. And if the condition of the upper class was bad, that of the lower was even worse. The State had pauperized it until all its independence and self-respect were gone. *Panem et circenses* was its only cry, and its only taste was for the obscenities of the pantomime and the demoralizing spectacles of the arena. Yet all this was concurrent with a high degree of so-called civilization and culture. Academic centres were numerous, just as universities are now.

"Schools of rhetoric and philosophy were thronged with eager scholars, and the salary of their professors was the subject of imperial concern." [1]

And may not there be a warning for ourselves in all this? A warning, which the increase of suicide only serves to accentuate, that civilization and culture, unless they be leavened by the teaching of Christian Socialism, are no trustworthy pledge of the real progress and prosperity of the nation.

The general aim of Christian Socialism is—

1st. To secure that the same principles and precepts which the individual Christian regards as of paramount authority in private life and conduct, shall be recognized in all the departments of social and industrial intercourse.

2nd. To spread the idea of the great Christian brotherhood amongst all grades and classes of society.

3rd. To improve the conditions of life and labour, and so to render the struggle for life less trying and severe.

"Let no man seek his own, but every man another's wealth," is the law which St. Paul lays

[1] *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, by Samuel Dill, M.A. See also *Church Quarterly Review*, pp. 174–186.

down for the regulation of the individual Christian to his neighbour. But we have to enlarge its sphere of operation so as to embrace the whole social body. And what does it then become? "Let no *class* selfishly seek its own advantage, but every one the advantage of the rest."

How, specifically, these principles and aims are to be brought into active operation in the solution of the many difficult problems of social and industrial life—*e.g.* education, terms and hours of labour, collective bargaining, profit-sharing, co-operation, free labour, housing of the poor, old-age pensions, and the like—is beyond the scope of my present work. All those who wish to prosecute these branches of inquiry would do well to join the Christian Social Union. In the avowed principles and objects of that Society,[1] and in the noble utterances of its President, the Bishop of Durham, we

[1] The following are the three objects :—

1. To claim for the Christian law the ultimate authority to rule social practice.

2. To study in common how to apply the moral truths and principles of Christianity to the social and economic difficulties of the present time.

3. To present Christ in practical life as the living Master and King, the enemy of wrong and selfishness, the power of righteousness and love.

The Hon. Secretary of the Society is the Rev. J. Carter, Pusey House, Oxford.

have set before us, as it seems to me, the lines of true social progress and Christian civilization. And through the application of those principles, and the attainment of those objects, lies our best hope of removing, or at least mitigating, the social evils which are so frequently the determining cause of suicide.

CHAPTER X.

AN APPEAL TO THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE.

The essentials of Christian fellowship and co-operation: (1) Faith: the three Creeds; (2) Obedience to Christ; (3) Love of the brethren—Conclusions.

THE forces of Christendom—moral, social, and spiritual—are incalculably great, if only we could bring them to bear effectually on those powers of evil which so grievously afflict mankind. But there is also a terrible waste of energy arising from the want of unity, discipline, and *esprit de corps* amongst those who call themselves Christians.

Not that perfect uniformity, in respect to doctrine, worship, ritual, or government, is either to be expected, or desired. In a large army corps there are the different wings or divisions, different arms of the service, artillery, cavalry, infantry, armed with different weapons, and pursuing different tactics; but in the midst of all this diversity there is still unity; unity in respect of

allegiance to the Sovereign, and obedience to the Commander-in-chief; all feel that they are fighting for the success of one common cause, and that as comrades in arms they are bound to support each other with brotherly love and sympathy.

So should it be in the army of Christ, amongst all those who recognize Him as their Captain, and profess to have taken up arms in His service, and promised "to fight manfully under His banner against sin, the world, and the devil."

But, alas! too often this is not the case, and we are confronted by the unseemly spectacle of mutual jealousy and distrust, if not of undignified hostility, amongst the different sections and denominations of Christians, whereby the work of Christ is greatly hindered.

It may not be amiss, therefore, just to look into this matter, and see if nothing can be done to promote greater unity, and a deeper sense of brotherhood and *esprit de corps* amongst those who call themselves Christians.

But it is essential that we should first ascertain what are the cardinal principles of the Christian fellowship. What is required of men before they can be admitted into that fellowship? How are they to be admitted? And what is expected of

them when they have been admitted? For this information we must go to the Fountain-head of all authority, to Christ and His Apostles. And first let us hear what the Master says. This was His parting injunction to the Eleven:

"Go ye, therefore, and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you." (St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.)

There are three points to be noted:

1. The preliminary condition is faith in the Trinity.

2. The initiatory rite is Baptism.

3. The rule of life to be observed by all who are admitted is obedience.

And if to these three points we add a fourth saying of Jesus, regulating the disposition of His followers to another, "By this shall all men know that ye are My disciples, if ye have love one to another" (St. John xiii. 35), we have the greatest test-marks of the Christian Fellowship; Baptism into the Name and Faith of the Trinity, Obedience, and Love. Where these are present, whether in the individual or the community, there we must acknowledge the true membership of Christ.

To the same effect is the teaching of St. Paul, the great Apostle of the Gentiles, to the Ephesian Christians—

"Giving diligence to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. There is one body, and one Spirit, even as ye were called in one hope of your calling: one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, Who is over all, and through all, and in all." (Eph. iv. 3–6.)

Here, again, we find the same test-marks as before—Faith (one faith) in the Trinity, the condition; Baptism, the rite of admission; Obedience to Christ as the one Lord, the rule of life; and all bound together in the unity of the Spirit, Whose first-fruit is love.

Faith and obedience, then, are the two essentials for the preservation of unity amongst the followers of Christ. "Certainly!" my reader will say. "This we are ready to acknowledge; and yet, for all that, we see the Church of Christ split up into sects, differing from, and even opposed to, each other, and His mission of love to man greatly impeded thereby."

True! But have we considered with sufficient care, and freedom from bias and prejudice, what is meant by the faith and obedience of Christ?

Let us consider these points a little more closely. First, as to faith, it is to be observed that St. Paul speaks of the faith as "one"—"There is one faith." He does not say many, but only one. That it is the same as that "once for all (ἅπαξ) delivered unto the saints," for which St. Jude exhorted all Christians earnestly to contend, we cannot doubt; moreover, the baptismal formula enjoined by our Lord is of itself a confession of faith. It is, in fact, the embryo and nucleus of those fuller confessions or symbols of the Christian Faith, which the Church in after times found it necessary to authorize. As the great baptismal formula it was evermore to be used; but in practice, when adults had to be admitted into the Christian community, it was necessary that they should know what was implied in that formula—Who the three Persons of the Trinity are; what is Their work; and how They are co-related to each other, and to mankind? To meet this want, as well as to serve as a confession of faith at the time of baptism, the creed commonly called the Apostles', was drawn up. Later on, when the Arian and other heresies arose, it became needful to make further additions to preserve the integrity of "the faith once for all delivered unto the saints." Hence the creed called,

though not quite correctly, the Nicene Creed. And lastly, for the same reasons as before, appeared the Athanasian Creed.

It is impossible to doubt that these *three Creeds* represented the unanimous belief of the undivided Church previous to the great schism between Eastern and Western Christendom; and what is still more surprising, they were accepted and held in high esteem by Luther and all the Reformed Churches.[1]

It is not too much to say that, if anywhere, outside of Holy Writ, an answer to the question, What is the "one faith" of St. Paul, the "one faith," once for all delivered unto the saints? is to be found, it is in the three great Creeds of undivided Christendom.

There is no doubt a great objection to them on the part of many Christian Denominations, but is it too much to hope that a deeper knowledge of their contents, and a truer perception of the causes which rendered, and still render, them necessary, will in time remove this prejudice?

What a mighty step towards the reunion of Christendom, the success of Christian effort, and

[1] Luther called the Athanasian Creed "a bulwark to the Apostles' Creed."

the promotion of Christian charity, would their acceptance constitute!

Obedience.

But it is not only heresy that has caused schisms and divisions amongst the followers of Christ. It has been, perhaps, no less frequently an imperfect obedience to His plain commands, a picking and choosing as to which are to be kept and which not. Yet His final injunction, given at the same time as the Baptismal formula, was very plain and imperative. "Teaching *them* to observe all things whatsoever I commanded *you*." (St. Matt. xxviii. 20.)

There can be no doubt on this point, for He Himself had said, "Why call ye Me Lord, Lord, and do not the things that I say?" As much as to say, "Obedience is a *sine quâ non* if you would be members of My Society."

And yet how often has this parting injunction been disregarded both by individuals and communities of Christians. Take, as one example out of many, the command, "Drink ye all of this." What could be plainer? And yet, incredible though it seems, two communities of Christians,[1]

[1] The Roman Church and the Salvation Army.

widely separated on many points, have presumed to read a "not" into the precept, and one, alas! to pronounce its anathema against those who would comply with it.[1] Thus have they made void the Word of God by their traditions, withheld "the Cup of blessing," which Christ gave for the thirsty souls of men, and proffered instead a mutilated Sacrament.[2]

The same Apostle who tells us "there is one body" and "one faith," tells us also there is "one Lord," to Whom, as such, all Christians owe a loyal obedience, without picking and choosing for themselves among His commands. And further on, expanding the figure of the Church as "the one body," he tells us that it is through the "unity of the faith and the knowledge of the Son of God," that the "body" is to reach its maturity in the perfect manhood, "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." (Eph. iv. 13.)

But the "knowledge of the Son of God" must surely imply obedience to Him as God.

[1] Council of Trent, canon xix. See also the Creed of Pope Pius IV.

[2] "The Church of Rome hath debarred her sons of the refreshment and comfort of a perfect Sacrament, and condemned them to a mutilated, maimed and half communion."—Bishop Bull, *A Vindication of the Church of England*, p. 182.

We seem brought, then, to this conclusion: that the only real basis for the reunion of Christendom is to be found in a return to those fundamental principles of faith and obedience on which Christ intended to build His Church, and which He enjoined for the observation of all His followers.

And how enormous would be the gain which would accrue to mankind, if all the various Christian communities, laying aside their mutual jealousy and distrust, could be made to work lovingly and harmoniously together, and bring their united forces, social, moral, and spiritual, to bear on those many social and religious problems, in the solution of which the true progress of society is so intimately bound up. And while agreement on the essential points of faith and obedience are necessary for the harmonious and effectual co-operation of the different classes and communities in the Christian service, identity of view and uniformity of action on minor points are by no means so necessary. Such matters as the forms of Church government, discipline, worship, and ritual, may well be left for each community itself to decide upon.

It is the old canon we all have to bear in mind: "In essentials, unity; in non-essentials, liberty; in all things, charity."

The following, then, seem to be the conclusions to which our investigations bring us:—

1. Our growing civilization is accompanied by an alarming increase in suicide. This increase is not only an evil in itself, but is the symptom of other evils lurking beneath the surface of society.

2. As the result of our efforts to discover the specific causes of suicide, we have found that, while many of them are due to diseases of the body and mind, and do not directly submit themselves to Christian Therapeutics, there is still a large percentage (63 per cent.), considerably more than half, which are due to moral, psychical, and social causes, which ought to come under such treatment.

3. Such treatment consists of two parts in the main—

(*a*) The formation of character.

(*b*) The improvement of the social and industrial condition of the people.

For the formation of character we must look to education. But the only education which is adequate for this purpose is not that which consists in secular and technical instruction, or even culture, but is based on the principles of Christian Psychology.

For the attainment of the second object—the improvement of the social condition of the people, lightening the burthen, and mitigating the severity of the struggle for life—the only civilization that can help us is that which is leavened with the teaching of Christian Socialism.

Christian Psychology and Christian Socialism—these are the agencies to be employed by the followers of Jesus, if they are to succeed in arresting the rising tide of suicide and insanity, which form so unwelcome an accompaniment of our modern civilization.

It is a call to all Christians, who have felt the touch of Divine compassion, or even of human sympathy, "to come to the help of the Lord against the mighty," against the powers of darkness, which in the dark are slaying our brothers and sisters. It is a call to apply the remedies of the Great Physician to the sores and diseases—social, moral, spiritual—which are preying with such deadly effect on the social body; and to raise a united protest against that spirit of materialism and secularism which is the enemy alike of all true religion and philosophy.

And what a vast field of usefulness is here opened out for us! Let us go forth, then, to our work,

united in the "one faith," in dutiful allegiance to the "one Lord," and in unfeigned "love of the brethren." Then may we hope to raise our civilization out of the ruts of mere secularism, and make it Christian not in name only but in reality; to abate some, at least, of the evils which press so heavily on mankind, and help to realize that ideal of progress and perfection to which the great Apostle of the Gentiles so ardently and confidently looked forward, when we shall "all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ."

May God of His mercy hasten it in His own good time, and may He vouchsafe to accept and bless these poor labours of His unworthy servant on behalf of humanity—for Jesus' sake!

APPENDIX

ON

CIVIL AND ECCLESIASTICAL CENSURES

Coroners' juries and their verdicts—Jurors' fees—Magistrates and cases of attempted suicide—Ecclesiastical censure—Burial of suicides.

I.—*Civil Censures.*

THAT in the eye of the Law, as well as of the Church, suicide is regarded as a criminal offence is plain from the fact that the only name by which it is known in correct legal phraseology is *Felo de se*, *i.e.* an act of felony against one's self. Such, too, was formerly the invariable verdict returned at coroners' inquests. And, in order to further stigmatize the crime, the barbarous custom was adopted of interment after dark at cross-roads, with a stake thrust through the body, and the possessions of the suicide confiscated to the Crown.

It was probably in revulsion from these barbarities, and in order to spare as much as possible the feelings of surviving friends, that coroners' juries dropped the old verdict of *Felo de se*, and substituted, instead, that of *Suicide during temporary insanity*, as is now almost invariably the case. And truly one would wish to do all

that can be done to lighten a blow which, for the shame, humiliation, and grief it brings, may not well be surpassed. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that a court of coroner's inquest is a legal tribunal, through which the voice and testimony of the Law in condemning and repressing crime should be distinctly heard, and not confused through any side-issues or merely humanitarian considerations. "The human law," says the Rev. J. W. Horsley, "in respect to suicide has not parted company with the Divine, as expressed in the Sixth Commandment. It is not, in the eye of the law, a 'rash act'—to use the minimizing phrase of the penny-a-liner—but a criminal act, one injurious to the well-being of the community, and not merely a personal and private sin, which the Law might consider outside its purview."[1]

Besides, the verdict of "Suicide during temporary insanity," which coroners' juries now almost invariably return, is, I venture to say, in the vast majority of cases, false and misleading. Not a few instances have come under my own limited observation, in which the victims themselves by anticipation have deprecated and despised such a verdict. No doubt, as we have seen (p. 120), a small percentage of cases is due to purely mental aberration, such as suicidal mania, and where this is proved, the verdict "*during temporary insanity*" might still be given. But where it is not proved, would it not be better, and more likely to act as a deterrent, if the verdict were to fall back into its old form of *Felo de se*, with the cause stated, if the jury has been able to ascertain it?[2]

[1] *Workers together with God*, art. "Suicide," p. 302.

[2] The Rev. J. W. Horsley, in *Jottings from Jail*, p. 259, writes: "That the legal, or perhaps the public, mind is at present irrational with regard to the crime of suicide, needs no further illustration than that afforded by the fact, that an attempt at suicide, if successful, is almost universally said by coroners and their juries to be due to temporary insanity; while, if unsuccessful, the chaplain or doctor would be simply derided if insanity, temporary or otherwise, had been assigned as the cause. The truest kindness would, I believe, be found in more seeming severity in the attitude of the Law, of moralists, and of society towards this form of murder, which is often more cowardly, and less frequently followed by real repentance, than those forms of the offence which are expiated on the scaffold."

Such a verdict would mark the moral reprobation with which Christian society is bound to regard suicide as a crime, and at the same time *provide valuable statistics* as to causes, which would assist in repressing it.

II.—*The Duty of Coroners' Juries, and their Fees.*

That it is the duty of the jury to try honestly to ascertain the cause does not admit of doubt; but the task is frequently an unsavoury one, and one, moreover, which requires time and intelligence.

Is it the fact that jurors are adequately paid for their work by the odd shilling or two they receive? Or is it not rather true that, because the pay is so small, men of sufficient leisure decline to sit?

III.—*Magistrates and Cases of Attempted Suicide.*

It seems probable that some material reduction in the number of attempted suicides would be made, if only magistrates would deal more severely with such cases. It is an undoubted fact that such attempts are frequently *mere shams*, the only object of which is to

attract sympathy or notoriety. And I quite agree with Mr. Horsley that, if it became the exception instead of the rule for such offences to escape a period of hard labour, the number of attempts would at once and to a remarkable extent diminish.[1] Sureties for good conduct of a substantial amount should also in all cases be required.

IV.—*Ecclesiastical Censure.*

It is not improbable that the verdict of "suicide during temporary insanity" is returned because it is thought to evade ecclesiastical censure, and carry with it *the right of clergy*. This, however, is a mistake. The only rule of the Church is that contained in the first rubric in the Burial Service, which reads as follows: "Here it is to be noted, that the office ensuing is not to be used for any that die unbaptized, or excommunicate, or have laid violent hands upon themselves." Alternative forms of service are indeed provided, consisting of a few passages of Scripture and portions of the Litany, to meet those cases where the ordinary Burial Service is not to be used; but it would probably furnish an additional deterrent were it clearly understood that, no matter what the cause of suicide, or what the mental or bodily condition of the self-destroyer, the Church regards him in the same category as one who is severed from

[1] *Jottings from Jail*, by Rev. J. W. Horsley, p. 258.
"The moral standard for thousands is provided chiefly, if not solely, by what is or is not punishable in the police-court, and, not unnaturally, little harm is seen in what the law ignores, or treats lightly. . . . Two years' imprisonment can be awarded for the attempt. But as the usual course is a week's remand, and a lecture, little is thought of the offence."—*Workers together with God*, p. 305.

the visible Church of Christ, and that therefore she is unable to commend him to God in her usual language of faith and hope. The discipline of the Church in a matter of such importance ought surely not to be neglected; for, as Mr. Horsley points out, that neglect has had something to do with the cessation of more just views of suicide.[1]

[1] *Workers together with God*, art. "Suicide," p. 307.

NOTES

(A.)—ON SIN.

(1) In the Hebrew we have three principal words or synonyms for sin—

(*a*) אָשָׁם (*asham*), with the sense of *guilt.*

(*b*) חֵטְא (*chet*), as *failure.*

(*c*) פֶּשַׁע (*pesha*), as *transgression.*

(2) In the Greek the principal synonyms are—

(*a*) ἁμαρτία (*hamartia*), verbal substantive from ἁμαρτάνω (*hamartano*) = to *miss the mark*, to fail.

(*b*) παραπτώμα (*paraptoma*) = a falling beside; thence, a false step, a blunder.

(*c*) ὀφείλημα (*opheilema*) = that which is owing, *a debt.*

(*d*) ἀνομία (*anomia*) = lawlessness.

(3) In Latin the chief generic word for sin is *peccatum*, which is the verbal substantive of *pecco*, a contracted form of *pecuco* or *pecudico* (but not *pedico*, from *pes* = a foot, as suggested by Skeat).

Pecuco and *pecudico* would be formed from *pecus* = cattle, usually sheep, after the analogy of *fodico*, *claudico:* and therefore *pecco* as the contracted form of *pecuco* or *pecudico* would denote wandering away like a sheep or beast. And the underlying idea of *peccatum*, therefore, is that of straying away into the wilderness, and so becoming lost. This idea of sin was familiar in Isaiah's time (cf. Isa. liii. 6, "All we like sheep have gone astray"). Our Saviour, it will be remembered, made use of this aspect of sin in His beautiful parable of the lost sheep. And the idea is preserved

for us in the General Confession of our Daily Office: "We have erred and strayed from Thy ways like lost sheep."

(B.)—ON CONSCIENCE.

THE idea which underlies the word for conscience both in Greek and Latin is that of *knowing together with* another, or with one's self. Συνείδησις is from σύνοιδα, and *conscientia* is from *conscio*. Both, too, take a dative of the person with whom the knowledge is shared. Μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ συνειδέναι is the equivalent of *nil conscire sibi* = "to have no load on one's conscience;" συνειδέναι τινι = "to be privy to a man's opinions;" so σ. ἐμαυτῷ = "to know my own thoughts." This function of conscience is well expressed by St. Paul in other words (Acts xxvi. 9), "I verily thought with myself (ἔδοξα ἐμαυτῷ) that I ought to do," etc.

Although in the Hebrew we do not meet with the exact equivalent to the Greek and Latin words for *conscience*, yet there are passages not a few in the Psalms—the great manual of Jewish devotion—which bear witness to that self-introspection and criticism—that "knowing together with another," which is the essential function of conscience. Sometimes we find the Psalmist asking God to act the part of conscience, while he exposes to His severe scrutiny the inmost recesses of his heart, *e.g.* Ps. cxxxix. 23, 24, "Try me, O God, and seek the ground of my heart: prove me, and examine my thoughts. Look well if there be any way of wickedness in me, and lead me in the way everlasting." At other times we find conscience exercising its functions of self-examination and judgment in the ordinary way, as Ps. lxxvii. 6, "In the night I commune with mine own heart, and search out my spirits." And as the heart was spoken of as the seat of the affections, and the head that of intelligence, so the reins (Lat. *renes* = the kidneys or loins) were regarded as the organs of the introspective and judicial faculty we now call conscience, *e.g.* "My reins also instruct me in the night season" (Ps. xvi. 7); "O Lord, try my reins and my heart" (Ps. xxvi. 2); "Thus was I pricked in my reins (conscience)." (Ps. lxxiii. 21.)

On the relation between the human and Divine conscience, I cannot refrain from quoting the following fine passage from the Rev. J. R. Illingworth's book, *Personality, Human and Divine*, p. 110: "Man is conscious of an imperative obligation on his conduct. It is not a physical necessity, disguised in any shape or form, for he is also conscious of being free either to accept or decline it. It cannot originate within him, for he has no power to unmake it, and it accomplishes purposes which its agent does not at the time foresee—results to himself and others which he can recognize afterwards as rational, but which his own individual reason could never have designed. It cannot be the voice of other men, though human law may give it partial utterance; for it speaks to his motives, which no law can fathom, and calls him to attainments which no law can reach. Yet, with all its independence of human authorship, it has the notes of personality about it. It commands our will with an authority which we can only attribute to a conscious will. It constrains us to modes of action which are not of our own seeking, yet which issue in results that only reason could have planned. It educates our character with a nicety of influence irresistibly suggestive of paternal care. The philosophers who have probed it, the saints and heroes who have obeyed and loved it, the sinners who have defied it, are agreed in this. And the inevitable inference must be that it is the voice of a Personal God."

(C.)—BETTING AND GAMBLING.

THAT betting and gambling frequently lead to suicide does not admit of doubt; nor, again, that both are vastly on the increase. The habit now pervades all ranks of society, and finds its way into many forms of sport and even business. Men need not go to the racecourse, or the casino, to find

opportunities. The neighbouring cricket or football match will afford them. And we have only to watch the crowds of men and boys, and even women, thronging the country wayside stations on a summer evening, eager to learn the latest odds, or the name of the winning horse in the last great race, to see how the press has provided facilities for betting to the labouring classes, even in our remote rural districts. A few words on the subject, then, may not be out of place.

If betting and gambling were an honest and profitable way of earning a livelihood, or even a healthy and innocent sport, I would not have a word to say against them; but I contend they are neither. What is it, then, that makes them so objectionable and immoral in their practice, so injurious in their tendency, so dangerous and often fatal in their effects? Nor is it enough, by way of reply, to point to the sad results in ruined homes and reputations, to which they often give rise. A man may say, "May I not do what I like with my own? If I choose to risk my money at dice, or cards, or roulette, or to lay odds on this or that horse, what is that to anybody but myself? If I lose my stake or wager, the loss is my own, and nobody else will suffer." All this has a plausible ring about it, but it will not bear examination.

Apart from the facts that the gambler frequently stakes money which does not belong to him, or which he knows he cannot pay if he loses; and again, that, if he loses, the loss will fall as heavily on his family and friends as himself, the habit itself, regarded from a moral point of view, is quite indefensible. Cupidity is its tap-root—that "love of money' which an apostle tells us is "the root of all evil." Aristotle[1] condemns the vice in scathing terms, and compares gamblers with footpads and robbers; for, says he, "they are greedy of filthy lucre, and make gain out of their friends, whom they ought rather to benefit."

Bishop Westcott defines gambling as "the habitual seeking of personal gain through another's loss, though with his

[1] *Nicomachean Ethics*, I.

consent, without making any adequate return for what is received, or adding anything to the sum of their commonwealth." Herbert Spencer calls it "a kind of action by which pleasure is gained at the cost of pain to another." The whole proceeding is immoral, and the immorality of it springs from covetousness—the desire, that is, to get rich at another's expense, without the expenditure of honest labour on our part, or any compensation made to him whose property we unjustly acquire. As such, betting and gambling are violations of the Tenth Commandment, "Thou shalt not covet," and are, therefore, from a moral and religious point of view, quite indefensible.

But not only is the habit reprehensible in itself—it is inevitably attended by moral deterioration. Like a cancer, it feeds upon a man's moral and spiritual fibre. Like the love of drink, it becomes, if yielded to, a master passion before which everything must give way. Nothing remains sacred: wife, family, home, reputation, all will be sacrificed rather than the fatal habit relinquished. Let a man once become possessed by the idea that he can make his living, and perhaps his fortune, by gambling, and he will despise patient toil and the laying up in store for himself and others. This method is too slow for him, so he thinks to carve out a royal road to wealth, and usually ends in poverty and disgrace. The practice, it has been said, seems to have the wondrous faculty of drawing its votaries into every kind of crime; and the chaplain of Stafford Gaol writes: "We are able to fill one of our spacious corridors with young men of the clerk and accountant class, varying from the age of sixteen to twenty-three, and, according to their own statement, it is betting and gambling which has brought them here." It tempts the shop-boy to rob the till, and the accountant to falsify his balance-sheet. It leads to cheating at cards, roguery on the racecourse, angry disputes and deadly feuds. It has ruined many of the first families in the land, broken up and scattered many an ancestral estate to the winds. The innocent suffer along with the guilty, and times without number the gambler, when beggary and shame stare him

in the face, has sought to escape by the terrible sin of suicide.[1]

It would be wrong to say that every form of speculation[2] should be condemned; and it is by no means easy to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate speculation. No man, probably, would go far wrong if he would limit his speculative transactions to a judicious forecast of future fluctuations in material or labour, owing to probable supply or demand. "Legitimate speculation," said the Ven. J. W. Diggle in his paper read before the Church Congress in 1899, "submits to no uncertainty, except such as is inevitable; it courts no risk, it can pay for what it buys, and has a well-grounded hope that at the appointed time it can deliver what it sells. It keeps well within its means; and its gains, far from necessarily involving another's loss,

[1] The following extract from the *Financial Guide*, January 12, 1898, is much to the point:—

"The case of the authorized clerk, who committed suicide the other day through difficulties he had got into in dealing in the Chartered Company's shares, should prove an object-lesson to Stock Exchange clerks generally. There is no doubt that a great deal of gambling takes place both inside and outside the 'House' by young men who are neither members nor clients of members, and the Committee seem powerless to put an end to it. . . . For instance, the letter-boxes of private residents in the country, and even in the suburbs of London, are flooded with craftily-written circulars, stating how money may be made easily, and a fortune gained without trouble. Only £5 is needed to begin with, and this, it is argued, may double itself in a week. The unsuspecting victim, ensnared by the brilliant prospect held before his astonished gaze, sends his £5—and loses it. Sometimes, indeed, he does not lose it at once, but the result is always the same in the end. These easy methods of gaining money are immoral, foolish, and unsafe. The whole thing is merely a form of gambling, and a very bad form too, because, in nine cases out of ten, the speculator stands no chance at all of ever getting his money back."

[2] The word is derived either from *speculum* = a mirror in which things are reflected, or from *specula* = a watch-tower, from which things are espied. Both, however, from Latin *specere* = to see.

are intended to flow from the facilitation and expansion of trade, or the success of some beneficent enterprise. On the other hand, illegitimate speculation disturbs the even progress of trade, profits nobody, except perchance the speculator himself; perverts salutary enterprises into mere games of chance; buys that for which it has no power to pay; and sells that which it has no reasonable hope of being able to deliver. It traffics in uncertainties, and, whatever its gains, they can only be won by inflicting on others a corresponding loss. All such speculations, however gilded, are mere, sheer profligate gambling." To put money into "Pools" and "Combinations," or to send it, in response to delusive promises, to financial agents to be placed in "Options," at "Put and Call," on the "Cover" system, is certainly speculation of the illegitimate kind, the only proper name for which is gambling.

The advice of Lord Rosebery[1] to those who are thinking of spending their time and money on the Turf—"Don't"—is applicable also to all who think of embarking in any form of betting and gambling, and that for similar reasons. (1) The apprenticeship is too expensive. (2) The pursuit is too engrossing for any one who has anything else to do in this life. (3) The rewards are altogether disproportionate to the disappointments.

But, if betting and gambling are morally and socially wrong, they are not less so when regarded from an economic point of view. The gambler and the betting man are as drones in the social community, because they bring no benefit to the commonwealth. Take the case of the bookmaker. Bookmaking is the most scientific mode of betting, and affords scope for considerable ability. Let us suppose that he succeeds in making a fortune; what do his gains represent? Simply the losses of others, less fortunate or astute than himself. But the world is no richer for his gains. He has added nothing to the common stock of wealth or happiness, but rather the reverse. And if it be

[1] Speech at the Gimcrack Club. See *Standard*, December 8, 1899.

argued, that but for him and his like a host of employees on the Turf would find their occupation gone, it may fairly be replied, that their time and labour would be more profitably spent in other walks of industry.

"The earth hath God given to the children of men." Yes, the earth is the true source of wealth. But this wealth is only to be extracted by patient industry and skill. The fisherman with his net, the farmer with his plough, the miner with his pickaxe, and the artisan who adapts the various products of the earth to the wants of mankind, these are the men who make nations wealthy and prosperous; but where amongst these is the gambler or the betting man to be found?

And how is the evil to be abated? Probably the only real remedy is to be found in the creation of a more healthy public opinion. As the press has had much to do in spreading the habit, so doubtless it might be instrumental in reducing it. Certainly a more strict censorship of the press in regard to betting advertisements seems desirable. Unfortunately, as the Bishop of Hereford recently pointed out, fashion gives countenance to betting, and the result is the demoralization of sport and the depravation of character. Here again, then, is work for the Christian Socialist.

(D.)—TEMPERANCE REFORMS.

By permission of Rev. J. Carter, Hon. Secretary of the Christian Social Union, I reproduce Leaflet No. 31, on the subject of Temperance Reforms, published by the Oxford University Branch. It not only contains a good deal of information on the present position of the Temperance question, but also affords much matter for the careful consideration of all who are interested in this important subject.

"TEMPERANCE REFORMS.

"In order to understand the Temperance problem it is important to recognize two facts. First, the intimate relation

between this particular question and other problems of social reform. On the one hand, overwork and underpay, insanitary dwellings, hard toil unrelieved by wholesome recreation, and similar causes, all tend to make people intemperate in the use of alcoholic liquor; while, on the other hand, any improvement in such conditions is sure to be hampered, if not neutralized, unless we can check the excessive increase of the national drink bill. Secondly, a general review of the numerous attempts both at home and abroad to reduce the evils of intemperance by State laws, shows that extreme measures have for the most part created worse evils (except under very special circumstances), while more moderate reforms have at least produced some good results, however partial in their effect. In any case the success of legislation depends upon the existence of an earnest and predominant public opinion, resolute to enforce the law.

"I.—*The Problem.*

"1. *Effects of Intemperance.* The *per capita* consumption of alcohol in the United Kingdom is greater than it was in 1840:—viz. 4·30 gallons of proof spirit, representing an expenditure of £3 16*s.* 10½*d.* for each individual, including abstainers and children. The total expenditure for 1898 was over £154,000,000, of which probably more than £100,000,000 was spent by the working classes, which represents an expenditure on alcoholic liquors of 6*s.* 5*d.* per week for each of the six million working-class families.

"2. The economic effects of this expenditure, implying a corresponding lack of power to purchase what is necessary for the maintenance of industrial life at its highest efficiency, are quite obvious. Though drink is not the sole cause of poverty and distress, yet the weekly income of a large proportion of the working classes will not allow free expenditure upon alcoholic drink except at the certain risk of lowering the standard of economic efficiency.

"3. The statistics of drunkenness show that about 30 per

cent. of the total number of offences are committed by women, and that during the last twenty years the ratio of mortality from alcoholic excess has increased 43 per cent. among men, and 104 per cent. among women. Sir Andrew Clark stated that, of the people in his hospital wards, 'seven out of every ten owed their ill-health to alcohol.'

"4. *Political Dangers.* In 1896 the United Kingdom contained 8686 brewers and 173 distillers, controlling some two hundred millions of capital; and the extension of Limited Liability Companies has distributed this pecuniary interest over a large body of shareholders.

"5. The trade has openly adopted the principle of 'Our trade our politics,' and endeavours to subordinate the larger questions which concern the national welfare to its own peculiar requirements. The political influence of such a powerful organization, working through the widespread system of public-houses, has already had a marked effect, which goes far to justify Lord Rosebery's prediction that 'if the State does not soon control the liquor traffic, the liquor traffic will control the State.'

"6. Similarly, in the United States, the organized power of the liquor traffic has been used 'to corrupt the lower courts, the police administration, political organizations, and even the electorate itself.'

"II.—*Proposed Remedies.*

"1. *Prohibition.* The method of total prohibition by law has been tried by fifteen of the States of America, but only survives in five. It closes the public-house and the distillery within the borders of the State, but does not prevent the consumer from importing liquor for his own use. It has been successful in the rural districts of sparsely populated States, but has invariably failed in those which have large urban populations.

"2. The statistics of drunkenness, pauperism, and crime do not prove the efficacy of prohibition outside the rural districts. And the wholesale evasion of prohibitive laws in the towns, often with the connivance of the officials, is disastrous to the moral tone of the community.

"3. Even in a rural and agricultural State like Maine, which in 1890 contained two towns with a population of more than 20,000, the evils created by fifty years' trial of this experiment seem to be worse than those it attempts to cure.

"4. *State Monopoly* is enforced in Russia and in South Carolina, with the object (*a*) of checking intemperance, and (*b*) of increasing the revenues of the State. The system insures more wholesome liquor, and also reduces the number of places where drink can be obtained. But there is a serious danger lest the authorities should be tempted to encourage or allow excessive drinking for the sake of the revenue. No compensation has been given for the suppression of licences.

"5. *High Licences* have been adopted in seven of the American States, notably in Pennsylvania, where the fee imposed in 1888 was so high that at Philadelphia the number of licensed houses was reduced from 5773 to 1343. The possible advantages of this system are the abolition of the worst saloons, stricter police control, and a better observance of the law; but it is exposed to the danger of illegal traders, and it hardly checks the political influence of the saloon, which can be made more effective when concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy monopolists.

"III.—*Other Plans.*

"1. *In Scandinavia.*—The Gothenburg system in Norway and Sweden, supported by the voluntary efforts of temperance reformers, has succeeded in reducing the consumption of spirits. Its main principle is the elimination of private profit from the drink traffic by granting a monopoly for the sale of spirits to a company under certain restrictions; and its immediate result is a diminution of the number of public-houses. It has only been applied to the sale of the national drink, 'bränvin,' beer and wine still remaining outside its range.

"2. The shareholders in these companies may not receive

more than 5 per cent. interest on the capital invested ; and the remaining profits of the trade are devoted to public purposes—*e.g.* the establishment of reading-rooms and eating-houses for working men, or grants to charitable institutions, or are paid over to the town treasury. The appropriation of profits in aid of local rates, as allowed by the Swedish plan, is exposed to serious abuse ; the Norwegian plan, which in 1901 will give 15 per cent. of the profits to the municipality, 20 per cent. to the company for 'objects of general utility,' and 65 per cent. to the State, probably for old-age pensions, is safer.

"3. The various houses are managed by officials who receive a fixed salary, and are responsible to the company for any breach of its bye-laws. The bars are plainly furnished, looking more like offices than tap-rooms. No loitering is permitted ; and in Bergen no seats are provided, nor may female attendants be employed.

"4. In consequence of this system, the trade regulations can easily be enforced without any legal proceedings ; for the company can immediately dismiss a servant who has permitted any irregularity. Progressive forms are facilitated without recourse to the legislature :—*e.g.* the age under which minors may not be served has been raised from the statutory fifteen years to eighteen years ; all the companies close on Sundays, and greatly limit the hours of sale on week-days. And a complete divorce has been effected between politics and the liquor traffic.

"5. *In England* the minority report of the recent Licensing Commission, signed by the Chairman, Lord Peel, suggests a practical basis of union between all temperance advocates for the immediate attainment of some measure of reform. Without some such agreement there is little hope of any effective opposition to the growing power of the liquor trade as organized for political purposes.

"6. Any scheme to reduce the number of public-houses—say to one per 750 inhabitants in towns, and one per 400 in rural districts—must face the question of compensation. There is no legal right to compensation, but it would be

equitable to give reasonable notice for the withdrawal of a licence (say five or seven years), or else to make the trade pay compensation to those who lose their licences.

"7. It should always be remembered that the public-house is a place for necessary social intercourse, and, therefore, that the provision of an adequate substitute for it should form part of any scheme for reducing the number of public-houses.

"8. If the Government would confer upon localities the power to grant a monopoly of the retail drink traffic, it would be possible for municipalities or philanthropic companies to try experiments on the Gothenburg principle.

"Cf. Rowntree and Sherwell. *The Temperance Problem and Social Reform.* (Hodder and Stoughton. 6*s.*)
Royal Commission on Liquor Licensing Laws, 1899. (C.—9379. 3*s.* 3*d.*)
Wines and Koren. *The Liquor Problem in its Legislative Aspects.* (Houghton and Mifflin. 6*s.*)
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

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CONTAINING

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PART II. AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY

BY

REV. J GURNHILL, B.A.
SCHOLAR AND MORAL SCIENCE PRIZEMAN OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
AUTHOR OF "A COMPANION TO THE PSALTER," "A MONOGRAPH ON THE GAINSBOROUGH PARISH REGISTERS," ETC.

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For is He not all but thou, that hast power to feel, I am I?"

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PREFACE TO VOL. II.

WHATEVER else I may have to complain of, I cannot complain that the first volume of my book on *The Morals of Suicide* has failed to attract attention. Not only in England and Scotland has it been extensively reviewed, but also in the United States, in India and Australia. Apart altogether from the very diverse character of these reviews, of which I shall speak later on, this proves that the importance of the subject is fully recognized. So far so good. And I hardly need say, that had I not been deeply and even painfully impressed with its importance, I should never have essayed to write on a subject so naturally uninviting. Perhaps there is none which brings us into closer touch with the weaknesses, the wants, the sin, the misery, and, I may add, the misfortunes of mankind than this. We seem in considering and investigating it to lay our finger

upon the pulse of the great social body. We feel it, so to speak, throbbing beneath our touch; and if, like the physician of bodily ailments, we have any powers of diagnosis, we ought to be able to gain some insight into the patient's condition, and some knowledge of the disease from which he is suffering. Truly there is scarcely a malady of body, mind, or soul which does not contribute its quotum to the death-roll of suicide. And if my book has been the means of directing the attention of thoughtful philanthropic men and social reformers to a subject so grave and important, I ought to be thankful, however little fresh light my own labours may have thrown around it. And I am thankful; for I cannot but believe that others, far wiser and more able than myself, will be prompted to come to the rescue, and consider what can be done to mitigate or remove those causes and social evils of which suicide is at once the index and the outcome.

Reviewers on the staff of journals, which rank amongst the highest in the land, in literature, science, and philosophy, have given me a thoughtful and dispassionate hearing. I do not doubt for a moment they are gentlemen fit in every sense

for the lofty position they fill, and the arduous and responsible duties which, as critics, they have to perform. And I desire before going a step further to tender them, one and all, my sincere and respectful thanks.

Whatever the nature of their criticisms—and it would be absurd to expect they should all agree—I do not doubt that those criticisms are the expression of genuine conviction. I suppose we are all in quest of truth, and honest criticism, even though severe, is not a thing to be deprecated, because, like the winnowing blast, it separates the corn from the chaff.

And, truly, the critiques which have appeared have not only been numerous, but well-nigh as varied as numerous. Almost every degree of praise and censure is to be found amongst them. Indeed, they would afford ample material for a study of mental idiosyncrasy, did I care to put them to such a purpose; and I confess it has both amused and astonished me to find how the same work should have called forth views and opinions so widely divergent. By some of my critics I am accused of opening the door to too many side issues, which seemed to lie outside the legitimate

scope of inquiry. And the *Church Quarterly* reviewer charges me with bringing myself and my readers into deep waters. There is some truth, perhaps, in both these accusations. In reply, I would merely say at this point, that the subject is so many-sided, and so intimately bound up with various aspects of human life and experience, that it is extremely difficult to say what side issues are not more or less pertinent to the thorough investigation of it. For example, the sense of Responsibility has a very close bearing on suicide. But Responsibility involves the consideration of Personality, without which it cannot be said to exist. Here, then, at once, we are necessarily brought into deep water. The worst of it is, that in the present volume I cannot promise my readers or critics a return to the calmer waters and shallower depths of ascertained truth. We shall still be on a voyage of discovery. But I ask them not to forsake me, but keeping open "the weather eye" of a healthy and impartial criticism, assist in making some addition to our stock of human knowledge and happiness. I have ventured, I know, to handle great subjects and difficult ones, and in so doing I have exposed myself to the criticism of

men who are probably more conversant with them, and better able to deal with them than myself. I humbly apologize for my presumption, and whether in some points I am right or my critics, I beg them at least to believe that I am actuated by one motive only, to promote the welfare of humanity.

The Essay on Personality may be called the Argument for a Personal Prius as deduced from, or implied in, Christian Theology and Metaphysic. And it will be seen from the footnotes to how large an extent I have endeavoured to strengthen my position by extracts from Professor Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, in which practically the same subject is treated from a somewhat different standpoint, but in which the same conclusion is arrived at.

And now, perhaps, it will be asked, What is the end and object to be gained by this dissertation on Personality?

The importance of the subject was brought home to me by Schopenhauer's dictum of "the unassailable right" of a man to destroy himself if he chooses. *Cui non libet vivere licet mori.* And certainly, if there be no personality other and

higher than his own, I do not see how this right can be denied him. My original object, then, was to try and deepen the sense of responsibility which attaches to life, by a more careful investigation of its most probable origin, and the obligations and conditions which that origin implies.

This, as it seemed to me, could not be done without an effort to show the connection which must ever exist between Metaphysic and Religion on the one hand, and between Religion and Morality on the other. For Metaphysic is the attempt to discover a theory of the Universe acceptable to reason and philosophy. And Religion is the same theory translated into popular language, and clothed in the form and raiment of worship. It is truth as an object of reason and intelligence, when it becomes the subject of faith and sentiment. And Morality is the product of Religion in its practical effect on character and conduct. What the metaphysical basis is, such will be the Religion which expresses it, and what the Religion, such the Morality. But truth is one, though many-sided. And the true Religion and the true Morality must also be able to justify themselves when subjected to the metaphysical test.

My aim has not been to prove the truth of the Christian Religion, but to show that it rests upon, and is the expression of, a Metaphysic which presents an intelligible and reasonable view of the facts and phenomena of the Universe, whether material or spiritual, whether mental or moral. I have endeavoured to show, however imperfectly, that there is a Christian Metaphysic as well as a Christian Religion, and that there exists between the two a harmony and consistency which strengthens both, and affords a strong presumption that both are true. Lastly, I have sought to prove that Personality is the essential principle which underlies them both, which renders them both intelligible, and without which neither could exist.

From Personality springs the sense of responsibility. If Metaphysic expresses itself in religion, and religion begets its corresponding morality in character and conduct; so, if the theory of Personality as propounded by the Christian system of Metaphysic and Religion be true, then my own personality at once becomes conditioned by its relation to other personalities, and chiefly to that Supreme Personality from Whom it springs. I

am not an isolated personal unit, coming I know not whence, going I know not whither, without purpose, without end, the product of blind fortuity. I am not free to do what I like with myself. I am not an irresponsible agent, and Schopenhauer's contention of man's "*unassailable right*" to destroy himself, if he be so minded, becomes in the highest degree immoral and untenable.

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REVIEWS AND FURTHER STATISTICS

CHAPTER I.

REVIEW OF PRESS NOTICES AND CRITIQUES.

Spectator—Christian Advocate—Independent (N. York)—London Quarterly Review—Church Review—Western Morning News—Literary World—Daily Chronicle—St. James's Gazette—New York Times—Review of the Week—Saturday Review—Liverpool Daily Post—British Medical Journal—Lancet—Medical Press—Indian Church Quarterly Review—Critic (N. York)—Globe—Democrat—American Ecclesiastical Review—Church Quarterly Review.

I WISH it to be understood that in this review I am not so much concerned about defending myself, as in examining the views and statements of my critics. My object will be rather to profit by criticism than to refute it. I shall consider the notices pretty much in the order I have received them ; and, I may add, that many of them, being little more than a summary of contents, do not present much to call forth any remarks.

The Spectator, January 26, 1901.

The Reviewer must allow me to thank him sincerely for his appreciative and favourable

critique. I only wish it were better deserved; but if my labours bear fruit in the direction he prognosticates, I shall feel to be abundantly repaid. To be told, on so high an authority, that my book is "very valuable for the statistical and other information that it supplies as to the growth of suicide and insanity in the world, and as to the relations between them and certain social evils, of which the chief is intemperance," is a compliment, of which I am, as I ought to be, deeply sensible.

I have been accused by one of my critics (the *Lancet*) of want of sympathy for those who find themselves "cornered in the battle of life." It is, therefore, an intense relief to find that, in the judgment of others, whose opinion is equally trustworthy and valuable, "the book is so full of faith and hope and charity, of wise counsel and tender sympathy, that it cannot fail to be of ethical as well as of psychological and sociological importance."

The Christian Advocate and *Independent*,
New York City.

The notices which appeared in these journals lay me under a debt of gratitude. My book, I am sure, is in many respects far from being "an admirable one." On the contrary, I am fully

conscious of its many imperfections. But if, indeed, it is found to be "stimulating and suggestive, and containing a great deal of information," that is enough for me. And heartily do I re-echo the wish of one of my kindly critics, that my words of warning and advice "could fall under the eye of many who stand at the parting of the ways before it is too late." God help thee, my brother! My sympathy and prayers are thine.

The London Quarterly Review, July, 1900.

The writer objects to the term "Christian Socialism," which he thinks would be better described as "Christian Altruism." But I would reply that, though Altruism is one of the leading features of Christian Socialism, it does not adequately express the objects or the work of *the Christian Social Union*. Even Morselli and the Comtists, with Mr. Harrison as their chief exponent in this country, are Altruists. But *the Christian Social Union* has its origin in the recognition of the Fatherhood of God as revealing the Brotherhood of man. And its object is to secure the acknowledgment of Christ as "the ultimate authority" in all the manifold relationships and activities of social life. I notice with pleasure my

critic's admission, that "the remedy, if indirect, would undoubtedly be effective. The universal keeping of the golden rule would prevent most of the conditions out of which the crime of self-murder grows." This is all I contend for. The aim of the Union is to leaven every class and department of social life and industry with the principles and precepts of Christianity. By so doing it hopes to ameliorate the conditions of life for all classes of the community down to the lowest. For, while education renders life more attractive to the few, and opens out fresh avenues of employment to those who can avail themselves of it, it seems to do little towards improving the conditions of life for the masses. In spite of our increasing civilization, the struggle for life is perhaps keener than ever, as is shown by the increasing death-rate through suicide.

Mr. W. W. Westcott, while fully admitting that there are many proximate causes which result in self-destruction, says—

"I should add that in modern times it is the high pressure at which we live, the difficulty of obtaining a livelihood, and the forced education of the young, which fills our asylums and swells our voluntary death-rate." [1]

[1] *Suicide*, p. 143.

The Church Review.

The writer refers to the subjects of Physiological Psychology, and Betting and Gambling. Each of them has, doubtless, an important bearing on suicide. A more fitting place for a few further remarks on the first will be found in the chapters on Personality and Responsibility, but what I have to add to my note on Betting and Gambling may as well be said now as later on.

The terrible increase in this habit is one of the most distressing features of our modern social life. It is thus that some of our judges have alluded to it:—

Mr. Justice Grantham says: "Gambling with book-makers is the cause of more crime and misery than anything else in the land."

Mr. Justice Wills: "When I first came upon the Bench I used to think drink was the most fruitful cause of crime, but it is now a question whether the unlimited facilities for illegitimate speculation . . . are not a more prevalent source of mischief and crime even than drink."

Sir James Vaughan (Bow Street magistrate): "It is sapping the vitals of the nation."

In an appeal put forth by the National Anti-Gambling League in 1900, urging on Local Government authorities the adoption of the by-law

forbidding street-betting, it is stated that this pernicious habit is responsible for no less than *fifty suicides* and embezzlements, and thirty bankruptcies during the past six months in England alone.

At the time I am writing this, a Select Committee of the House of Lords is sitting for the purpose of taking evidence as to the growth of betting. Mr. I. Hawke, Secretary of the Anti-Gambling League, when called upon to give evidence, made some sad and startling disclosures as to the increasing prevalence of betting and gambling in almost every class of the community, from the highest to the lowest. It was spreading amongst postal telegraphists and civil and other public servants. "In the 5½ years from May, 1896, to May, 1901, there had been clearly traceable to betting, 80 *suicides*, 320 embezzlements, and 191 bankruptcies." More drastic legislation was in every way desirable. It is much to be wished that, as a result of the present inquiry, a Bill will be passed to repress the growth of this great social evil, which, as we see so frequently, leads its victims to self-destruction.

The Western Morning News.

The writer has very accurately gauged the purpose and scope of my book in the following passages :—

"The psychology of the materialistic scientist reduces man to an automaton, the psychology of 'the greater hope' finds in human personality a corresponding, but infinitely greater, Personality behind the veil of the flesh."

And again—

"Indeed, the main value of the treatise lies in this solid appreciation of the fact that religion and morality must work hand-in-hand with social progress, if evils of the nature of suicide are to be stamped out."

The Literary World.

There is great truth and value in the following remark. Would that we might see it more generally exemplified !—

"There are, of course, many cases of suicide which cannot be remedied, for which, in fact, there is no remedy ; but there are many more where a little kindness, a little practical help, or a little friendly counsel would have tided over what seemed a crisis, and showed life again not at all hopeless or impossible."

The Daily Chronicle.

I fear there is only too much truth in the following remark :—

"The crime (of suicide)—for such it is reckoned by our law—is becoming more frequent, because a belief that there is no conscious life beyond is also becoming more common, though not perhaps among the most thoughtful people."

My critic finds fault with my quotation from "In Memoriam" on the title-page. Let me point out that he has failed to grasp my meaning. The principle, which is writ so large in Nature, of "Life through death," is equally true in the department of man's moral and spiritual life. Only through the mortification of the lower animal passions is the soul set free to soar into the higher and purer atmosphere of spiritual light and liberty. It is only by victory over self that a man can escape those causes and conditions which degrade and enslave him ; which rob life of its zest and nobility, and lead him to flee from the evils which encompass him by the act of self-destruction. Surely such a victory as this may well be described in Tennyson's beautiful lines—

"That men may rise on stepping-stones
Of their dead selves to higher things."

Again says my critic—

"There are quaint, but wholly irrelevant notes on Philology."

If they are irrelevant, then I have nothing more to say. But I cannot admit that they are. Words are like fossils ; they have a tale to tell. And just as the crust of the earth contains the record of its past history, so language throws light on the origin and progress of human thought. Words are more than empty sounds, conventional tokens useful for the transfer of ideas, but nothing more. If we can read them aright, and get at their radical meaning, full often they, too, will amply repay the toil : for they will disclose the primitive ideas of the things for which they stand. And certain it is, that a knowledge of the names and terms we use is absolutely necessary for accurate thought. I apologize for alluding, even in self-defence, to truths so obvious.

St. James's Gazette.

Reference is made to the form of verdict usually passed by coroners' juries.

"Mr. Gurnhill is right, we think, when he says some good might result, if attempts at suicide were more rigorously dealt with by magistrates."

The testimony of Mr. W. W. Westcott, Deputy-Coroner for Central Middlesex, on this point ought to carry weight.

"I cannot refrain from saying, that both law and custom with respect to suicide are in a very unsatisfactory and anomalous state. On the one hand, self-murder is ranked by the law as a *felony*, one of the worst of crimes; on the other hand, hardly one suicide a year is called a *felon*. Suicide is not in law any proof of the existence of insanity, yet no sooner is the suicide quite dead, than almost every one cries out that he was insane. Again, an attempt at suicide is a misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment, yet a person caught in the act and taken before the magistrates is generally dismissed from custody, not because of insanity, certainly not, because if that were the plea he would be sent to an asylum, and not set free; but let the culprit presently die from a cause dependent on the suicidal injury, and the verdict will be that he was insane. Surely such incongruities cannot be allowed to exist much longer."[1]

New York Times.

The critique which appeared in this journal is both appreciative and discriminating, and I beg to offer the writer my best thanks. With

[1] *Suicide*, by W. W. Westcott, p. 160.

regard to the increase of suicide in the United States, I am glad to say that the figures which appeared in the *Chicago Tribune*—namely, from 987 in the year 1885 to 5750 in 1895—appear to be much exaggerated. For more reliable information I now refer my readers to Chap. II., containing further statistics in the United States.

Review of the Week.

"The chapters in the book are of somewhat unequal merit, and in some cases we should like to have seen fuller treatment—*e.g.* in the discussion of Personality. But this in no way impairs our verdict that the work is a valuable contribution to the literature of sociology, bearing evidences of serious thought."

The subject of Personality is one of great importance in relation to the moral aspect of suicide. Moreover, as it is one of considerable complexity, a fuller discussion of it will be found in the Essay on Personality, which forms the second part of this volume.

The Saturday Review.

The notice which appeared in this paper can neither be called a critique nor a review. Indeed, we might almost suppose the writer had accepted

a brief in defence of suicide. He is pleased to regard my book as to all intents and purposes little more than "a sermon;" and he then goes on to quote evidence showing the want of unanimity as to the lawfulness of suicide amongst different nations in ancient and modern times. I do not suppose any one doubted this; though the statement that suicide was not proscribed by Greek and Roman philosophy must, I think, be accepted with reserve; seeing that Aristotle (*Ethics*, V. chap. xi.) calls it a sin against the State, and says that the memory of the suicide should be marked by infamy.

Under the later Roman Empire suicide became *excessively* frequent, and, indeed, quite fashionable. But what was the cause? The luxury and sloth which predominated amongst the cultured classes, and the dictum of the Stoic School, "*Mori licit cui vivere non placet.*"

But are those examples for us to follow? Are Zeno and Epicurus and the rest, "the followers of Odin and the Brahmins of the East," to influence the conclusions to be drawn from Christian Ethics?

"Suicide," the writer adds, "was permitted by Sir Thomas More in his *Utopia*, and has

been defended by many thinkers in modern times."[1]

The following, I presume, is the passage in the *Utopia* to which my critic refers. I quote it that my reader may see for himself under what circumstances and to what extent Sir Thomas More thought self-destruction to be permissible. I do not remember any other passage in which he alludes to the subject.

"The sick (as I said) they see to with great affection, and let nothing at all pass concerning either physic or good diet, whereby they may be restored again to their health. Such as be sick of incurable diseases they comfort with sitting by them, with talking with them, and, to be short, with all manner of helps that may be. But if the disease be not only incurable, but also full of continual pain and anguish, then the priests and the magistrates exhort the man, seeing he is not able to do any duty of life, and by overliving his own death is noisome and irksome to others, and grievous to himself, that he will determine with himself no longer to cherish that pestilent

[1] It is the custom, I am told, for ladies in Japan to carry about with them a stiletto, with which to take their lives, rather than suffer dishonour. The Czarowitz, when he visited that country some years ago, was attacked by a native policeman. A short time after, a young Japanese woman immolated herself on the spot, to atone, as she thought, for the national disgrace. Both in China and Japan life is held very cheap.

and painful disease. And, seeing his life is to him but a torment, that he will not be unwilling to die, but rather take a good hope to him, and either despatch himself out of that painful life, as out of a prison or a rack of torment, or else suffer himself willingly to be rid out of it by others. And in so doing they tell him he shall do wisely, seeing by his death he shall lose no commodity, but end his pain. And because in that act he shall follow the counsel of the priests, that is to say, of the interpreters of God's will and pleasure, they show him that he shall do like a godly and a virtuous man. They that be thus persuaded, finish their lives willingly, either with hunger, or else die in their sleep without any feeling of death. But they cause none such to die against his will, nor they use no less diligence and attendance about him, believing this to be an honourable death. Else he that killeth himself *before that the priests and the council have allowed the cause of his death*, him, as unworthy either to be buried or with fire to be consumed, *they cast unburied into some stinking marsh*."[1]

From this passage my readers will be able to judge for themselves how far, and under what circumstances, Sir Thomas More justified suicide.

But who are the many thinkers of modern times? Does my critic refer to Schopenhauer and his followers of the Pessimistic School? If

[1] *Utopia* (The Camelot Series), p. 158.

so, he is welcome to their patronage and support. Perhaps he had Dr. Donne in mind, who wrote *Biathanatos* in defence of suicide. But this work was not published till long after the author's death. It is very plain to see that he was far from being proud of it. And if he could have been consulted, in all probability it would never have been published at all.

Liverpool Daily Post.

"Even the title is challengeable, for it goes without saying that suicide has no morals."

The writer, however, is kind enough to say that the book is eminently instructive on this saddening subject.

As to the title, I confess I fail to see much difference between "Morals" and "Ethics."[1] The distinction, if distinction there be, seems to me rather subtle and insignificant than practical and real. Of course, by "The Morals of Suicide" I mean the moral aspect of suicide. And in this sense it certainly is not true "that suicide has no morals."

[1] "Morals" is derived from Lat. *Mos* = a manner, or custom; "Ethics" from Gr. ἔθος, which has the same meaning.

British Medical Journal, *Lancet*, and *Medical Press*.

I attach great importance to the reviews which have appeared in these three journals, and, as an expression of the opinion of the medical faculty, they demand the utmost respect. The ministers of Christ and medical men should surely regard themselves as fellow-workers in the cause of humanity. The welfare of mankind and the healing of their diseases are the objects which they both have in common. It is true that they are not working in exactly the same department of human nature. In the one case the bodies, in the other the souls of men are, broadly speaking, the objects of regard; nor are the medicines or the methods in each case the same. But it should never be forgotten that the two departments frequently overlap; that man is a unity combining two elements, body and soul, flesh and spirit; that these are mutually dependent, and that the health and welfare of the one cannot long be maintained if those of the other are neglected. The same conclusion is to be drawn from the example and teaching of Him Whom we ministers of religion call the Great

Physician. It was not only the diseases of the souls of men that excited his sympathy, but every form of human suffering. The foul leper, the devil-driven epileptic, the lame, the blind, the deaf and the dumb appealed to His compassion and received His gifts of healing.

For these reasons I felt deeply interested to know what the medical journals would say about my book.

The British Medical Journal says—

"We should welcome any suggestions to abate the evil of suicide. But we do not think that Mr. Gurnhill's suggestions are of practical use."

Did my critic expect me to discover a specific remedy for suicide? He knows, as well as I do, that none such exists. But, if my suggestions are worthless, has he any others to offer? Apparently not. What, then, are my suggestions? They resolve themselves into this: that, having ascertained some of the more general and persistent causes of suicide, we should *attack those causes*. Thus, for example, it is proved beyond a doubt that a large percentage of cases is directly due to drink, another large percentage to betting and gambling, and so on. Is, then, my

suggestion that we might reduce the number of suicides by reducing the amount of drinking, betting and gambling, and similar vices "of no practical use"? Let my reader decide for himself.

Dr. Magnus Huss, in his standard work on Chronic Alcoholism, stated—

"that the suicidal impulse is a more frequent accompaniment of the melancholia of drunkards than of melancholia from other causes, and, further, that amongst the uneducated classes suicide frequently follows on the disordered emotional tone, which sooner or later results from the abuse of alcoholic liquors."

Again, Dr. W. C. Sullivan, Deputy Medical Officer of H.M. Prison, Pentonville, in an article on "The Relation of Alcoholism to Suicide," after referring to the Registrar-General's Returns, as showing the close connection between a high rate of alcoholism and a corresponding frequency of suicide, points out that the explanation is to be found in the visceral and organic depression, and consequent melancholic tendency resulting from alcoholism, which are powerless to overcome suicidal impulses arising during intoxication, whereas in healthy subjects such impulses speedily vanish and come to nought.

The Lancet.

This review is a curious mixture of praise and blame. The reviewer asks why should suicides be amenable to any arguments? Especially as "I excuse myself from dealing with the arguments of Pliny, Seneca, and others, who have expressed approval of suicide under certain conditions."

In reply, I would venture to remind my critic, that I stated plainly I approached the subject from the standpoint of the Christian Socialist; and, consequently, that I never undertook to collate and compare the views and arguments set forth by ancient Greek and Latin writers. But I am not afraid to meet my critic on his own ground. He quotes Pliny the Elder, and Seneca, and others, who have expressed approval of suicide. I could quote Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Æschines, Virgil, and Pliny the Younger, all of whom denied its permissibility and strongly condemned it.

Again, I am accused of "a great want of thoroughness," because "from cover to cover there is not a word about that awful problem—the duty that sometimes corners the true Christian and good citizen—of laying down his life." "The tragedy, the problem, the unselfish dread of

becoming burthensome, or of cankering a young life with the infirmity of an old one—these things do not exist for the author, who can speak of suicide only with horror as 'this deadly sin.'" But surely the argument for suicide, which is suggested in these words is one which would equally justify the custom, which we are told prevails amongst some of the Indian tribes —of tomahawking their aged parents when they become useless and burthensome. I confess I dare not espouse such an argument, for I do not know where it would lead me. And yet I should be truly sorry if my critic were to think me wanting in sympathy for those unhappy beings who find themselves "cornered" in "the battle of life." God forgive me, if I were; for I know full well how truly awful and tragic is the dilemma in which they sometimes find themselves placed.

But, if the laying down of our lives for the sake and the good of others is to be called suicide, then Jesus Himself was not only a suicide, but He bade all His disciples follow His example. "He laid down His life for us, and we ought to lay down own lives for the brethren."[1] This is

[1] 1 John ii. 16.

quite true; nevertheless, we must not complicate the question by the confusion of ideas. I grieve that my critic should have so far misunderstood me; but, seeing that he has, I do not wonder he concludes his critique as he does. For myself I would only say, that my motive has been more than he imagines; more than to provide dissuasive arguments for those *comparatively* few persons who, contemplating self-destruction, are yet open to the voice of reason and religion; more than to save a few hundreds or thousands from a suicide's grave. Rather has it been to represent suicide as the symptom and index of those festering sores, moral and social, which afflict humanity, and that with a view to their healing.

The Medical Press.

This review is thoughtful and appreciative, but by no means eulogistic. It is gratifying, however, to find that the writer thinks my book, in spite of its many defects, of which no one is more conscious than its author, "deserving of intelligent perusal." I do not ask for more.

With regard to "a functional relation existing between every act of thinking, willing, or feeling on the one side, and some molecular change in

the body (the brain) on the other side," my critic will find some further remarks in the essay on "Personality." This, I hope, he will also do me the honour to criticize.

"In this work," he says, "the preacher is much in evidence." It is not my wish either to preach, or sermonize, except in the proper place. But I do hold, and firmly hold, that religion and the religious instincts of man are facts which must be faced and treated, like any other facts, in a scientific manner. If they be real they must justify their reality as part of the great body of philosophic and metaphysical truth.

The Indian Church Quarterly Review, April, 1901.

I beg to thank the reviewer for his kind commendation of my book. His remarks about the neglect of Moral Theology in the English Church are, I fear, only too true.

"If the English Church ever really took serious notice of the evils which are preying upon the lives of the inhabitants of her great towns, and perhaps even to a greater degree of the villages, she would insist on her candidates for Holy Orders acquiring some considerable knowledge of the principles of Moral Theology."

The Critic (New York City).

This notice is brief and almost amusing. And yet, withal, there is a spice of truth about the writer's suggested remedy.

"The folly of suicide needs to be insisted upon in these days, rather than its possible sinfulness. In five cases out of six a good dinner will do more to ward off self-destruction than a barrel full of sermons and texts."

Similarly Mr. W. W. Westcott, in his chapter on the prevention of suicide, says—

"Suicidal patients require most watching early in the morning: a good lunch often dispels the tendency *for the day*."[1]

There is no doubt that a great number of persons are annually driven to suicide through want and destitution. But how is the good lunch or dinner to be brought within their reach? Here is the great problem for Christian socialists and philanthropists to solve.

But the same writer, whose practical acquaintance as a coroner with the subject of suicide renders his testimony deserving of special respect, though he does not prescribe "a barrel full of

[1] *Suicide*, p. 170.

sermons and texts," speaks out very clearly on the value of religion as a preventive. His words are worth quoting.

"The cultivation of a religious conviction of the sanctity of life and the sin of a self-inflicted death is a more certain hindrance to suicide (than education). Persons who are unable to obtain this mental conviction, are, I believe, more prone to take their lives in time of trouble; and beyond good advice, and the care of their friends, I do not know that any means exist to restrain them." [1]

Globe Democrat (St. Louis, M.C.).

The following extract is worth notice:—

"If ministers can help in the matter by sermons, prayers or treatises, very well; but the main relief is in wholesome life and robust health. Good morals promote all this, and so indirectly touch the main question."

American Ecclesiastical Review.

The notice which appeared in this Review is one of the most thoughtful and discriminating of any I have seen; and I beg to thank the writer for his candid, even though severe criticism.

[1] *Suicide*, p. 172.

There are, however, two or three points which I cannot pass over in silence.

1. He considers my definition of *personality* as very inadequate, and is of opinion that no more adequate definition has ever been formulated than that of Boethius, "Persona est naturæ rationalis individua substantia." As, however, my readers will find the subject of Personality discussed at some length in the essay which forms the second part of this volume, I will only point out in this place that my definition of Personality was framed to express the fundamental idea, latent in the etymology of the word *persona*, as denoting first a mask, and secondly the actor who speaks through, or behind, the mask.

2. But the next point of criticism demands a more careful consideration. The wastage of philanthropic effort through want of union and co-operation amongst Christians led me to consider the causes of division leading to a loss of the moral and spiritual power which ought to be available for the amelioration of the social, moral, and religious condition of mankind.

Amongst these causes, I pointed out, was the lack of obedience to the rules and precepts of Christ Himself. And as a striking instance of

this disobedience I quoted the action of the Roman Church in withholding the cup from the laity, and so delivering *a mutilated sacrament* to the people. The charge, I admit, is a very grave one, and I cannot wonder it has seriously disturbed the mind of my Roman Catholic critics. But the question is, can it be substantiated? For, if not, I am bound to withdraw it.

My critic accuses me, in the first place, of being untrue to the first principles of my own position, and he then goes on to say—

"If Christ, the God-Man, commissioned His apostles (and their lawful successors) to teach men all things whatsoever He had commanded them, and if He promised to be with them in their appointed official duty unto the end of time, so that the powers of hell should never prevail against the teaching organism He had constituted, either He, the God-Man, was unfaithful to His promise, or else the organism, which traces its origin historically back to Him, could not be permitted by Him to 'make void the Word of God,' and 'to proffer to the thirsty souls of men a mutilated sacrament.'"

But the writer does not seem to see that in this passage he is giving himself and his case away completely. What did Christ commission

His apostles to do? To teach men to observe all things whatsoever He had commanded them.[1] Has the Roman Church done this? "Drink ye all of this," said Christ. "No," says the Roman Church, "you must *not* do so. I will absolve you from your obedience to Christ. It is quite sufficient for you to receive the Sacrament in one kind."

Doubtless Christ did promise His Presence with His apostles and their successors. But He attached a condition to His promise—that of "teaching men to observe all things He had commanded them"—and this condition the Roman Church has failed to fulfil, not only by omission, but also by addition; not only by withholding the Cup and so proffering a mutilated Sacrament to the people, but also by setting up a system of mediation[2] for which

[1] St. Matt. xxviii. 20.

[2] As an illustration of the length to which the Church of Rome has gone and is prepared to go, I quote the following extract from the late Dean Church's Article on 'Our Irenicon,' republished in vol. i. p. 352 of his *Occasional Papers*:—

"From the single consideration of what was fitting and 'congruous' to the Mother of our Lord, a whole system has grown up, and expanded to proportions which, to those who were not under its influence, appear simply inconceivable and incredible. Inference has been piled upon inference, deduction has been drawn out from deduction, each growing more astounding than its predecessor. . . . The only way of describing what it all results in is by saying, that what the general sense of Christians has considered for centuries to

there is not a vestige of authority in the words, the teaching, or the commandments of Christ.

Let us see what is the history of this strange infraction of Christ's express command.

In the Catholic Dictionary we read: "Down to the Middle Ages the faithful usually received the Eucharist under both kinds." Two Popes (Leo I., 440, and Gelasius, 490) specially condemned the Manichæans for withholding the Cup, and commanded them to be expelled from the fellowship of saints. The practice was condemned by the Council of Clermont (1095) and by Pope Paschal II. (1118) as "a human and novel institution, a departure from what Christ the Master ordained and did."[1] Then came the Council of Constance positively forbidding Communion in

be the special and incommunicable prerogatives of the Saviour of mankind are now claimed, sometimes with something that marks superiority, for his mother. . . . When she is proved in deliberate dogmatic language, duly guarded by appropriate distinctions, to be what she is frequently called, our 'co-redemptress,' it might be thought that the zeal of her devotees had reached its limit, but they have advanced one step further, and laid down that she, too, is present and is received in the Eucharist; they have not only maintained her co-presence, but defined the manner of her presence" (pp. 353, 354).

[1] Dearden's *Modern Romanism Examined*, p. 168. See also Pelliccia's *Polity of the Christian Church*, who admits that it was not until after the thirteenth century that the custom of receiving the Cup at the Holy Communion began gradually to fall into disuse in the Western Church, p. 453.

both kinds to the laity; and lastly, the Council of Trent confirming the decision of Constance and pronouncing its anathema against those poor souls who would fain keep the commandments of Jesus.[1]

What an extraordinary history! One Council reverses the decrees of a former one. One Pope sanctions what previous Popes had condemned as disloyalty to Christ. Yet all are infallible! And, as though the climax of inconsistency had not been reached, the last Pope (Pius IV.) and the last Council (Trent) presume to revise the very ordinance of the Founder Himself, and forbid obedience to one of His most imperative commands! Only on one plea can such action be justified— the plea and claim of possessing a wisdom and authority superior to that of the Founder of Christianity Himself. Does my critic make this claim on behalf of the Roman Church? If he does, I have not another word to say. If he does not, then what escape is there from the charge that the Roman Church, in adding to, and subtracting from, the teaching of Christ, has "made void the Word of God," and proffered to the thirsty souls of men *a mutilated Sacrament?*

[1] Council of Trent, Art. XVII. and XVIII.

But even this, sad as it is, is perhaps not the saddest feature in the case. Rome stands committed to her errors. By the decree of Papal Infallibility she has crystallized and stereotyped them upon her. They have become not merely accretional, but organic. And this is a matter for profound regret, because it renders the hope of reunion remote indeed.

And because I have pointed out this instance of disobedience to the teaching and precepts of Christ, as a cause of disunion amongst His followers, entailing a loss of moral and spiritual force, I am no Catholic. Truly I do call and consider myself a Catholic, in the sense of holding all the Articles of the Catholic Faith. At the same time I humbly hope I shall never cease to be a Protestant in the sense of protesting against the unwarranted and unscriptural additions which the Church of Rome has made to that Faith. I confess I do not see how I can withdraw my charge.

My critic has coupled his review of my book with that of another, *The Bible and its Interpreter ;* And he adds—

"In the position established in the latter work lies the only hope for the unity of faith and

loyalty of obedience for which Mr. Gurnhill pleads, and in which alone is there healing for the individual and the nations."

Now, I have been at the trouble to procure this work. It is written by the Rev. P. H. Casey, S.J., Professor of Dogmatic Theology in Woodstock College, and appears with the imprimatur of the Archbishop of Philadelphia. The main object of it is to prove that the Roman Church, being infallible, is the true interpreter of Holy Scripture. Nay, more than this, "Churches that cannot claim infallibility—and what Protestant Church or Churches dare claim it?—*are not a part of the Catholic and Apostolic Church ; they lie outside it ; they are cut away from it.*"[1]

And so, forsooth, the Church which has not scrupled to read a "not" into one of our Lord's most imperative commands ; which has invented and still maintains a system of mediation for which not a shred of evidence is to be found in Holy Scripture ; which presumes to declare all Churches which cannot claim infallibility to be no part of the Catholic and Apostolic Church, to lie outside it, and to be cut away from it ; this

[1] *The Bible and its Interpreter*, pp. 90, 91.

Church is to be for Christendom the infallible interpreter of the Bible! Comment is needless.

The Church Quarterly Review.

The writer is disposed to find fault with me because I have attached "too expansive a sense" to the title of my book. He has read it "not exactly perceiving why one chapter precedes another, doubting now and then whereunto this discursive treatment will grow, realizing with some alarm that the author has brought himself and us into deep water." He has been unable to solve the enigma of "the symbolical device on the cover." He does not see the least connection between "the lines from Tennyson" quoted on the title-page and the subject in hand. I am truly sorry for having so grievously perplexed him. But, then, we cannot swim in a duck-pond, and if we wish to catch anything bigger than minnows we must not be afraid sometimes "to launch out into the deep." But to be serious, my critic must pardon me if I say, with all respect, that he appears unable to take in that aspect of the subject which to me seems its most important and significant one—its aspect as a symptom and index of those many and various evils which afflict the social body,

and which are the active causes leading to self-destruction. To deal with these causes, even in a cursory manner, must, I hardly need point out, involve from time to time "frequent enlargements of scope."

My critic finds fault with me again for what I have said about the action of the State with reference to religious teaching in English Board Schools. I regret that I should have expressed myself in terms which are not formally and literally true. What I meant was that the ministers of the various religious denominations have no *locus standi*, no recognized right to enter a Board School and impart religious instruction. Boards of managers, I know, can do almost what they like in the matter; but, as a general rule, ministers of religion are not asked, and therefore cannot teach. In saying this, I am speaking from my own experience.

Before taking leave of my critics, which I do with sincere respect and gratitude, I cannot refrain from expressing a feeling of disappointment, that so few of them, especially those representing the more distinctive Protestant forms of Christianity, have examined my suggestions as to the basis of the reunion of Christendom. What

worthier object, I ask, could Christians set before them for attainment during the century on which we have so recently entered, than the reconciliation of their differences, that so with one heart and one mind they might co-operate in the work of their common Lord? Great are the powers of evil for the destruction of mankind; but great also are the powers of Christ's Church if only they be concentrated and applied.

CHAPTER II.

FURTHER STATISTICS OF SUICIDE.

I. In England and Wales.
II. In the United States.

I.—England and Wales.

From the Registrar-General's Report for 1900 it appears that the number of actual suicides in England and Wales during 1900 exceeded those of 1899 by 52—namely, of males, 45; females, 7.

The following table gives the total number of suicides, male and female, for the years 1890 and 1900, together with the approximate rate per 100,000 of the whole population of England and Wales, and the increase during the decade:—

TABLE I.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Year.	Number of Suicides.			Rate per 100,000 of Population, Males and Females.
	Total.	Males.	Females.	
1890	2205	1635	570	7·7
1900	2896	2166	730	9·2
Increase during decade	691	531	160	1·5
Average annual increase	69·1	53·1	16	0·15

N.B.—I have given in column 5 the rate per 100,000 of population, for the purpose of comparison with a corresponding table, IV., for the United States of America on page 53.

In the volume of Criminal Statistics of England and Wales for 1899, we are informed that within the last forty years actual suicide has increased no less than 115 per cent.; and attempts to commit suicide, which have become known to the police, have increased more than 1000 per cent. in the same period. And even these figures are far from exhaustive, since many cases both of suicide and attempted suicide occur which never come within the cognizance of the law.

"The formidable growth of self-murder," says

Mr. W. D. Morrison, in his article on the above statistics,[1] "within the last half-century, and its persistent increase within the last few years, is a very sinister social phenomenon."

And he adds—

"Most writers who have devoted attention to this sad subject are of opinion that its alarming growth among modern communities is as much due to moral as to economic causes. The immense increase of material wealth in the nineteenth century has been accompanied by a tragic increase of moral misery. This is no doubt to be attributed, in part at least, to the *decay of faith*, and the *growth of pessimism*. . . . One thing, at least, is plain. Men are more than ever in need of the inspiring powers of hope and consolation. To supply this great need is the imperative mission of the Church."

Since the issue of my former volume I have carefully collected all cases of suicide and attempted suicide that have met my eye in the daily newspapers, in order that I might judge for myself as to their nature and, as far as possible, their determining cause. These cases I have analyzed and classified, and I now offer a few remarks such as can hardly fail to be suggested.

[1] *The Guardian*, August 21, 1901, p. 1131.

Observations.

1. In looking over my analysis I observe two features, which stand out with a lurid significant prominence. First, the large proportion of cases in which suicide treads on the heels of crime. First comes crime, very frequently the violent assault ending in murder, and then, to escape the consequences of crime, self-destruction.

2. The second feature is the entire absence of all sense of responsibility in the great bulk of the cases. The restraining influence of religion and morality seems to be growing less and less. This is what Mr. Morrison calls "the doctrine of faith" and "the growth of pessimism." It is the spirit which says, "I dread the pains and penalties of sin in this life, the punishment which man's law can inflict; but as for any other punishment in another life, or any responsibility to a higher tribunal than that of man, I neither know nor care anything about it."

But have we any right to be surprised? Are not such sentiments as these the legitimate product of the factors which are at work in our modern civilization? A scientific Monism is seeking to monopolize the whole field of philosophy;

the worship of humanity to supplant the worship of God; and a secular socialism to represent the highest aims and interests of mankind. What wonder, when men are taught to regard death as annihilation, it ceases to awaken either hope or fear; and that, when their circumstances appear desperate, they prefer to slip the cable, rather than try to ride out the storm!

Causes connected with the Amatory Passion—Disappointment, Jealousy.

3. The number of suicides which are due to the miscarriage in some form of the amatory passion — to misplaced, illicit, or disappointed affection, forms another significant feature in the analysis of cases.

The only preventive in such cases as these would seem to be the exercise of greater care and deliberation on the part of young men and women before contracting engagements, and a truer perception of the sanctity of the affections when they have done so. But the practical difficulty in the way of applying such a remedy as this is only too obvious.

Methods of Self-destruction.

4. The extreme variety of the means or instruments employed for self-destruction calls for one or two remarks. The most extraordinary method which I have come across was that adopted by an inmate of the Connaught Hospital, who tried to choke himself by swallowing a tablespoon. Strange to say, although the man swallowed his food with difficulty, and was strange in his manner, and though the doctors suspected some obstruction, they only discovered the spoon wedged in his throat at the *post-mortem* examination.

Abuse of the Revolver.

5. It is impossible to study the annals of suicide as recorded in the daily newspapers without observing how frequently the revolver is chosen as the instrument of death. And the question arises whether some steps ought not to be taken to stop the fatal facility with which these weapons of destruction are procurable. Murder followed by suicide is becoming increasingly common. And one great reason, I feel assured, is because for a few shillings any man can provide himself with the means for the swift execution of both.

If the State interferes with the sale of poisonous drugs, why should it not also interfere in the matter of revolvers, which are equally dangerous and deadly? In the Hampstead shooting case (*Standard*, January 19, 1902), the jury desired the coroner to add a rider to their verdict, calling the attention of the Home Secretary to the indiscriminate sale of revolvers to those having no licence to carry firearms. It certainly seems probable that a law prohibiting the sale of revolvers *except to persons who produce such a licence* would tend to lessen the number of both murders and suicides. To afford facilities for the commission of a crime is next door to a temptation to commit it.

The Verdicts of Coroners' Juries.

6. I have already referred to this subject in my first volume (p. 206), and I need not repeat the remarks I then made. The usual form of verdict still given is that of "Suicide during temporary insanity." And in many cases this verdict is no doubt true so far—but only so far—as it means that the mental balance has been disturbed, and the mind become unhinged, and in that sense deranged. But this loss of balance

and equanimity, this derangement, as in the case of the bodily functions, is due to assignable causes. It is due to the neglect of the rules of

Mental Hygiene.

7. Unwholesome diet, insanitary habits and dwellings, derange the bodily functions. Therefore, wise men are very careful to avoid them. But because the mind and mental faculties are invisible and intangible we are apt to ignore them, and neglect those precautions which are necessary to preserve them in health. There is a science of mental as well as bodily hygiene, and the importance of attending to both was fully recognized by the ancient moralist, *Orandum est nobis ut sit mens sana in corpore sano.*

Our reserve of mental and nervous energy is limited, and when the strain is put upon it, either through excess of work, or intemperance, or worry, or excitement, exceeds those limits, it stands to reason that the mental equilibrium is disturbed. The mind gives way, and that nervous collapse ensues which so frequently ends in suicide.

But it may be asked, is it possible in this work-a-day world—in this life which for many is one of rough-and-tumble, where the weakest must go

to the wall—to avoid this mental strain and consequent nervous exhaustion? No doubt in many cases it is not; but it is equally true that in many cases it is, if proper precautions be taken.

What I mean is this: if through the inordinate love of money, and the haste to become rich, men resort to illegitimate methods of obtaining it, such as betting, gambling, speculation, and fraud; if, through the unbridled love of pleasure and excitement they give the rein to lust or illicit affection; or if, through want of proper care and observation, they overtax their mental powers,—is it to be wondered at, that such courses should end at last in nervous collapse, or a frenzied state of mind, which may be termed "temporary insanity," and in which the unhappy sufferer is no longer wholly accountable for his actions?

Doubtless, if all men could be induced to live according to laws of mental hygiene, and avoid those habits and pursuits which are almost sure to disturb the mental balance and deaden the moral sensibility, we should hear far less of suicide than we do. But, again, the remedy or preventive is very difficult of application; and especially so in the cases of those who need it

most. The work is one, I believe, which only the teachers of the Christian religion and morality can attempt with any prospect of success. Education will not do it. Civilization only intensifies the evil. Sociology, like the gardener's rake, may remove some of the rubbish and smooth some of the roughness which deface the surface of society,[1] but it does not probe the mischief to its root. To do this we need something that will impress men with the sanctity and responsibility of their lives, and show them, at the same time, what is best worth living for.

Child Suicide.

8. The increase of suicide amongst children is much to be deplored. In the Registrar-General's Report for 1899 we find that out of a total of 2121 suicides of persons of all ages, 67, or about three per cent., were under the age of twenty, namely, between five and ten years, 1; ten and fifteen, 6; fifteen and twenty, 60. But out of the first hundred of my collected

[1] For example, intemperance, betting, and gambling, overcrowded dwellings, poverty, and want of work, are amongst the chief causes of suicide; and to effect reforms and remove defects with regard to these things falls within the proper scope of Christian Socialism.

cases of suicide or attempted suicide I find no less than 6 were those of children between the ages of eight and sixteen. I do not say it would be safe to assume that these figures correctly represent the average percentage of child suicide in the present day, but I do think they show that the percentage is on the increase.

It will be interesting, I know, to some of my readers to learn the nature of the causes which were operative in these deplorable cases.

No. 2 is the case of a boy, aged seven, who ran away from school, and, rather than return, drowned himself.

No. 29.—Girl, age not stated. This was clearly a case of over-wrought religious emotion, amounting to mania.

No. 31.—Boy, aged eight, at school, who, in a fit of passion at being punished and sent to bed, hanged himself.

No. 53.—Girl, aged fourteen. Cause: ill-treatment by step-mother; three previous attempts.

No. 90A.—Boy in service, who destroyed himself in a fit of passion at being told to clean some boots.

No. 80.—Boy at public school, aged 16. "Thoroughly tired of school-life."

I will not comment on these cases, for they point their own moral; but they concur in teaching one plain lesson, which is, the need for greater care and consideration on the part of those who are entrusted with the training and education of the young. The opening faculties of the mind, as of the body, may be easily over-taxed, with consequences which cannot be foreseen. Gentleness coupled with firmness should be the invariable rule.

Extraordinary Cases.

9. There are a few cases in my collection which, owing to their exceptional character, call for a few words of comment.

Acute mental distress is frequently the precursor and cause of suicide. But it is astonishing from what comparatively insignificant causes the distress sometimes arises.

No. 108B is the case of a man who was so overwhelmed with grief at the loss of a pony to which he had become greatly attached, that he drowned himself, saying he had nothing left to live for. In another case, a young man hanged himself rather than submit to vaccination. Such

examples show how easily the mental equilibrium is disturbed in some cases.

If there is one word that may be said in extenuation of the crime of self-destruction, it is that the suicide may sometimes by his very act emphasize and call attention to some abuse or festering sore in the social body, and so help to secure its removal or remedy. Such, I think, are the two cases following :—

No. 64.—This is the case of a clergyman of the Church of England, who for eighteen years had been the incumbent of a living with a princely income of £80. Finding himself unable to struggle any longer against his increasing poverty, he asked to be allowed to resign, and had even gained permission to enter a charitable institution; but even this escape from his troubles was denied him. In a letter sent to a friend shortly before his death, he wrote—

"The Bishop seems not to be disposed to accept my resignation, as I should never be able to pay the dilapidations (£300). . . . I shall have to make myself a bankrupt, and afterwards apply to the guardians for admission to the Union-House—a terrible and shocking termination of my life."

If his case excites our deepest sympathy and

compassion, we may at least hope that the reproach it contains for the richest Church in Christendom will not pass by unheeded.[1] You Churchmen and Churchwomen, rolling in all the luxury of untold wealth, think of that poor priest and pastor of your own Church, rising from his sleepless couch one bitter winter morning, driven by poverty and distress to end his miserable existence in a horse-pond!

The next case (No. 181) may truly be termed *a tragedy of old age;* but, alas! only the type of a numerous class.

A poor old man, aged 80, bearing an excellent character, is reduced to a state bordering on starvation because he cannot find work, and the miserable dole of 3*s.* 6*d.* from the guardians is quite insufficient to enable him to support his old wife and keep his home together, so in a fit of utter despair he tries to destroy himself with a table-knife. It is easy to say that his proper course was to go into the workhouse, but we must at least admire the old man's love of freedom and independence, and wonder that our

[1] The number of benefices in the Church of England is about 14,000. Of these, 4704 are worth between £100 and £200 per annum; and about 1500 are less than £100.

boasted civilization should have no alternatives to offer to the industrious and deserving poor in the evening of their days but starvation or the workhouse.

II.—The United States.

The truth of the statement made by the *Chicago Tribune*, that the number of suicides had increased in the United States from 978 in 1885 to 5750 in 1895, at the rate of 500 a year, has been much canvassed. I have, therefore, endeavoured to obtain some trustworthy information on this point, and the results I now lay before my readers.

For this information I am indebted to the kindness and courtesy of Mr. Commissioner Wright of the Labour Department, Washington, and also to Dr. I. S. Billings, Director-in-Charge of the Consolidated Libraries, New York.

I must premise, however, that vital statistics are not collected and recorded in the United States as they are in England and Wales. There is, in fact, no publication answering to the Annual Reports of the Registrar-General in England.

Roughly speaking, the whole country is divided into two parts, the Registration Area and the Non-registration Area; and it is very important to

bear this in mind in seeking to make comparisons or draw conclusions from the statistics published.

The Registration Area, as we can readily understand, is being enlarged year by year. Between 1890 and 1900 it has increased by almost 50 per cent., and now comprehends nearly 29,000,000 of population. The Registration Area now appears to comprise all the more important states, with the exception of Delaware, Maine, and Michigan, and 153 cities of 8000 or more population in other states.[1]

In consequence of the insufficiency of data from the Non-registration Area, the death-rates and ratios for the census of 1900 are based only on the returns from the Registration Area, and in endeavouring to ascertain the truth as to the annual increase of suicide we shall follow the same rule.

TABLE II.—SHOWING THE INCREASE IN THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES.

	1890.	1900.
Registration Area	19,659,440	28,807,269
Non-registration Area ...	43,288,274	47,278,525
Total population ...	62,947,714	76,085,794

Increase during the decade = 13,138,080.

See Census Bulletin of August 20, 1901, p. 2.

TABLE III.—SHOWING SUICIDES RECORDED THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH PROPORTION DUE TO THIS CAUSE IN 100,000 DEATHS FROM ALL CAUSES IN 1890 AND 1900.

Year.	Total.	Proportion.
1890	3932	467
1900	5498	529
Increase during decade	1566	62
Average annual increase	156·6	6·2

The following table is based on statistics drawn from the Registration Area only :—

TABLE IV.—SHOWING DEATHS FROM SUICIDE IN THE REGISTRATION AREA IN 1890 AND 1900, WITH CORRESPONDING DEATH-RATES PER 100,000 OF POPULATION.

	Total Suicides.	Rate per 100,000 of Population.
In 1890	2027	10·3
,, 1900	3327	11·8
Increase during the decade ...	1300	1·5
Average increase per annum ...	130	0·15

Taken in conjunction with the fact that there has been a decline in the general death-rate in the

Registration Area during the decade 1890–1900, the above increase is all the more significant.

It would seem, then, from the above statistics that the figures quoted by the *Chicago Tribune* are considerably exaggerated, at least for the decade 1890–1900.

During that decade the annual increase in the number of suicides recorded throughout the whole of the United States appears to have been not 500, but 156·6, and in the Registration Area during the same period, 130 or 0·15 per 100,000 of population.

On comparing the statistics in the above Table IV. with those of Table I., giving the corresponding statistics for England and Wales during the same period, it appears that, though the rate of suicides per 100,000 of population, male and female, was 2·6 greater in the United States than in England, yet the increase during the decade 1890–1900 was identical in both countries.

TABLE V.—SHOWING DEATH-RATE FROM SUICIDE PER 100,000 OF POPULATION FOR REGISTRATION AREA AND SOME OF ITS SUB-DIVISIONS, WITH DISTINCTION OF COLOUR AND SEX, IN 1890.

Areas.	Aggregate.			White.			Coloured.		
	Total.	M.	F.	Total.	M.	F.	Total.	M.	F.
Registration Area ...	10·31	16·12	4·53	10·61	16·62	4·63	4·40	6·17	2·68
Cities	11·04	17·35	4·81	11·44	18·01	4·90	4·47	6·55	2·47
States	8·78	13·82	3·85	8·90	14·04	3·87	3·68	4·54	2·86
Cities	9·29	14·87	3·97	9·44	15·12	4·03	3·68	5·57	2·00
Rural	8·00	12·27	3·65	8·08	12·46	3·62	3·65	2·35	5·05
Cities in Non-registration States	12·65	19·55	5·61	13·42	20·75	5·91	4·69	6·81	2·61

This table shows (*a*) that the death-rate was much higher among males than among females, both white and coloured;

(*b*) That the rate was very much higher among whites than among coloured inhabitants;

(*c*) That the rate is highest among white males in Non-registration States, and lowest among coloured females.

These latter facts go to support Morselli's contention, that civilization tends to the increase of suicide.

TABLE VI.—Showing Death-rates from Suicide per 100,000 of Population in Registration States during 1890, with Distinction of Conjugal Condition, Sex, Colour, and General Nativity.

Conjugal condition.	Colour and Nativity.											
	Aggregate.		White.						Coloured.			
			Total.		Native-born.		Foreign-born.					
	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.		
Single	6·81	2·17	8·86	2·09	4·88	1·60	13·10	3·74	5·01	5·35		
Married ...	19·12	4·92	19·44	5·03	16·30	4·46	23·25	5·55	4·18	—		
Widowed ...	52·76	7·30	53·96	7·54	42·34	9·71	65·32	4·12	—	—		

Remarks—(*a*) The aggregate percentage amongst the widowed males is more than twice that of the married, and more than eight times that of the single.

(*b*) The death-rate among married native-born white males was more than three times that of single native-born white males.

Statistics collected from the Registration States show that the number of suicides among males is nearly four times as great as among females. It was highest of all in New Hampshire (9·83); rural districts, 11·28. Amongst males it was highest of all in the cities in Vermont (22·15), and next in the district of Columbia (18·25).

As regards age, it appears that the rate of deaths per 100,000 is least between the ages of 15 and 45, namely, 10·43, and greatest amongst those of 65 years and over, 27·32; between 45 and 65 it is 24·54. It is highest among males in cities (19·39), and least among females in rural districts (3·34).

In the age group from 45 to 65 the rate was five times as high amongst males (41·44) as amongst females (7·80), and much higher in cities of Registration States (23·06) than in the rural districts (16·91). It was highest among males in cities of 100,000 and over (56·46), and lowest among females in the metropolitan district (7·05).

In the age group of 65 years and over it was nearly seven times as high among males (49·19) as among females (7·80), highest of all among males in cities of Non-registration States (76·00), and lowest of all among females in the cities of the Registration States (6·13).

TABLE VII.—SHOWING, FOR THE REGISTRATION AREA, THE DEATH-RATE FROM SUICIDE AMONG THE WHITES DURING THE CENSUS YEAR 1890 PER 100,000 OF WHITE POPULATION, WITH DISTINCTION OF BIRTHPLACES OF MOTHERS; AND A COMPARISON OF THE SAME WITH ETHNOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES OF SUICIDE AMONGST EUROPEAN NATIONS AS GIVEN BY MORSELLI (*page* 84, *International Series*).

Birthplaces of Mothers.	Rate per Million.	
	United States.	European (Morselli).
Ireland	52·6	30
Italy	64·3	36
Anglo-Saxon	91·6	70
France	109·8	116
Scandinavia	127·2	127·8
Bohemia	221·1	158
Germany	160·9	165

In this table the European nations, or races, are placed in order of their suicidal tendency, beginning with Ireland, which has the lowest. The comparison is remarkable, as showing how closely the tendency exhibited in Europe corresponds with that which prevails amongst their descendants even when transported across the Atlantic and settled in a foreign land.

"The highest numbers of suicides," says Morselli, "are given by countries of Germanic race, and the two stocks, German and Scandinavian, divide this supremacy."[1] The above table seems to corroborate Morselli's contention.

Ireland has the lowest rate among European

[1] *Suicide*, p. 81.

nations; and in the United States the rate is lowest among the offspring of Irish-born mothers. On the other hand, the Germanic races rank highest in Europe, and the highest rate in the United States is found amongst the descendants of those races, with the exception of Bohemia and Hungary.[1]

[1] Morselli does not give the annual number for Hungary.

PART II.

AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY

PREFATORY NOTE

TRUTH in religion must ever be the outcome and expression of truth in metaphysic. And between truth in metaphysic and science it is idle to suppose that any real discrepancy or antagonism can exist. Hence we are placed in the following dilemma: either there is no such thing as metaphysic—and science monopolizes the whole field of epistemology—or the claims of science and metaphysic must be capable of reconciliation. Thoughtful men, I imagine, will hardly be prepared to accept the former alternative, and the following essay is offered, with all due deference, as a humble contribution in support of the latter. In other words, it presents the outline of a system which, in the opinion of the author at least, affords a reasonable basis on which

the claims of science, metaphysic, and religion may be harmonized, and which is capable of dealing with the facts and phenomena of our varied environment, whether material, moral, or spiritual.

PERSONALITY

SECTION I.

Definition—The *a priori* and *a posteriori* views—Personality in Aristotle's Metaphysic—In the Hegelian System—The higher Pantheism—The Formula I = I—The Logic of Hegel contrasted with Christian Metaphysic—Hegel's attempt to reconcile the two.

EXCEPTION has been taken to my definition of Personality, and that of Boethius has been preferred: "*Persona est naturæ rationalis individua substantia*"—an individual, complete substance, subsisting in a rational nature.[1] But with all due respect to my critic, this definition, to my mind, savours too much of mediæval scholasticism. I doubt, moreover, whether it would convey any very clear and definite idea to ordinary readers. Personality is a subject in which all of us are interested, inasmuch as every man is a person by virtue of possessing an intelligent, self-conscious soul, or spirit. It will be well, however, to avoid

[1] *American Ecclesiastical Review.*

as far as possible all terms and forms of expression which the ordinary reader cannot be expected to understand. I shall, therefore, stick to my guns, and be guided in forming the concept and definition of Personality by the radical idea embodied in the word and its etymological meaning. Self-consciousness, then, I hold to be the essential feature of Personality.[1] And "a person" I conceive of, and define, as a rational, self-conscious being, who thinks, speaks, and acts under the figurative semblance of a mask (*persona*).[2]

But, whichever method we adopt, there are two things to be kept carefully in view, the *terminus a quo*, and the *terminus ad quem*. Reason demands a Prius, or First Cause, adequate to the production of all phenomena. And this Prius is our *terminus a quo*. The human Personality, being, on the whole, the greatest phenomenon of which we have actual experience, is our *terminus ad quem*. These two

[1] "Thus the fundamental characteristic of spirit as we know it in human personality is self-consciousness, the power to make mental distinction between self and other things, and to regard all other things as objects over against our subjective self."—*Divine Immanence*, Illingworth, p. 6.

[2] By metonymy the *persona*, or mask, is used to denote the actor who wears the mask and acts from behind it.

limits represent the whole field of our investigation. Neither may be ignored, and neither separated from the other, seeing they must be, so to speak, organically connected.

Two Points of View—The "a priori" and "a posteriori."

Personality, again, is a subject which may be regarded and discussed from two opposite points of view. The first we may call the *a priori*; the second the *a posteriori*. We may start from the postulated Prius, whatever we may call it, and endeavour to trace downwards the connection between it and the phenomenon of the human Personality to which we are bound to come. Or, on the other hand, reversing the operation, we may begin with the fact of human Personality, and by reasoning backward consider the conclusions it will lead us to form as to the nature of the Prius.

Let us take the *a priori* view first. Many and various have been the speculations as to the existence and nature of the Prius of all things. That a Prius of some kind does exist, and has existed from all eternity, seems to be one of the

necessary laws of human thought. Its existence has been postulated in all the best accredited systems of philosophy, that have ever appealed to the judgment of mankind.

Progress in the Study of Metaphysic.

"If we look to completely elaborated theories," says Professor Baird,[1] "and disregard all tentative and imperfect sketches, it may fairly be said that all that has as yet been done in the region of pure metaphysic is contained in two works, in the *Metaphysic* of Aristotle and the *Logic* of Hegel."

It will be well, then, to consider, in the first place, how and to what extent Personality enters into these two systems.

Personality in the Metaphysic of Aristotle.

The recognition of reason and intelligence in Nature, the employment of means to an end, and the display of something which looks very like design, has not always led to the inference that there must be, behind all natural phenomena, a creative, intelligent, and personal mind. On the contrary, the tendency has often been to invest Nature herself with Divine attributes—that

[1] Art. "Metaphysic" in *Encyc. Brit.*, p. 99, vol. xvi.

is, towards Pantheism. This was not the case, however, with Aristotle. His theory of the universe has long been exploded, and now survives only as an interesting relic of ancient philosophical speculation. And yet it is desirable we should know what it was in outline, if we would correlate rightly his conception of Personality, whether human or Divine.

The earth he held to be the stationary centre of the universe, with the seven planets, including in their number the sun and moon, moving in oblique courses from right to left. But the whole outer heaven, or sphere of the stars, was composed, not of matter, but of a divine ether, moving from left to right, and deriving its motion from the surrounding Godhead, the Essence, or Being, which moves all things, but is Himself unmoved. Aristotle speaks of Him as "the Unmoved Mover of all things." Whatever else He is, He is Personal. He is not pure thought, like Hegel's Prius; for His life is the thinking upon thought. Nor can He think of anything inferior to Himself, for to do so would imply change and degradation. He is a Personal Deity; but He lives aloof from His creatures; and enters into no relations with the material universe. If He is its Maker, He leaves

it to take care of itself. Such was Aristotle's conception of the Prius of all things. He held it to be no abstract impersonal thought, but a personal Deity.

How, then, about man, and the human Personality? Man he conceived of as being partly within, and partly without the sphere of Nature. Within, so far as man is the highest product of Nature, and, in a sense, the end, for which all besides is the means. And yet, he held, there is something about man which does not fall within the sphere of Nature, and therefore transcends Nature. And this something he regarded as coming in *from without*, and therefore belonging to that ethereal essence of which the supernal heavens, and the starry spheres are composed. And thus the Personality of man, by virtue of his reasonable soul, was brought into relationship more or less direct, with his personal Prius, the Unmoved Mover of all things.[1]

Personality in the Hegelian System.

"Pure thought," according to Hegel, is the Prius of all things. But it is not easy to

[1] See Sir Alex. Grant's article on Aristotle in the *Encyc. Britannica*, to which I am partly indebted for the above digest.

ascertain with certainty what he conceived this pure thought to be, and what it contained. In one place we are told "that it must be conceived as a living principle, a principle which only in self-manifestation can be conscious of itself, and to the very nature of which, therefore, self-manifestation is essential."[1]

In another place we are told, "At the basis of all reality, whether material or mental, there is 'thought.' But the thought thus regarded as the basis of all existence is not consciousness with its distinction of ego and non-ego. It is rather the *stuff* of which both mind and nature (? "matter") are made, neither extended as in the natural world, nor self-centred as in the mind. Thought in its primary form is, as it were, thoroughly transparent, fluid, free and mutually interpenetrable in every part—the spirit in its seraphic life before Creation had produced a natural world, and thought had risen to an independent

[1] *Encyc. Brit.*, Art. "Metaphysic," p. 100. The following passages from the article on Metaphysic in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* will be found helpful as laying down the fundamental basis from which self-consciousness proceeds, according to Hegel:—

"In the Hegelian Logic self-consciousness is interpreted as a unity, which realizes itself through difference and the reconciliation of difference—an organic unity of elements, which exist only as they pass into each other."—*Ibid.*

existence in the social organism."[1] Thought, in this primary form, is what Hegel calls the "Idea," which, though fundamental, becomes also final in the process of the world. It only takes the form of consciousness in the crowning development of the mind. Only with philosophy does thought become fully conscious of itself in its origin and development.

Now, whatever we may be able to make out of the above paragraphs, and whether we can assent to them, or not, one thing at any rate seems plain, that Hegel himself did not claim for his Prius, his pure thought, his "Idea," either self-consciousness or personality. We are to regard it as a living principle, indeed, and, as a principle, for ever manifesting itself in the universe, but at the same time as unconscious in and of itself, and only reaching the summit of self-conscious personality in the mind and soul of man.[2]

[1] *Encyc. Brit.*, Art. "Hegel," vol. xi. p. 618.

[2] The criticism of Professor Ward, though directed against Naturalism, is equally applicable to the Hegelian theory of a Prius of pure thought, or "*mind-stuff*." "The more clearly we succeed in mentally depicting such 'mind-stuff' or 'matter-stuff' in its nakedness—it is indifferent which we call it—the more hopeless and absurd will appear the emergence therefrom of a living feeling, Ego, and a known non-Ego."—*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. 255.

The inevitable and only legitimate conclusion to which we are led by Hegel's Logic is, that there is but one Personality in the Universe—the Personality of Man. And as for any distinction between a Divine and human Personality, or any relationship between the two, or any responsibility of the latter to the Former, it cannot be maintained. The Divine is the human, and the human is the Divine. The human is not an object to the Divine nor the Divine to the human. Such a system, it is hardly necessary to point out, can never, as regards its theological aspect, rise higher than an intellectual Pantheism, that Higher Pantheism so well expressed in Tennyson's lines—

"Dark is the world to thee: thyself art the reason why;
For is He not all but thou, that hast power to feel 'I am I'?"

The Higher Pantheism.

It has been said that Hegel, because he grasped the concrete character of thought in itself, was enabled to understand the necessary unity of thought or self-consciousness with the world, and heal the division of physics from metaphysics which Aristotle had admitted.

But, if this be true, then it is evident that the breach has only been healed by the triumph of

Pantheism, and the loss of that which even Aristotle allowed, the existence of Jove as a deity, though somewhat too otiose and neglectful of his duties.

I know I shall be laying myself open to a charge of great presumption, if I venture to make any critical observations on the reasoning and conclusions of the Hegelian Logic and Philosophy in regard to the subject of Personality. If I venture to do so, I wish it to be understood, that I submit my criticisms with the utmost deference to far deeper thinkers and logicians than myself.

1. It appears to me that we are left in a state of uncertainty as to what is to be understood by the Prius of "pure thought." Perhaps we have, or we think we have, some notion of what is meant by "pure thought;" but when we are told it is "mind-stuff"—the stuff of which both mind and nature are made, neither extended and embodied as in the natural world, nor self-centred as in mind, then, I confess, I find myself at sea. Surely, there is here an inconsistency at least, if not a contradiction in terms. Surely "pure thought" must be thought unmixed and uncombined with anything whatsoever beside itself, but especially with matter.

2. Have we any experience of thought, or can we conceive of it, except as the product of the mind of a thinker? As throwing some light on this aspect of the Hegelian system and its relation to the precurrent philosophy of Kant, I venture to quote the following extract from the article on Schopenhauer in the *Encyc. Britannica.*

According to Kant—

"Behind thinking there is the thinker. But to his successors from Fichte to Hegel this axiom of the plain man is set aside as antiquated. Thought, or conception, without a subject-object appears as the principle—thought or thinking in its universality, without any individual substrata in which it is embodied. Thinking (τὸ νοεῖν) or thought (νοήσις) is to be substituted for mind (νοῦς)."[1]

For my part, there seems little or nothing to choose between the "thought" of Hegel and the "will" of Schopenhauer. Both are alike *impersonal* and void of self-consciousness; and I can no more conceive of "thought" without a thinker, than I can of "will" without a "willer." Perhaps I shall be called "antiquated" for holding such a view. Well, be it so.

3. Is the self-manifestation theory satisfactory?

[1] *Encyc. Brit.*, Art. "Schopenhauer," p. 457.

We are told that the Prius of pure thought is self-manifesting, and that it reaches its highest stage of self-conscious personality first in mankind. Now, geology assures us that man appeared on the earth late in the order of animated nature. Assuming, then, that "thought conscious of itself" is a higher form of thought than when in the unconscious stage (otherwise it would be no development), it follows that the only Prius, or living principle, which is the root and source of all existence, whether natural or spiritual, produces something greater than itself. In other words, the stream is made to rise above its source.[1]

4. Again I ask, is not Hegel's theory of a self-manifesting Prius, arriving at self-consciousness and personality in man, an illogical concept, and really a contradiction in terms?

"Only in self-manifestation does the Prius become self-conscious."

But if Nature and the whole universe be the self-manifestation of the Prius then, surely, it follows that whatsoever is manifested, up to the self-conscious personality of man, must be a

[1] It is impossible, beginning with the material world, to explain the mind by any process of distillation or development, unless consciousness, or its potentiality, has been there from the first."—Art. "Hegel," *Encyc. Brit.*, p. 618.

manifestation of the "self" of the Prius, and therefore must have been from the first essentially and potentially inherent in it; that is to say, the Prius must always have been self-conscious and personal, and the theory of an impersonal Prius, reaching self-consciousness through self-manifestation in man is an illogical concept.

The Formula I = I.

This in the Hegelian System is the Formula of the Universe. It denotes the Unity of Thought with itself. Not merely that the Prius of Thought manifests itself in Nature, but that it is one with Nature; that Thought and Matter are two parts or aspects of one organic whole, which stand in the relation to each other of subject and object, and which have no existence except in this relationship.[1]

This is analogous to the doctrine of Divine Immanence, which forms one aspect of Christian Metaphysic—the doctrine of God in Nature.

But the formula I = I, and what it connotes, is one which lends itself equally well to a

[1] "Each factor in this unity, in fact, is necessarily conceived as passing beyond itself into the other; the subject is subject, only as it relates itself to the object, the object is object, only as it relates itself to the subject."—Professor Caird, writer of Art. "Metaphysic" in *Encyc. Brit.*

Pantheistic interpretation. "God is Nature, and Nature is God." And here, as it seems to me, the Logic of Hegel and Christian Metaphysic must part company. The Christian doctrine of the Divine Immanence in Nature may be said to find its analogue in Hegel's self-manifesting Prius of pure thought. But Divine Immanence is only one aspect of Christian Metaphysic; the other is that of the Divine Transcendence. Not only does the Prius manifest Himself in Nature, and so become one with it; but, while doing this, His self-conscious Personality, as distinct from Nature and transcending Nature, is distinctly asserted. And it is just because Hegel failed to safeguard this doctrine of Divine transcendence, that his system can never be really brought into harmony with Christian Metaphysic and the Christian religion.

And yet it does not appear that Hegel was conscious of any real and radical discrepancy between the two. On the contrary, it is evident from his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* that he thought Christianity, regarded in its metaphysical and dogmatic aspect, would be explained and interpreted in accordance with the principles of his own system.

In these *Lectures*, after reviewing the various forms and gradations of religious belief, he comes to what is called the absolute religion of Christianity, in which the mystery of the reconciliation between God and man is openly taught and expressed in Christian dogma.

"God is a Trinity because He is a Spirit. The revelation of this truth is the subject of the Christian Scriptures. The Son of God, in the immediate aspect, is the finite world of nature, and man, who is far from being at one with his Father, is originally in an attitude of estrangement. The history of Christ is the visible reconciliation (Synthesis) between man and the Eternal. With the death of Christ this union, ceasing to be a mere fact, becomes a vital idea—the Spirit of God, which dwells in the Christian community."[1]

Doubtless, there is a Christian ring about all this. Nay, further, it is a statement of the Christian system, which in many points any orthodox Christian might endorse; but is it fruit which grows naturally on the tree of Hegel's Logic? Or is it only an attempt to apply his triadic law of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis to a system of metaphysic and philosophy, which, on one cardinal point at least, is opposed to that

[1] Art. "Hegel," *Encyc. Brit.*

Logic? The harmony he sought to establish seems forced and unnatural, and those who after his death opposed his system, attacked it on the very ground of its pantheistic or atheistic tendency.[1]

Indeed, it seems a self-evident proposition, that the metaphysic which postulates nothing but an impersonal thought, as the Prius of all things, can never rise to the higher level of personality.

[1] Hegelianism, as a separate system of philosophy, did not long maintain its ground even in Germany, but its influence on philosophic thought has been deep and widespread both in Germany and outside.

"Fichte and Hegel," says Dr. Bain, in his summary of the theories of the soul, "being overmastered with the idea of unity, had to make a choice; and attaching themselves by preference to the dignified mental side, became Pantheists of an ideal school, resolving all existence into mind or ideas."—*Mind and Body*, p. 194.

SECTION II.

PERSONALITY CONSIDERED ON "A POSTERIORI" GROUNDS.

The *a posteriori* view—Mr. Illingworth on Personality—Inferences from this view of the subject, and Summary.

LET us now proceed to consider Personality from the *a posteriori* point of view.

We assume and start from the fact of human Personality. To deny this to be a fact is to deny that we are self-conscious agents, and in so doing we preclude ourselves from the capability and the possibility of proceeding any further with this investigation; for, if we are not certain of the fact of our personal existence as self-conscious spirits, then there is no other fact in the wide universe of which we can be certain. The admission of the fact of human Personality, then, forms the very foundation, on which all subsequent reasoning and conclusions must be based.

And here I would observe, in passing, that the

question how this human Personality came to be what it is, is a matter of indifference in our present investigation. It matters not whether it sprang into existence full-fledged, as it were, at the fiat of the Almighty, or whether it arrived at its present stage of development by a slow and gradual process of evolution. In either case, it is the product of a power, and the outcome of causes, which must be adequate to the total effect produced. But evolution, apart from the evolving force behind it, can produce nothing. It is only the name for a process or method of procedure.

But, if it be a matter of comparative indifference how the human Personality came to be what it is, the question, "what it is?" is one of paramount importance. Are we agreed on this point? Let us hear what some of the best authorities say.

Mr. Illingworth has made the subject of Personality in a special sense his own, and the following extracts from his book on *Divine Immanence* is much to the point :—

"Spirit, then, as we know it in our own personal experience, has two different relations to matter, that of transcendence and that of immanence. But though logically distinct, these two relations are not actually separate; they are two aspects

of one fact, two points of view from which the single action of our one personality may be regarded. As self-conscious, self-identical, self-determined, we possess qualities which transcend, or rise above the laws of matter; but we can only realize these qualities, and so become aware of them, by acting in the material world; while, conversely, material objects—our bodies and our works of art—could never possibly be regarded as expressions of spirit, if spirit were not at the same time recognized as distinct from its medium of manifestation."[1]

And again—

"Now we find, on reflection, that what we call our spirit transcends, or is, in a sense, independent of the bodily organism on which otherwise it so entirely depends. Metaphysically speaking, this is seen in our self-consciousness, or power of separating ourself as subject from ourself as object, a thing wholly inconceivable as the result of any material process, and relating us at once to an order of being which we are obliged to call immaterial."

Such, according to Mr. Illingworth, is human Personality. It is a wonderful combination of spirit and matter, of subject and object—a combination in which, though there is mutual interaction, there is no confusion, in which the spirit,

[1] *Divine Immanence*, p. 68.

while it is immanent in matter, and in a measure dependent upon it, is yet able to rise above, and to act independently of it.

We have to remember, besides, that this human Personality is part of the natural order of things, the outcome of some force or power inherent and energetic in nature, and the highest product—the finished article—so far as our experience goes, which that force or power has produced.

Inferences and Summary.

What, then, are the inferences or conclusions to which this fact of human Personality points?

They would seem to be the following:—

1. On the principle, *Causa semper æquat effectum*, there must be behind nature a Power, call it what you will, that is adequate to the highest results produced, including the self-conscious personal spirit of man.

2. That, judging from analogy, this Power, not being of a lower order than the highest of its products, will be a Spirit similar to our own in kind, though infinitely superior in degree; a Spirit which is both immanent in Nature, and at the same time transcends Nature; a Person in Whom,

as in our own, both subject and object are combined, but not confused.

To quote Mr. Illingworth once more—

"He must be conceived as ever-present to sustain and animate the universe, which then becomes a living manifestation of Himself—no mere machine, or book, or picture, but a perpetually sounding voice."[1]

Summary.—The consideration of Personality, then, from the *a posteriori* point of view, points clearly and consistently to the existence of a Prius spiritual and personal, Who is immanent in Nature in such sense that "in Him we live, and move, and have our being," yet at the same time transcends Nature, and is not to be confounded with it. It is the view of the Psalmist: "The Lord sitteth above the water-flood: and the Lord remaineth a King for ever."

Reader, let me ask, did you ever grow a Trumpet Lily (*Lilium longiflorum*)? If not, let me recommend you to do so, for you do not know, until you try, how much pleasure it can give you. "Sermons in stones," says our great English Bard. "Consider the lilies," says the Prophet of Nazareth. And what a sermon does this exquisite flower

[1] *Divine Immanence*, p. 73.

preach me, with its trumpet tongue, its sublime yet silent eloquence! I seem to see in it a striking instance of Divine immanence in Nature. As I stand before it I feel bound as by a spell, in which admiration is mingled with reverential awe. Its graceful form and purity of tint, its boldness and symmetry of outline, its ravishing perfume and dignified repose, bespeak the presence of a Power before which I could fall down and worship. It seems as though God Himself were speaking to me through that flower, and revealing to me something of His ineffable beauty and loveliness. To entertain an impure thought, an unchaste desire, in the presence of that flower would surely be an act of sacrilege, a dishonour done to Him Who manifests Himself therein. I see in it a reflection of the Divine Being, which, while it ravishes my soul, begets in me the desire to know Him better, and possess Him in fuller measure.

SECTION III.

PERSONALITY IN THE CHRISTIAN SYSTEM OF METAPHYSIC AND RELIGION.

Three propositions—

I. The Prius of all things is a Self-conscious personal Unity.

II. Self-manifesting by (*a*) Generation, (*b*) Creation, (*c*) Immanence, (*d*) Incarnation.

III. Self-reconciling.

First Proposition.—The Prius a Self-conscious Personal Unity.

Second Proposition.—The Christian Prius Self-manifesting by (*a*) Generation, (*b*) Creation—What is Life?—Mr. Spencer's definition—The birth of the Soul—Manifestation of the Prius by (*c*) Immanence—*Homo speculum Dei*—Manifestation of the Prius through (*d*) Incarnation—Not considered improbable in non-Christian systems—The Christian Incarnation—The argument for it.

Third Proposition.—The Christian Prius a Self-reconciling Unity—Dualism—Differences and their reconciliation—The mystery of sin—Hegel's triadic law illustrated in Christian Metaphysic—Reconciliation of wills through the Incarnation.

IN no respect, perhaps, is the difference between the various systems of secular and Christian Metaphysic more clearly defined and accentuated than in their respective treatment of the subject of Personality.

We have already seen how Personality is dealt with in some of the principal systems of secular Metaphysic. We now come to consider how it is dealt with in Christian Metaphysic.

By Christian Metaphysic, as distinguished from secular, I understand that Metaphysic, which forms the philosophic basis of the Christian Religion, and of which Christianity is the religious expression.

But what is Christian Metaphysic? It is almost needless to say, that for any authoritative statements in answer to this question we must have recourse to the sacred Records of the Old and New Testaments. And I venture to submit the three following propositions, as embodying the main doctrines and conclusions of Christian Metaphysic :—

PROPOSITIONS OF CHRISTIAN METAPHYSIC.

I. The Prius of all things is a self-conscious personal Unity.

II. Self-manifesting.

III. Self-reconciling.

Of course, it is needless to say, that these propositions do not admit of absolute proof. But there are two points, on which the reader has a right to demand the fullest satisfaction.

First, are they such as may rightly be called propositions of Christian Metaphysic? Do they, in the second place, afford a rational and probable theory, on which to account for the facts and phenomena of which we are conscious or sensible, either within or without us?

To afford satisfaction on these two points, therefore, will be my first endeavour. And we will take the propositions in the order in which they appear.

PROPOSITION I.—*The Christian Prius is a Self-conscious, Personal Unity.*

That the Christian Prius is consistently represented as a self-conscious Unity in the sacred Scriptures will, I imagine, be generally admitted. Both in the Old and New Testaments the fact is both repeatedly and variously asserted, as every child in a Sunday school would tell us. There is no need, therefore, for a long string of texts, and two will suffice.

Deut. vi. 4: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God (= Jehovah, our Elohim) is One Lord (= Jehovah)."

Col. i. 17: "And He is before all things, and by Him all things consist."

Self-conscious.

Neither can it be necessary to show, that self-consciousness is an attribute of the Christian Prius; for passages without number could be quoted in which it is, either directly stated, or left to be inferred.

Creation, and especially the creation of man, is spoken of as the result of self-conscious action: "Let us make man." And again, St. Paul speaks of Him as "working all things after the counsel of His Own Will." (Eph. i. 11.)

Personality of the Prius.

If the Christian Prius be self-conscious, then Personality must also be attributed to Him, for self-consciousness is of the essence of Personality. But, if Personality be claimed as an attribute of the Prius, we must remember that it is in a different sense to that in which it is claimed for man.

Each man is individually a person. But the Divine Prius is not an individual Person, but a Trinity of Three distinct Persons. And He is One, only by virtue of the unity or union of these Three Persons in One. His Unity is not the

unity of a single individual, as in the case of man, but that of a community of Three Persons. Each of these Persons possesses the same attributes in equal measure, and it is the participation in common of these attributes in which the Unity of the Personal Prius consists. If I may be permitted, without irreverence, to borrow an illustration from the world of commerce, I would compare it to a company or society of three men, who unite to form a business firm for trade or manufacture, and in which they each place equal sums of money. The firm is one, but the partners are three. The firm is not a person, but each of the partners is. The firm possesses no personality, and yet, by virtue of the personality of the partners, it becomes invested with that attribute, and the firm is said to do things, as representing the unanimous consent and intentions of the partners.

So the Prius of Christian Metaphysic is a Unity, not by virtue of being One Person, but because each of the Three Persons is an equal sharer in the One Divine Substance which is common to them all.[1]

[1] "Each Person in the Blessed Trinity has the attributes of the Others, so that the distinctions of Persons whereby They be, in some incomprehensible way, distinguished from Each Other, coalesce in the Unity of the Godhead." (St. Aug., *De Trin.* lix.)

That this doctrine of the threefold Personality in the Unity of the Prius is mysterious we fully admit. This, however, is no argument against its truth and probability. For in the human Personality, regarded as a type of its Maker, we encounter the same, or a similar, difficulty. And, therefore, as St. Augustine points out, we ought not to question about Him, until we have first learned the mystery in ourselves.

"The *mind* itself and its *knowledge*, and *love* as the third, is a sort of image of the Trinity; and these three are one and one substance. Nor is the offspring less (than the parent), since the mind *knoweth* itself just as much as *it is;* nor the love less, since it *loveth* itself as much as it *knoweth*, and as much as *it is*." (Aug., *De Trin.*, I. ix. c. 4 & ff.)

The Names of God.

The very names by which the Divine Prius is revealed indicate the nature and attributes which are claimed for Him. Take, for example, the following:—

Elohim (Heb.).—This word is a plural in form, but is joined to verbs in the singular. As the first name of the Divine Prius, it asserts His Unity, and claims in His behalf, that He is the

only Source of all the forces and influences by which the Universe was first created, and is now governed, developed, and maintained.

Jehovah (or *Yahveh*), "He Who brings into existence."—This name denotes that the Divine Prius is the Self-Existent, the one and only source of being—the Absolute, the Unconditioned, the Eternal One.[1]

El-Shaddai (Heb.).—El, which is usually translated "God," denotes primarily "might," or "power," or "force." The second name, Shaddai, indicates the nature of this power, which is not that of violence, but All-bountifulness and Love.[2] He is Almighty, but His Almightiness is of the

[1] Cf. Exod. iii. 14: "And God said unto Moses, 'I Am that I Am:' and He said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, 'I Am' (Ehyeh) hath sent me unto you." And Is. xlv. 6, "I Am, and there is none beside Me." See also Deut. vi. 4: "Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God (Jehovah our Elohim) is one Lord (Jehovah)." This latter passage claims on behalf of Jehovah that He, and He alone, is the One Absolute Uncaused God.

[2] "'Shaddai' primarily means 'breasted' or 'the breasted one,' from Heb. 'Shad' = breast, and especially a 'woman's breast.'"—Rev. A. Jukes, *Names of God*, p. 66.

"*Shaddai*," as one of the Divine titles, denoted the "Power" or "Shedder-forth," *i.e.* of blessings and fruits. The Sheddim, referred to as objects of idolatrous worship (Deut. xxxii. 17; and Ps. cvi. 37), were the many-breasted idols representing the genial powers of nature, the givers of rain, and pourers-forth of fruits and increase. See Parkhurst's *Hebrew Lexicon*, s. v. "Shaddai" and "Sheddim."

breast: that is, of self-sacrificing affection, giving and shedding itself for the good of others.

El Shaddai, then, reveals the Divine Prius under the attribute of Love. He Who is power and force; pure thought and intelligence; the Absolute, the Unconditioned Self-Existent One, is also Love. He is Power, Thought, Existence, rendered operative by Love. All life is the self-realization of the All-loving One. The Universe is the Self-manifestation of the Uncreated, instinct with His own attributes of power, intelligence, and love. And this name, El Shaddai, while it claims Love as the animating principle of the Prius, so also, by direct inference, it reveals Him in His Attribute of Paternity. He is the All-Father, and from Him all fatherhood is derived.[1]

But "will" also is the prerogative of a father; hence a further inference to be drawn from this name "El-Shaddai" is that the Divine Prius, beside embracing under His Personality the attributes of Power, and Pure Thought, of Self-Existence, of Love and Paternity, is also the source and seat

[1] Eph. iii. 15: Ἐξ οὗ πᾶσα πατριὰ ὀνομάζεται. See also Heb. xii. 9, where He is called "the Father of spirits;" and Ps. lxviii. 5: "Jah" is also "A Father of the fatherless;" and Is. lxiii. 16: "Doubtless Thou art our Father, though Abraham be ignorant of us."

of Sovereign Will. Indeed, a moment's reflection will show us, that the former necessarily involve the latter. It is impossible to conceive of One Who is power and thought and love who is not also possessed of will.[1]

The following, then, to speak briefly, is the position assumed by Christian Metaphysic with regard to its Divine Prius:—

1. It involves Personality as its essential principle and characteristic.

2. This Personality is not simple, but threefold. It is that of a Trinity of Persons.

3. These Three Persons are so intimately united that they form but One Being, Who is the Absolute, the Unconditioned, the Uncaused Cause of all things.

Bearing in mind, then, how, according to the teaching of Christian Metaphysic, Personality forms an essential principle of the Prius, let us pass on to the consideration of our second proposition.

[1] We see how Schopenhauer's contention, that "Will is Lord of all," is the enunciation of a great truth, which only becomes reconciled with reason under its treatment by Christian Metaphysic.

PROPOSITION II.—*The Christian Prius is Self-manifesting.*

We are not left in any doubt that Christianity does claim this proposition to be true. And, indeed, a moment's reflection will show, that, unless Nature and the Universe be illusions, it follows, as a necessary corollary from the first Proposition, that the Prius of all things is a personal Unity.

In various ways has this Self-manifestation been going forward; but we shall find, I believe, that most, if not all of them, may be arranged under one or other of the following heads:—

(*a*) Generation.

(*b*) Creation.

(*c*) Immanence and Effusion.

(*d*) Incarnation.

Let us consider them in this order, still remembering, that my object is, not to prove them to be true, which under the circumstances is impossible, but only to show that they are concepts and doctrines of Christian Metaphysic, which are either explicitly, or implicitly contained in the Christian sacred writings.

(*a*) *First Method of Self-manifestation of the Prius: by Generation.*

From all eternity the Prius adopted this method of Self-manifestation. The very mystery of the Threefold Personality involves it. For the second Person is represented as occupying the relation of a Son to the First Person. St. Paul, the great exponent of Christian Metaphysic, speaks of the Second Person as "the first-born of all creation."[1] And the First Person he calls the Father, because "from Him every family in heaven and earth is named.[2]

Then from the First and Second Persons, Co-equal[3] and Consubstantial, there proceeds the Spirit, which is shared in common by them both, the Third Person of the Trinity—the Holy Ghost.[4]

[1] Col. i. 15: Πρωτοτόκος πάσης κτίσεως.

[2] Ἐξ οὗ πασὰ πατρία ἐν οὐρανοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς ὀνομάζεται. Lit. "all-fatherhood."

[3] Col. i. 19: Πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα.

[4] See for the further enunciation of these doctrines the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds. From the Eternal generation of the Second Person there follows the Eternal procession of the Third. The view held by the Bishops and Doctors who drew up these Creeds was "that the Father is the Head and Fountain of Deity (Πηγὴ Θεοτήτος), from Whom the Son and Holy Spirit are from all eternity derived, but so derived as not to be divided from the Father; but they are in the Father and the Father in Them by a certain περιχώρησις or inhabitation."—Bp. Browne, *Thirty-Nine Art.*, p. 58.

But this aspect of our subject falls rather within the domain of Theology, and therefore I will not dwell upon it, further than to point out its important bearing on those methods of Self-manifestation which follow. It is "in Him"[1] and "through Him"[2] that the Prius, as Father, creates; it is by His Spirit that He is immanent throughout the Universe.

In his paper on "The Evidences of Design in Nature," the late Mr. G. J. Romanes quoted with manifest approval extracts from the Rev. Aubrey Moore's Essay in *Lux Mundi*. Amongst them is the following :—

"It seems as if, in the providence of God, the mission of modern science was to bring home to our unmetaphysical ways of thinking the great truth of the Divine immanence in creation."

(*b*) *Second Method of Self-manifestation of the Prius: by Creation.*

That many of the statements in the Christian Records, which describe the Prius as Self-manifesting in creation, are couched in anthropomorphic language need not surprise us, when we remember they were intended to convey abstract

[1] Col. i. 16. [2] Heb. i. 2.

ideas to people in an early stage of civilization and intellectual development. In no other way could those ideas have been rendered intelligible. And we find the same method adopted in the heathen mythologies, and especially in the polytheism of ancient Greece and Rome. But while it need not surprise us, it is none the less important to make due allowance for it. Moreover, as a matter of fact, we do find abundant warnings, even in the Jewish and Christian Records themselves, against errors and misconceptions, which might arise from anthropomorphic language and modes of thought.

The very prohibition of idolatry in the Second Commandment of the Decalogue is a case in point. God is a Spirit; nor must we conceive of Him as comparable to any earthly similitude. And this applies not only to outward form, but to inward thought and intelligence. "For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are My ways higher than your ways, and My thoughts than your thoughts."[1]

And St. Paul, when reasoning with the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers at Athens, warned them against the misconception of supposing that

[1] Isa. lv. 9.

the Maker of all things "dwells in temples made with hands," or "is like unto gold or silver or stone, graven by art and device of man."[1]

If this means anything, it means that in our conception of the Christian Prius and His method of Self-manifestation by Creation, we must rise above, and free ourselves from anthropomorphism. He is the Great Poet, and the Universe is His poem. But He writes not with pen and ink. He carves not with chisel and hammer. Nature is the canvas, on which He is for ever depicting Himself, but it is with no human pencil that He paints.

The following I venture humbly to submit as the true position :—

1. All life proceeds from and is a manifestation of the Prius. If there be a Prius, this is an axiomatic truth, for there is no other source from which life can spring. If there be no Prius, then chance, or necessity, are the only alternatives.

2. But what is Life? According to Mr. Spencer, it is "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations."[2] And he adds, that we may consider the internal relations

[1] Acts xvii. 24, 29.

[2] *Psychology*, p. 374.

as "simultaneous and successive changes," and the connection between them as "a correspondence." This means that internal phenomena answer to external phenomena.

I humbly submit, that this so-called definition of Life is no definition at all; because it leaves the question of what Life is in itself untouched, and gives us only a generalized expression of the forms in which Life is manifested to us. Is, then, a definition of Life possible? I do not think it is, beyond saying it is "the *power* to produce all its manifestations." But we must not confound what a thing is in its essence with what it can produce, or become. A potter can make pots but pots don't make a potter. The pots are the product of his skill, but his wares are entirely distinct from it.

Life, then, I submit, is not "adjustment" or "correspondence," but the power under suitable conditions to produce them; and for this power, as I have endeavoured to show, we must go back to the Personal Prius, seeing that there is no other source whence it can be derived.

But life is more than this. It is the power to assimilate for self-support; to receive impressions, and respond to stimulants from its

environment; to produce an internal image, or reflexion, answering to external phenomena, whether physical or spiritual. And the experiential result of all this is the production of interior psychical relations, corresponding to outer relations, and forming the psychical content of each stage in the progress of vital development.

But Life is more even than this: it is the power, not only to receive and respond to impressions and impulses from without, and so to beget by experience inner relations corresponding to outer relations; it is the power to register, to collect, to store up, and then finally to transmit all accumulated experiences and relations to successors by the laws of generation and heredity. Take a young mole and a young squirrel as soon as they are born, keep them in a cage till they are fully grown, and then turn them loose. The mole will quickly hide itself in the ground, and the squirrel will run up the nearest tree. And we call this instinct. It is really nothing but inherited physical and psychical faculty.

I submit, then, that Life is not all what Mr. Spencer conceives it to be, an effect to be accounted for by the experience of purely

material and physical forces; but a power proceeding from the Self-manifesting Prius; a power—

1. To assimilate for self-support;

2. To receive, reflect and respond to impressions and stimulants from the environment;

3. To deal with them, and translate them into mental ideas and concepts, thus establishing a system of internal psychical relations corresponding to external relations;

4. To register and accumulate these relations;

5. To transmit them to successors by the laws of generation and heredity, whereby the psychical content goes on continuously increasing *pari passu* with each higher development of the vital organism.

It is thus, I venture to think, we may give a rational account of the phenomena of Life from its lowest to its highest stage of progress—from the amæba to the man—and whether regarded from a physiological or psychical point of view.

Regarded in this light, further consideration will show that all Life is in a double sense a manifestation of the Prius: first, in respect to its source; second, in respect to its development.

Those who are acquainted with Mr. Spencer's *Psychology* are aware, that on no point does he

insist with greater force and frequency than the fact that there is a perfect correspondence or adjustment between our inner and outer relations. "Every form of intelligence," he says, "is in essence an adjustment of inner to outer relations."[1]

This must mean one of two things, either our inner relations—*i.e.* our whole psychical content—are adjusted to, and so in a great measure an effect produced by, our outer relations; or our outer relations—*i.e.* our whole environment, with all its phenomena, whether material or spiritual—are adjusted to, and influenced by our inner relations.

The latter supposition is manifestly absurd, therefore the first must be true. This means in effect, that our inner relations are really the product, as regards their form, disposition and development, of those outer relations, both material and spiritual, which constitute our environment. But what is our environment? It is the world of Nature, it is the boundless Universe, which is again only the Self-manifestation of the Prius.

And so it appears, that Life, not only in its origin, but in every successive stage of its development, is the product and creation of the

[1] *Psychology*, p. 486.

Self-manifesting Prius. Each individual concrete form of life, and each increment in the content of life, whether physical or psychical, represents a further adjustment and correspondence of inner to outer relations. And each manifestation received and appropriated prepares the way for further manifestations in succeeding generations. But the power to adjust and correspond, to establish internal relations answering to external, to accumulate experiences, and transmit them by generation and heredity,—all these must be regarded as the product and creation, so to speak, of the One and only efficient Cause, the Self-manifesting Prius.[1]

The Birth of the Soul.

The account of the creation of the soul of man given us in Genesis is evidently couched in anthropomorphic language, which calls for allowance and interpretation. And in all the ranks of animal life inferior to man the psychical development,

[1] Of course, every manifestation of the Prius must be a matter of experience by the vital organism, for in no other way can they be received and appropriated. In this sense there is truth in Mr. Spencer's Experience Hypothesis. But experience is not, as he appears to regard it, an efficient cause, but only the application of it.

effected through the manifestation of the Prius, only reaches the stage of consciousness; but in man it has advanced a step further, to the stage of self-consciousness. It is at this point, when the Ego becomes differentiated from the non-Ego, when the will assumes the supremacy and control over all the other elements of the psychical content, such as feeling, thought, memory, etc., that the spirit of man becomes a living soul, a being endowed with individual personality, formed through the Self-manifestation of the Prius in the image and likeness of the Prius Himself. And this final result is well expressed, as it seems to me, by Professor Wundt under the heading of "The Ego and Personality."[1]

"As the Ego is the will in its distinction from the rest of conscious content, so Personality is the Ego reunited in the manifold of this content, and thereby raised to the stage of self-consciousness."

May it not be thus that the claims of Science and Revelation are to be reconciled? And not of Science only, but of Metaphysic also. In the language of Metaphysic we say the human Personality is a Self-manifestation of the personal

[1] *Principles of Morality*, p. 21.

Prius; in the language of Scripture we say, "God made man in His own Image," "He breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." If Metaphysic and Science can teach us, as doubtless they can, something of the method adopted by the First Great Cause in the production and development of Life, should we not be thankful for their help in our quest after the truth?

(c) *Third Method of Self-manifestation of the Prius: by Immanence and Effusion.*

As this branch of our subject has already been dealt with at considerable length, and in a very convincing manner by the Rev. J. R. Illingworth in his book on Divine Immanence, it does not seem necessary for me to go over the same ground in detail. I would only point out, that, while in Christian Metaphysic the Self-manifestation of the Prius by Creation is regarded as the work of the Second Person of the Trinity, Self-manifestation by Effusion and Immanence is the work of the Third Person—the Spirit which proceeds from the First and Second.

There are two main aspects under which the subject may be regarded; though some persons

might, perhaps, be disposed to regard them as one—

(*a*) Immanence in Nature ;

(*b*) Immanence in Man.

The influence of Nature—that is, of the material Universe—upon the mind and soul of man is universally acknowledged. The literature of all nations, since the time they possessed a literature, bears witness to it. Even the lowest and most degraded forms of religion and mythology are but the expression of a consciousness of something in Nature which is yet above Nature.[1] And though men have put different interpretations on their experience of this influence, and framed different systems of religion and philosophy to explain it, still "beneath them all, that experience remains ; a sense, in the presence of Nature, of contact with something spiritual ; a sense of affinity, or kinship, as the Neo-platonists described it, with the material world, implying spirituality within or behind it." [2]

[1] "Sun-myths, star-myths, myths of the mountains and the rivers and the trees lie at the root, as we now know so well, of all early religion. . . . We have long outgrown mythology, and are intolerant of doubtful logic, but the religious influence of external nature is as strong upon us as it ever was, possibly even stronger than in some bygone times."—*Divine Immanence*, p. 22.

[2] *Divine Immanence*, p. 50.

And what has been the result so far as man is concerned ? the birth of what, to use a single term embracing sentiment and emotion, we call the religious instinct. Of all created forms of life, man is the only one who possesses it. He alone is capable of it, and it is that, which differentiates him most completely from all other and lower orders of creation. This religious instinct forms part of my psychical equipment. It is one of my spiritual assets. I cannot deny it, for it is a matter of daily and universal experience. It is one of my inner relations ; but my inner relations, to use the language and reasoning of Mr. Spencer, are only the counterpart of my outer relations, and without the latter the former cannot exist. And what is the inference from this ?

I conclude that my religious instinct demands both for its existence and satisfaction the presence in Nature, and the whole Universe, of a Spirit answering to my spirit, immanent in matter yet transcending matter, the effluence and Self-manifestation of the Prius.

Immanence in Man. Homo Speculum Dei.

But, bearing in mind the unity of Nature and the solidarity of all life, we perceive that man is part of Nature. Therefore in him, too, we should expect to find the immanence of the same Spirit which indwells and animates Nature.

Nor shall we be disappointed. The religious instinct testifies to the presence in Nature of a spiritual Influence. But my religious instinct is only a part of my psychical content and equipment. There are other faculties and functions of an instinctive nature, of the reality of which I am as conscious and assured as I am of my religious instinct. There is the perception and apperception of beauty; for example, of truth and justice and love. However I came by them, it is vain to tell me I do not possess them, or that they are the illusive fictions of my imagination. Not only are they co-efficients, factors, attributes of that entity, which for convenience I call my soul, but they are indices of a something behind them which is real and spiritual. And if my religious instinct bears witness to the existence of the Prius, manifesting Himself through

immanence in Nature, do not these reveal to me something of His character?

It is Nature, or rather the Spirit which animates Nature, which gives us our first and most trustworthy lessons in art, and begets in us the instinctive perception and love of the beautiful. It is the study of the mathematical axioms and laws of matter and space, which reveal to us the foundation stones on which the whole edifice of truth and justice is erected. It is Nature which imparts to all things living their first lessons in love; and the function of the human soul is to translate the material impress into the spiritual idea or concept. But life itself is the immanation of the Spirit of the Prius, and the soul of man is the mirror of God, *Speculum Dei*, in which He causes Himself to be reflected; the plastic wax which received the impress of His Image. My innate sense of the beautiful bespeaks Him to be the source of beauty. My consciousness of truth and justice tells me that He is true and just; my conscience, with its categorical imperative of duty, that He is holy; my sentiment of affection, that love is His abiding and essential attribute.

We must not suppose, however, that the influence of the Self-manifesting Prius on man is only

experienced indirectly through immanence in Nature. So soon as the spirit of man, through the attainment of self-consciousness, arrived at the stage of personality, it became thenceforth a fitting recipient of more direct manifestation. How else shall we account for the appearance from time to time, and in various lands, of those great ones of the earth, such as Socrates, and Plato, and Buddha; of poets and philosophers, who have risen like meteors in a midnight sky, and astonished and enlightened the world by their holy lives, their devout aspirations, their deep and prophetic insight into truth? These, surely, were inspired men; and what could be the source of their inspiration but the Spirit of the Prius immanent both in Nature and in man?

"Thus God's immanence in Nature," says Mr. Illingworth, "we may reasonably assert, reappears as inspiration in man. Meanwhile, our spiritual character reacts upon the material instrument of its realization, moulding the brain and nervous system, and thence the entire bodily organism, into gradual accordance with itself, till the expression of the eye, the lines of the face, the tones of the voice, the touch of the hand, the movements, and manners, and gracious demeanour, all reveal with increasing clearness the *nature* of the Spirit

which has made them what they are. Thus the interior beauty of holiness comes by degrees to be a visible thing; and through His action on our spirit, God is made manifest in our flesh."[1]

And it is not only in life that we have evidence of the transforming influence of the Divine Spirit immanent in the body. I doubt not that some at least of my readers have been privileged to behold that wonderful transfiguration which sometimes takes place at the moment of death. The face of the humble servant of Jesus becomes for a moment suffused with an unearthly glory, which ere now has wrung from the sorrowing bystanders the exclamation, "How beautiful! O death, where is thy sting?" It is the Christian Euthanasia—the kiss of Psyche—with which she bids adieu for a while to her frail earthly comrade; and, as she does so, whispers in the ear, "See what glory awaits us in the far-off land."

But religion is the people's Metaphysic, and pre-eminently is this true in the case before us. The Christian Religion, including in the term the Jewish Dispensation, which was preparatory to it, is the practical exemplification of the metaphysical law of a Prius self-manifesting through effusion

[1] *Divine Immanence*, p. 76.

and immanence. And it is hardly too much to say, that the whole Christian system is based on the acknowledgment of this principle. I scarcely need remind my reader how in the Old Testament the immanence of the Spirit of God in man is claimed, or inferred, over and over again. "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me. Cast me not away from Thy presence, and take not Thy Holy Spirit from me." Such was the prayer of the Psalmist; while the Prophets claimed to speak not their own words, to give utterance, not to their own thoughts, but to those of the Spirit which inspired them: "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me."[1] Such is ever the justification of the message they delivered. Nor was this all. These same holy men, who "spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," foretold a fuller effluence of the same Spirit in the future: "I will pour out My Spirit upon all flesh:"[2] and a more complete and intimate immanence, "and I will walk among you, and will be your God."[3]

All these promises and predictions the Christian holds to have been fulfilled, or, at least, the means

[1] Isa. lxi. 1. [2] Joel ii. 28.
[3] Lev. xxvi. 12, and Jer. xxxi. 33.

for their fulfilment provided, in the Christian Religion, which may truly be described as a Dispensation of the Spirit. To pursue the subject further in this direction would bring me into the domain proper to Theology. What I have said will be sufficient, I imagine, to show the consistence and harmony between Christian Metaphysic and the Christian Religion in respect to immanence and effusion as modes of Self-manifestation of the Prius.

(*d*) *Third Method of Self-manifestation of the Prius: through Incarnation.*

We have considered the Second Proposition of Christian Metaphysic—that the Prius of all things is a self-manifesting personal Unity—as realized by Generation, by Creation, by Effusion, and Immanence. We come now to the fourth and last method, that of Incarnation, where by Incarnation we mean the Christian view and presentation of it.

I would observe, then, in the first place, that the subject of Incarnation is not one peculiar to Christianity. The ancient Mythologies and Religions of India, Greece, and Rome, not to mention other countries, may be said to abound in incarnations. For example, Hinduism, the most ancient religion of which we have any historic records,

claims no less than ten incarnations of Vishnu, of which the two most important are those of Râma and Krishna;[1] while, to come down to modern times, we read only the other day of the "living god" of Urga, who is to the millions of Chinese and Mongolian Buddhists what the Dalai Lama is to the Buddhists in that part of the world.[2]

All these many examples of so-called incarnation at least show that there is nothing in the idea abhorrent to the human mind, on the score of being intrinsically improbable or impossible.

[1] *Christianity and Hinduism*, by Bishop Caldwell.

[2] See letter from a correspondent of the *Standard*, which appeared Nov. 15, 1901. I give the following extracts from this interesting letter:—

"In the flesh he is a young man under thirty, and was in a house which is an exact replica of the Russian Consulate-General. His personification of a deity is chiefly confined to religious occasions and his public life. In private he is of the world, worldly. . . . I was fortunate enough to see this extraordinary personage under conditions not easily forgotten. Outside one of the beautiful Buddhist temples, in a carefully guarded enclosure, was pitched a semicircle of tents. The central one, resplendent with yellow silks and gold embroidery, with huge yellow silk umbrellas and cushions to match, contained the throne of the living god. On either hand, and surrounding him, were crowds of Lamas, priests, Mongol princes, and Ambans. . . . Upon entering the ring, each pair of wrestlers prance up with curious movements of the arms and legs to the immediate presence of the 'living god,' before whom they kowtow, falling on their knees and striking the ground repeatedly with their foreheads."

On the contrary, we are led to infer that, where there is a belief in the supernatural, an incarnation of it appears reasonable, possible, and probable. Of course, a belief in the probability and possibility of an event, and the expectation that it will happen, affords no proof that it has happened. But neither, on the other hand, because many incarnations are held to be spurious and untrue, are we justified in concluding that all incarnations, or any one in particular, are false and therefore to be rejected. Neither are we justified in discrediting incarnation on the ground of its being miraculous and contrary to experience. Is nothing to happen that is contrary to our limited experience? Is it not true, that in the evolution and development of any subject every step is necessarily contrary to experience? If nothing were to happen but what accords with our very limited experience in the past, there would at once be a stop put to all progress in the future. A miracle, if we analyze the word, is merely something to be wondered at, as being unusual in the ordinary course of Nature. And certainly no miracle can happen without an adequate cause. But to argue from this, that a miracle is impossible is tantamount to saying that there is no

Supernatural, no Power higher than Nature herself. Nature, indeed, cannot produce a miracle in the ordinary sense of the word, as something contrary to Nature. But if there be a Supernatural, *i.e.* a Power working according to some higher law and for a higher end, then an event which appears miraculous may in reality not be so, because it is in accordance with the higher law, and brought about for the attainment of the higher end.

And this, as it appears to me, is precisely the position of the Incarnation in the Christian system of Metaphysic and Religion. It is but a further development of a principle, which all along had been in operation, namely, the Self-manifestation of the Prius. If that principle be true, if the Prius has been manifesting Himself first in Creation (Nature), and then in Effusion and Immanence, is there anything improbable or impossible in the supposition, that He would make a further and more direct manifestation of Himself by Incarnation? Nay, should we not rather expect it?

There is another point on which a few words may not be out of place here. Is the Incarnation to be merely regarded as the climax of the Self-manifestation of the Personal Prius in matter

through Immanence?[1] In a certain sense this is true, and theologians will not be at a loss for passages which seem to support such a contention.[2] Still, on the whole, it seems more fitting to regard Self-manifestation through Incarnation as differing, not only in degree, but in kind. Immanence and Effusion are the special function and work of the Divine Spirit. But Manifestation through Incarnation, though effected by the co-operation of the same Spirit, is specially attributed to the Second Person of the Trinity, the Word or Expression of the First. He who could say "I and the Father are One" must needs be something more than a human person in whom the Spirit is immanent, in however high a degree. And, therefore, the Christian Incarnation, while we may regard it as a prolation and further development of the metaphysical law of a Self-manifesting Prius, should not, I think, be confused with Immanence and Effusion. That the Prius

[1] "In proportion as we are enabled to recognize this progressive manifestation of God in matter, we are prepared to find it culminate in His actual Incarnation, the climax of His Incarnation in the world."—Illingworth's *Divine Immanence*, p. 77.

[2] As, for example, St. Luke i. 35, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee;" St. Matt. iii. 16, the descent of the Holy Spirit on Jesus at His Baptism by John; and St. John iii. 34, "God giveth not the Spirit by measure *unto Him.*"

has manifested Himself in Nature, and in man as part of Nature, is the contention of Christian Metaphysic and Philosophy. That this Self-manifestation was carried to a higher stage by Spiritual Immanence both indirect and direct has ever been both the belief and teaching of the Jewish and Christian Religions. But that this latter stage was all that was possible, and all that was required to satisfy the religious instincts and aspirations of mankind, none, I imagine, would dare to assert. Moreover, it is a fact of some significance that the further and fuller manifestation of the Prius was, like Effusion and Immanence, the subject of the clearest prediction. "Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a Son:" so spake Isaiah hundreds of years before. And Jeremiah, foretelling the advent of "the Branch" which should grow out of the stem of David, went so far as to give Him a Name, "The Lord, our Righteousness." And these predictions, apart altogether from the question of their fulfilment, were, we must all admit, of an astonishing character, unparalleled in the history of all previous or subsequent literature. They led men to expect, not merely a fuller effusion of the Spirit, but a veritable Incarnation of God. But each and every incarnation

must stand or fall by its own intrinsic merits; that is, according as it can satisfy the demands of reason and congruity. And the question to be settled is this, "Was the Christian Incarnation, when, and in the manner in which it is said to have taken place, of such a nature as to satisfy those expectations which previous predictions had led men to entertain? Was it, both in its character and its consequences, a true manifestation of that Being, Who all along had been disclosing Himself in Nature and in man?

Whether, or not, this was the case, it is not for me to attempt even to prove. I would only point out that they are real questions, which every thoughtful man is bound to face and answer for himself. In the words of Bishop Caldwell,[1] he has to consider—

> "Whether the purpose for which God became man, namely, to furnish men with a pattern of moral excellence, and to reconcile sinful men to the holy and blessed God, was not a purpose worthy of a Divine Incarnation. Whether the life and doctrines and death of Christ, or the influence of them upon Christians, has not, as a matter of historical fact, been the origin of all that

[1] *Christianity and Hinduism*, p. 47.

is most elevated in the moral and spiritual life of Christendom, and of all that has rendered Christendom the source of moral and spiritual life to the rest of the world. And, lastly, whether it would not be unreasonable and unscientific to attribute results so divine to anything less than a Divine Cause."

PROPOSITION III.—*The Christian Prius a Self-reconciling Unity.*

The Third Proposition of Christian Metaphysic, that the Personal Prius is also a Self-reconciling Unity, is really a conclusion which follows necessarily from the First and Second Propositions. For, if it be granted that there is a Personal Prius, Who manifests Himself in nature, through variety and difference, then, in case that variety and difference issue in antagonism and hostility, the Prius must also be Self-reconciling. The contrary supposition would be inconsistent with our First Proposition, and would be tantamount to a practical denial of the supremacy of the Prius.

In the dualistic creed of Zoroaster the existence of differences and antagonisms received a different explanation. From the beginning there existed two Principles, Ormuzd, who represented the power of good, and Ahriman that of evil. Thus evil is

presupposed from all eternity.[1] But a metaphysical dualism of this kind has long been abandoned. And even the Parsees, whom we may regard as the lineal descendants and representatives of the Zoroastrian faith, though they still acknowledge Zoroaster as their Prophet, have abandoned his dualistic doctrine for pure Monotheism.

Though the powers of Nature sometimes seem not only diverse, but hostile, sometimes benevolent, and sometimes malefic, we still believe that she is one, and that all her energies proceed from one and the same source. If a frost comes in May and cuts off all the blossoms; if some mighty river overflows its banks and spreads devastation and death far and wide, we do not attribute these catastrophes to an evil principle in Nature wilfully counteracting the principle of good, but rather to the infinite variety in the Self-manifestation of the One Creative Prius.

The existence of differences and their reconciliation is, indeed, the one great problem which

[1] "Both Principles possess creative power, which manifests itself in the one positively, and in the other negatively. Ormuzd is light and life, and all that is pure and good—in the ethical world, law, order, and truth; his antithesis is darkness, filth, death, all that is evil in the world, lawlessness and lies."—*Encyc. Brit.*, Art. "Zoroaster."

Metaphysic and Philosophy has to solve. Differences exist on all sides of us in the material, moral, and spiritual worlds. The whole Universe may be said to be made up of differences.[1] But when we speak of differences and their reconciliation, it is essential to remember that differences are of many kinds, and arise from several causes.

Differences.

Assuming a Prius manifesting Himself by creation, it is evident that, unless only one kind of thing be created, in which case it could not be a true manifestation of an infinite Creator, there must be endless variety—that is, difference in the things created. But all differences do not imply antagonism. Sometimes the difference is only one of contrast or degree; as, for example, the contrast between long and short, thick and thin, rough and smooth. In such cases the difference is no more than the absence of a quality in one thing, which is present in another.

[1] In the Hegelian Logic, Self-consciousness is regarded as "a unity which realizes itself through difference and the reconciliation of difference—as, in fact, an organic unity of elements, which exist only as they pass into each other." I have already pointed out some of the flaws and inconsistencies, as they seem to me, at least, which mar the Hegelian system.

But we cannot close our eyes to the fact that beside differences of contrast and negation, there are others which are far more. There are differences which seem to contain the element of antagonism and hostility. Thus acids and alkalis are mutually destructive. The forces of Nature are frequently opposed. Animal and vegetable life alike, from beginning to end, is a struggle between vital and physical force, and death is the triumph of the latter over the former.

So, too, when we ascend to the higher range of moral and spiritual life, we meet with differences, which seem to imply a radical and essential antagonism.

Such differences as these present a far greater difficulty, even if they are not entirely beyond the reach of solution by ourselves. That powers of good and evil do exist side by side, that they are both energetic and mutually hostile, are facts of daily experience. *Primâ facie*, it would appear impossible to reconcile them with the existence of a Prius Who is One, Supreme, and Good. How are we to explain this? Or must we give up the problem in despair?

The opinion of some Moralists and Theologians who have given much thought to this subject, and

whose conclusions, therefore, are entitled to our respectful consideration, is that we must seek the solution in the action and effect of Free-will. Such, I believe, was the opinion of the late Dr. Liddon. The argument in its metaphysical and religious aspect is somewhat as follows :—

God is a free Agent—that is, Free-will is one of His essential attributes. If, then, He chose to manifest Himself, or, as the Scripture expresses it, to make man in His Own Image and likeness, man also must possess a Free-will. If he does not, then it is evident that any service or worship he might render would be a matter of compulsion, in which free will and voluntary surrender would have no part. Such service, therefore, would have no moral value. God will not be served by compulsion, but by love. But Free-will means the power to obey or refuse to obey impulses, and impulses may arise founded on ignorance and appealing to a narrow and selfish egoism. If, then, these be listened to and obeyed, the phenomena of opposing wills comes in sight. The Free-will of man may oppose and rebel against the Free-will of God, the result of which is sin, with all its evil consequences.

Similarly Professor Wundt, in discussing the

question of immorality, which is really the same as sin, makes it to consist in the perversion of the will, caused by a narrow and ignorant egoism : "The ultimate spring of immorality is egoism." And he adds—

> "The conflict of good and evil is just this strife between wills. Since the empirical social will is finite and liable to error, the ultimate solution of this conflict is to be found only in an idea of reason, which makes the infinite series of will-forms terminate in a Supreme Will, phenomenally manifest in the individual consciousness, as the imperative of the moral idea, in the State and in society as the Spirit of History, and in the religious conception of the world as the Divine Idea." [1]

I quote these words of Professor Wundt, not because I think his ethical system altogether sound and convincing, but because they show that in his opinion too, as an independent Moralist, and not as a Christian Advocate, the essential nature of sin is to be sought and found in the antagonism between the different forms of Free-will. If this be so, then the conclusion is obvious. The triumph of good over evil is only to be secured by the reconciliation of all antagonistic will-forms with the Supreme Will which "in the

[1] *Ethics*, p. 112.

religious conception of the world is the Divine Idea."

That sin is a perversion of the will, leading to overt acts of rebellion and disobedience, seems to admit of little doubt; whether the above theory offers a true explanation of the manner in which that perversion is brought about is another question. At any rate, the only other hypothesis would seem to be that of the co-existence of a power, or principle, of evil together with that of good, which contravenes the unity and supremacy of a personal Prius.

If, on the other hand, this be the true solution of the origin and existence of evil, then the "difference" of good and evil becomes explicable. We may regard it as illustrating the Second Proposition of Christian Metaphysic; namely, that the Prius is self-manifesting through differences.

Nor is this all that may be said of it. The Third Proposition defines the Prius as Self-reconciling, which is really a necessary consequent or corollary from the First. For the continued and permanent existence of hostile differences would be incompatible with the existence of a Prius which is One and Supreme. And if all differences are to be reconciled (by the Prius), then,

above all others, the hostile difference between good and evil, by bringing all antagonistic will-forms into harmony with the One Supreme Will of the Prius. And here Hegel's triadic law of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis finds a cardinal illustration. The Divine Will is the Thesis, the antagonistic will of the creature is the Anti-thesis, and the harmonizing of the two is the Synthesis.[1]

Recalling, then, the fact that Religion is the people's Metaphysic, and that no Religion can be true which is not also the expression of a true Metaphysic, it remains for me to show two things:—

First, that the principle of a Personal Prius manifesting Himself through differences and their reconciliation is a doctrine of the Christian Religion.

Second, that Christianity is a religious system which provides for the exercise and application of this principle: that, concretely, sin, and the

[1] "Three elements—a notion, its opposite or contradictory, and that which embraces or reconciles the two, or, in other words, a thesis, an anthithesis, and the synthesis—represent a complete act of logic, or one movement of dialectic. And on the type of this environment Hegel undertook to explain the entire course and action of thought in its efforts to comprehend the Universe."—*Handbook of Biography*, Art. "Hegel."

difference between good and evil, arising from the antagonism of a perverted free-will in the creature and person of man to the Supreme Will of the Creator, is reconciled through the Incarnation of the Son, or Word of God, in the Person of Jesus Christ.[1]

Of all the writings of the New Testament, it will, I think, be admitted that none display so clear an insight into what may be called the metaphysical side or aspect of Christianity as those of St. Paul and St. John. St. Paul, indeed, may truly be called the great exponent of Christian Metaphysic. To these, therefore, let us have recourse, in order to ascertain what is Christian doctrine on this subject of reconciliation.

St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Colossians, writes as follows:—

"For it was the good pleasure (of the Father) that in Him should all the fulness dwell;[2] and through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself, having made peace through the blood of His

[1] To express the above in terms of the Hegelian Formula—the Supreme Will of the Personal Prius is the Thesis, the perverted will of the human personality is the Antithesis, and the Person of the Incarnate Word is the Divine Synthesis.

[2] Or, "for the whole fulness of God was pleased to dwell in Him."—R.V., margin.

Cross; through Him, I say, whether things upon the earth, or things in the heavens." (Col. i. 19, 20.)[1]

Writing to the Corinthians, he says—

"To wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world (Cosmos) unto Himself." (2 Cor. v. 19.)

And again, in his first Epistle we find the same doctrine enunciated:—

"For He must reign until He hath put all His enemies under His feet. The last enemy that shall be abolished is death. . . . And when all things have been subjected unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subjected to Him that did subject all things unto Him, that God may be all in all." (1 Cor. xv. 25, 26, 28.)[2]

[1] This passage, taken in connection with the previous context, especially verses 15–17, is all the more significant, because St. Paul's object was to define the Christian doctrine of the Universe, of creation and reconciliation, as against the metaphysical speculations of the Gnostics, some of whom, where Persian influences predominated, held the doctrine of two separate and antagonistic Principles of Good and Evil, and others traced the origin of evil to matter.

[2] See also Ephes. ii. 16: "And that He might reconcile both unto God in one body through the Cross," where Bishop Ellicott has the following note: "This brings out the profound idea, which so especially characterizes these Epistles, of a primæval unity of all created beings in Christ, marred and broken by sin, and restored by His manifestation in human flesh."—*Commentary for English Readers.*

In his Epistle to the Romans (viii. 19–22) he speaks of the whole creation[1] groaning and travailing in pain together, because in pursuance of the sovereign purpose of God it has been subject to vanity. That purpose, however, he tells us, is not yet worked out. It is a purpose in which there is hope and earnest expectation; because Creation shall finally be delivered from that bondage of corruption under which for the present it groans and travails "into the glory of the liberty of the children of God."

The Apostle and Evangelist St. John records a prayer offered by Jesus Christ to God, Whom He called His Heavenly Father, in which the following significant petition occurs: "That they may be one, even as We are One: I in them, and Thou in Me, that they may be made perfect in One." (St. John xvii. 22, 23.)

Now, the foregoing passages taken together clearly show, I think, two things:

1. That the Christian Religion, regarded under its metaphysical aspect, involves the principle of a Personal Prius manifesting Himself through differences and the reconciliation of them.

[1] V. 19: ἡ Κτίσις = "the whole world of Nature, animate and inanimate."—Bp. Ellicott.

2. That this reconciliation is claimed to be effected through the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.

He is the Divine Synthesis in Whom Thesis and Antithesis are reconciled. And He is so, because "in Him dwelleth all the fulness (*plerōma*) of the Godhead bodily," *i.e.* the essential nature, comprising all the attributes of God. (Col. ii. 9.)

Moreover, it will appear on further investigation that the reconciliation effected through the Incarnation consists mainly in the harmonizing of all antagonistic forms of free will, with the one supreme will of the Prius. The very virtue and efficacy of the Atonement is attributed to the cheerful oblation of the perfect will of Christ, the God-man, to His Father, God.

"I came not to do mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me. Wherefore, when He cometh into the world He saith . . . Lo, I am come to do Thy will, O God. . . . By which will we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all." (Heb. x. 5, 7, 10.)

This willing oblation of His will was the keynote and motto of His whole life. "I must work the works of Him that sent Me while it is day: the night cometh, when no man can work." And death, when it came, was only the anticipated climax of His willing self-sacrifice.

But the reconciliation of the Atonement through the oblation of a perfect will is not limited to the Person of Christ. It is to find its counterpart on a lower scale in the life and experience of all His followers. The Christian must be like his Master. Christ is represented, not only as the New Man, but the Type of the New Creation. The daily prayer of the Christian is to be—"Thy will be done on earth, as it is in Heaven." And his whole life is to be one constant endeavour to give it practical expression, until the entire man, even to the innermost recesses of thought and motive, are brought into cheerful and loving acquiescence to what is held to be the Divine will.

And here I should like to point out the congruity between the end to be attained and the means employed for attaining it. The end is the triumph of good over evil through the reconciliation of divergent and opposing wills. The means are—

1. The exhibition of a faultless character appealing by its intrinsic loveliness to the moral perception of an intelligent and spiritual personality.

2. The action and influence of a Divine Spirit upon the cognate created spirit of man.[1]

[1] Heb. ii. 11: "For both He that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of One."

Such are the means to be employed, and according as they have been employed has Christianity proved itself a power for good in the world. Has Christianity, where it has been fairly tried, tended to raise the character of its followers, to liberate them from the thraldom of sin in all its countless forms, to make their lives pure, unselfish, and true? Then the secret of the transformation is to be found in the power of that Religion to bring about the reconciliation, not merely theoretic, but practical, of all individual and antagonistic wills to the supreme Will of the Personal Prius. And the prayer of the Psalmist—"Teach me to do Thy Will, O God, for Thy Spirit is good"—is something more than a pious ejaculation, a devout aspiration. It is the practical recognition and expression of a profound metaphysical truth.

SECTION IV.

PERSONALITY IN OTHER SYSTEMS—SPENCER, WUNDT, TOLSTOY.

(*a*) Schopenhauer's Thelology, impersonal and untenable—(*b*) Comte's "Religion of Humanity"—(*c*) Spencer's "Persistent Force"—Logical inference ignored—Correspondence between internal and external relations—Deduction from the foregoing—Professor Wundt on Personality—Personality the expression and measure of psychical endowment—Comparative Psychology—Stages of growth—Count Leo Tolstoy.

HEGEL'S Prius of "pure thought" is by no means the only one which has been propounded by philosophers.

"Will," said Schopenhauer, "is Lord of all," and "persistent Force unknown and inconceivable," says Mr. Spencer, is the Prius which ruthlessly closes the door to any further investigation. But neither to "Will" nor "Force" apparently is personality attributed. As I have already referred to Schopenhauer's "Will" theory in my former volume, I shall not devote much space to its

further consideration. The question to be considered is, at the bottom, this :—

Is "Will," apart from the person of a Willer, a philosophic concept? Does it not land us either in chance or necessity?

We are not justified in regarding Schopenhauer as the original propounder of the "Will" theory. On the contrary, he appears to have imbibed his views from the previous teaching of Fichte and Schelling. "The will is the living principle of reason," said Fichte. "In the last resort," said Schelling, "there is no other being but Will." Will is primal being. Where Schopenhauer differed from his teachers was in his physical or naturalistic views of Will, which, according to him, is the result of impulse given to the nerve-organs by the objects of the external world. Knowledge itself, and its instrument—the mind, or intellect—is immediately dependent on, and, as it were, the product of, these nerve-organs thus brought into action. This knowledge is only a type or special example of that intimate feeling, or will, which is the underlying reality and the principle of all existence,[1] the essence of all manifestations

[1] "Analogy and experience make us assume this will to be omnipresent."—Art. "Schopenhauer" in *Encyc. Brit.*

inorganic and organic. Thus, in Schopenhauer's system Will, impersonal and without motive, takes the place of reason or thought, as the Prius or primal principle of all things. And the origin of man is not to be sought for us by Hegel in any theory of self-manifestation of thought at unity with itself; nor, as by Spencer, in the theory of evolution, but in "automatic action" and "adjustment" which is everlasting and ever-present.

Both the "Will" of Schopenhauer and the "Force" of Spencer are alike the result of "automatic action." In both systems the Prius is impersonal, and they fail equally in affording a reasonable solution of that great problem of human personality. It is here, again, where Christian Metaphysic comes to the rescue with its personal Prius—a Prius which, while it embraces the Thought of Hegel, the Sovereign Will of Schopenhauer, and the "persistent Force" of Spencer, offers, at the same time, a reasonable theory on which to explain the fact of human personality.

The philosophy of Schopenhauer landed him at length in a sort of pessimistic Buddhism. The soul of man, unowned and uncared for, is born into a world of sin and sorrow, the sport for

a time of an insensate purposeless Will, until through death it reaches the Nirvana of the eternal oblivion. No wonder that Schopenhauer was the apologist of suicide.

Personality in Comte's System of the Religion of Humanity.

The Philosophical System of Comte so far resembles that of Hegel and Schopenhauer, that the only form of Personality which can be recognized is that of mankind. But it differs in this respect, that it merges individual in collective Personality. Comte even goes so far as to assert that the former is only an abstract idea, which has no existence save as part of the latter.

Not only can the individual not be separated from the social organism of which he forms a part; but that organism is something essential to his very existence. Thus the individual person has no separate existence. He exists only through the spirit which pervades the whole family of men, and manifests itself in them as a principle of life and development.

This is collective, as distinguished from individual Personality. And as being in Comte's view the highest and only form of Personality of which

we have any knowledge or experience, it not unnaturally led him on to the religion and worship of Humanity. The weakness and defect in Comte's system lies in mistaking a finite and particular example of being for the infinite and universal. His system of Humanity is nothing more than a philosophical fragment, detached from its proper surroundings, without antecedent and without consequent. He loses sight of the solidarity of all life, and the unity of all being. Beyond the collective Personality of man he propounds no Prius; while for that Personality he supplies no object, save the Personality itself which becomes deified as the highest and only proper object of human worship.

If mankind could be shut up in a box, or transported to a desert island, and cut off from all intercourse with the outer world until they imagined they were the only beings in existence, then Comtism as a philosophy, and the worship of Humanity as a religion, might suffice. But it cannot be. Humanity is only a part, and a very small part, in the equipment of the Universe. Doubtless man is the highest example of terrestrial life, the most delicately constructed, the most richly endowed. But to regard him as the hub

of the Universe, to construct a philosophy limited to his own microcosm, and to imagine there are no forms of sentient life but those he is aware of in this small satellite of perhaps the smallest of the solar systems, scattered in endless profusion through the boundless regions of space; to preach a religion in which man is to be worshipped as the only God; and to teach a morality in which the welfare of humanity is the highest motive and end; all this betokens, to my mind, such short-sighted self-conceit and such a want of the sense of integrity and proportion as it would be impossible to surpass.[1]

The recognition, however, of the collective Personality of mankind does import a sense of the responsibility of every man to the social body of which he is a member. This sense takes the form and is expressed by the term of Altruism, *i.e.* the absorption, or extinction, of

[1] "But the philosophy, which has gone so far, must logically go further. It is impossible to treat humanity as an organism without extending the organic idea to the conditions under which the social life of humanity is developed—*i.e.* to the whole world. And if the recognition of a universal principle manifested in humanity naturally led Comte to the idea of the worship of humanity, the recognition of a universal principle manifested in man and nature alike must lead to the worship of God." (*Encyc. Brit.*, Art. "Metaphysic," p. 101.)

mere self-love in the nobler duty of promoting the welfare of the community at large.[1]

When, moreover, we come to consider the effect of such a sense of responsibility as a deterrent from self-destruction, we are bound to admit that theoretically it should have this effect.

"I am not free to injure or destroy myself; for such injury or destruction is done, not to myself alone, but to that body whose welfare ought to be to me a matter of paramount importance." But how far such theoretical reasoning will be practically effective as a deterrent from suicide is a matter of opinion. At any rate, it is the only and the strongest argument against suicide on the score of responsibility which could have any weight with a disciple of Comte.

Some provision for the religious instinct of man is afforded by proposing Humanity itself as an object of worship. Whether such worship is deserving the name of religion at all, any more than the Ancestor-worship of the Chinese, is open to question. The last day of the year is set apart in the Positivist Calendar for the commemoration of the dead, and in his address

[1] The same result is arrived at in the Christian system. But the premises are of a different and higher order, as will appear when we approach the subject of Christian Metaphysic.

delivered to the members of the Positivist Society, of which he is the head, on December 31, 1900, Mr. F. Harrison is reported to have said—

"The religion of submission to the will of humanity had no crude worship of heroes, no vain apotheosis of genius. The day was dedicated to all the dead—to nameless, as to those of name, to the lowly as to the great, to those who served as much as to those who ruled. . . . He need hardly remind them that the one name which he held to be destined to perpetual honour in the coming ages was that of the founder of the religion of humanity."

How utterly destructive such a system is of belief in any Personality higher than that of man is shown by the following instance:—

Some few years ago a young man, who had embraced Comtism and the Religion of Humanity, emigrated to America and settled in San Francisco. In a letter to his sister at home the following passage occurs:—

"You say you remember me in your prayers. This, so far as it is a mark of your sisterly affection, I fully appreciate. But, otherwise, you might save yourself the trouble. Believe me, there is no God. It is not that we have a God without ears, but there is absolutely no God to hear. In this country religion is a commodity for which

there is no demand. We find we can get on very well without it."

A missionary, who had been working in the same part of North America, once told me that in the course of a conversation he had with an old settler on the subject of religious education in the State Schools, the settler replied, "Oh, we have abolished God on this side of the Rockies; so we don't trouble ourselves much about religion or religious education."

Mr. Spencer's Prius and Personality.

Let us now turn to consider briefly Mr. Spencer's Prius in respect to Personality: for, like all other philosophers and metaphysicians, he is bound to have a Prius of some kind. Mr. Spencer's Prius is "Persistent Force." What does he mean by this expression? Let him speak for himself.

"By the persistence of Force we really mean the persistence of some Power which transcends our knowledge and conception. The manifestations, as recurring, either in ourselves or outside of us, do not persist; but that which persists is the unknown cause of these manifestations."[1]

[1] *First Principles*, p. 187. And again, p. 192, he says, "In asserting it (persistent Force) we assert an Unconditioned Reality without beginning or end."

Thus the prime factor of Mr. Spencer's whole system is a Power which transcends our knowledge and conception. But, indeed, Mr. Spencer's statements and postulates respecting his persistent Force are inconsistent and mutually self-destructive. For first he calls it "a Power which transcends our knowledge and conception." And then, having done this, he proceeds to tell us that "every antecedent mode of the Unknowable must have an invariable connection, quantitative and qualitative, with that mode of the Unknowable, which we call its consequent." Mark the words "invariable connection, quantitative, and qualitative." How comes Mr. Spencer to know this, if his Persistent Force be both "unknowable" and "inconceivable"? And if, on the other hand, it be true that this connection between the Absolute Force and the phenomenal forces which we know, does exist, then how can he say that the Absolute Force, the "Unconditioned Reality" which persists, is unknown and inconceivable? We know what "the consequent modes" are, both physical and psychical, for they are matters of experience. And since there is "an invariable connection both *quantitative* and *qualitative* between these and all antecedent modes of the Unknowable Force, it is

obviously untrue to say the Force is unknown and inconceivable. Such "an invariable connection" amounts to an analogy, and must lead logically to something far more than the postulation of a Power transcending conception. It will surely enable us, if there be any truth in the analogy, to form, not indeed a perfect and exhaustive idea, but at least a general conception of the nature and characteristics of the Persistent Force, from which all other forces, both physical and psychical, proceed.

But the fault we have to find with Mr. Spencer is that, having assumed or postulated the existence of a great unknown and inconceivable Power, he forthwith proceeds to fabricate a philosophy and psychology in which it is practically ignored, in which, as a factor of thought or mind, it is entirely absent. Mr. Spencer's Force is clearly only a name for something unknown and unknowable, and which, therefore, he thinks may be practically shelved. It is shorn of what, even to man, is the highest concept and attribute of being, namely, self-conscious personality; and, save as a blind, unconscious force, it is permitted neither to intervene nor act in the Universe. All this is strikingly exemplified in the "Psychology," which from first

to last is the product of materialistic evolution[1] pure and simple. But is this philosophy? Ought not Mr. Spencer to have seen that, though his Prius transcends both our knowledge and conception, this by no means justifies him in excluding it as a working factor in any hypothetical scheme of nature? His Persistent Force may be unknown and inconceivable in its fulness, but, inasmuch as it is *ex hypothesi* the only source of all power, it must follow, that every form of force of which we have any knowledge and experience is a manifestation of that Force which persists in all things; and therefore all these various manifestations are so many indications of the nature of his Persistent

[1] After reviewing Mr. Spencer's doctrine of Persistent Force and his attempt "to bring organisms and societies and all thereto pertaining—life, mind, character, language, literature, and institutions of every kind—under the cover of a single formula," Professor Ward writes as follows: "We are, therefore, not surprised to find Mr. Spencer treating of the transformation of physical forces into mental forces, and insisting on a quantitative equivalence between the two, just as he treats of transformation of mechanical work into heat and the value in foot-pounds of a calorie. The poetry of Milton and the British Constitution, nay, the human mind and the Christian Religion, are all, according to him, equally with the tidal bore on the Severn, or gales at the equinoxes, so many secondary results of the nebular hypothesis, cases of integration of matter and dissipation of motion in obedience to the persistence of Force. It is to encompass all these within one formula that he is tempted to stretch a great physical generalization beyond all meaning and to justify his venture by questionable metaphysics concerning Absolute Being."—*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. i. p. 221.

Force—the unknown Power, "the Unconditional Reality" which, though it transcends our knowledge and conception, has not "left itself without witness." And if among the forces we know, whether simple or complex, there be one which is self-conscious and intelligent—that is, the human Personality—may we not safely postulate on behalf of Mr. Spencer's Persistent Force, that this, too, must be a self-conscious intelligent Personality ? [1]

But Mr. Spencer's Psychology is vitiated throughout by the hiatus—the unbridged and unbridgeable abyss—between his Persistent Force and those material quantitative and mechanical forces which alone he allows to have been operative in the production of physical and psychical phenomena. Where does the Persistent Force intervene ? Where in the whole of his evolutionary system, embracing products and organisms from the protozoa to the personal soul of man, do we find a nexus between the Force and the forces ? Nowhere. But what do we find ? A marvellous capacity for transmuting the *material* into the *ideal*. By the sweep of his magic wand, Mr. Spencer summons idealism

[1] My personality is one of those "consequent modes," which are "invariably connected with antecedent modes of the unknowable Force."

from the vasty deep of his imagination to crown his materialistic edifice. Sensations have only to recur a certain number of times, and forthwith they blossom into ideas and memories of the past There has but to be a complexity of impressions on the organism from without, which do not produce direct automatic action ; then after a period of hesitation, and a struggle for the mastery, reason, deliberation, and will spring forth like a *Deus ex machinâ* to settle the dispute and take the command.[1]

Correspondence between Internal and External Relations.

On no point does Mr. Spencer lay greater stress than that of the invariable correspondence between our internal and external relations. It is this, indeed, which lies at the root of his *experience*

[1] The following is a fair specimen of what we may call Mr. Spencer's dialectic. "We shall find that as, when more complex and less frequent correspondences come to be effected, the internal actions effecting them become less automatic: as in ceasing to be automatic they necessitate a previous representation of the motions about to be performed and the impressions about to be experienced, and in this involve at once both harmony and reason ; so in this same previous representation they simultaneously involve the germ of what we call the feelings."—*Psychology*, p. 585. And again, p. 590, "As the psychical changes become too complicated to be perfectly automatic, they become incipiently sensational. Memory, reason, and feeling take their rise at the same time."

hypothesis. And the following is a brief summary of his position :—

1. Corresponding to absolute external relations, *i.e.* in the universe around us, there are developed in the nervous system absolute internal relations, developed before birth, antecedent to, and independent of individual experiences, and that are automatically established along with the very first cognitions.

2. These internal relations, nevertheless, are not independent of experiences in general, but have been established by the accumulated experiences of preceding organisms, handed down by heredity from parent to offspring.

3. Hence the brain represents an infinitude of experiences received during the whole evolution of life in general. The most uniform and characteristic of these experiences have been successively bequeathed, principal and interest, from father to son, and have thus slowly amounted to that high intelligence which is latent in the brain of the infant, which the infant, in the course of its after life, exercises and usually strengthens or further complicates, and which, with minute additions, it again bequeaths to future generations.[1]

[1] *Psychology*, p. 583.

I should be sorry to deny there is much truth in all this. It must, I think, be admitted that life means the power of adaptation and correspondence to environment; that outer and objective relations produce inner and subjective relations which answer to them, and that this correspondence has gone on increasing from the lowest to the very highest form of life, physical, intellectual, and psychical. This may be all quite true, and probably is. But we must not forget at the same time what the very theory necessitates, that without the real objective relations there could be no inner subjective relations. And, if it be true that our external relations are the cause of our internal, then, conversely, it is equally true that our internal are the record and reflex of our external. But what are our internal relations? Are they not summarized in our personality? Our personality is the involute and ultimate collective expression of all previous experiences. The brain is the muniment room wherein are treasured up the archives of our past history, and the title-deeds of the ever-increasing heritage of mankind.

What, then, is the conclusion to which we are led? This, namely, that somewhere in our external relations there is that which corresponds to our

own personality. Or, to put it briefly, the Personality of man implies and demands the Personality of God.

My whole psychical content, my perception of duty, my power to distinguish between right and wrong, between sin and holiness, my religious instinct, my sense of beauty, truth, and love, all these form part of my inner relations, and they are mine simply and solely because the Personal Prius, Who is in the world, has thus manifested Himself to me through the experience of my outer relations, through Creation and Immanence and Incarnation.

But does Mr. Spencer see this? Or, if he does, has he ever pointed out its far-reaching consequence in establishing the bond of affinity between the human Personality and the Divine? I am not aware that he has. On the contrary, having postulated an unknown persistent Force, the source of all other known forces, and of which every antecedent mode is *invariably connected* with its known consequent, he proceeds to construct the cosmos out of purely material elements, and to interpret the phenomena of Life, Mind, and Society in terms of matter, motion, and mechanical force, without so much as an allusion to

that postulated Force which is the only cause of all.[1]

To sum up, then, in few words, this is the conclusion to which the foregoing considerations bring me.

The human Personality is the latest and highest product of all past vital experiences, the fabric built up of internal subjective relations answering to those external relations which form its environment. It is like the lense of the camera, which gathers up and focuses into one consistent intelligible picture the multitudinous rays which fall upon it from the world without. And because it is all this, it bears irrefragable testimony to the unity in diversity of the Power which works in Nature, call it "persistent Force," or what you will; to the solidarity of all life, and the supremacy of a self-conscious, designing and, therefore, Personal Intelligence.

Professor Wundt and Personality.

According to Professor Wundt, Individual Personality is the unity of feeling, thought, and will, in which the will appears as the active power that sustains the other elements. "As the Ego is the

[1] See Ward's *Nat. and Ag.*, vol. i. p. 256.

will in its distinction from the rest of the conscious content, so Personality is the Ego reunited to this content, and thereby raised to the stage of self-consciousness." [1]

Now, without entering into the minute discussion of this definition, we may say, perhaps, that it is tolerably correct. What, then, is the presentment it gives us of Personality? It is that Personality is the final outcome of our psychical development —of feeling, thought, and will. And perhaps we shall not be far wrong in regarding Personality as the result of those same processes, evolutionary or otherwise, by which the rest of our psychical faculties and activities have come into being.[2]

But the effects of this admission, that Personality is the expression of the psychical content, is more far-reaching than at first sight appears.

In the first place, it is evident that man has no monopoly of what we may call psychical content, that is, of those faculties and functions which are usually supposed to fall within the domain of

[1] *The Principles of Morality*, by Wilhelm Wundt, professor of Philosophy in the University of Leipzig. English Translation, p. 21.

[2] In saying this, I wish once more to guard against the supposition that evolution of itself is a power capable of creating anything. As my readers are aware, I hold that Evolution is only a *modus operandi*, which demands the power and presence of the Operator.

psychology. Intelligence, thought, feeling, will, memory, affection, these he shares, in common, with creatures far below him in the scale of animal life.

Man is but the last link in the great chain of evolutionary process, the heir of the accumulated experiences of a thousand generations of genera and species which have preceded him on the earth. And all along the line the Eternal Prius has been manifesting Himself in ever-increasing forms of beauty and loveliness. But there seems good reason for thinking that physiology and psychology have ever gone hand-in-hand, and form integral parts and different aspects of the progressive movement towards perfection.

If there be any truth in Darwin's *Origin of Species* regarded from a physiological point of view, then it must also be true, regarded from a psychical point of view. As the species advances in respect to its physical organism and differentiation, it will advance also in point of psychical faculty and development.

If, then, Personality be the expression of the psychical content, it follows (1) that man is not the only being that can claim it; and (2) that it will vary in each order of animal life in exact accordance with its psychical endowment.

Just because man is more richly endowed with psychical faculty than any other terrestrial order of beings, his Personality is the highest. But the lower orders of animated nature also possess a Personality varying according to their psychical content. I have a dog which goes with me to Matins every morning, but he patiently waits for me outside the church, because his psychical development does not enable him to join me in the service of prayer and praise to the common Maker and Father of us both.

In the lowest organisms, whose functions are limited to the common object of preserving life, either by procuring food, or avoiding danger, the Personality is only of the collective or social kind, and individual Personality does not as yet exist. But as we mount the scale of animal life, when the organism becomes more complex, and a variety of conturbing motives come into play, the psychical content is increased, and the personality tends to assume an individual character. Examples of both forms of Personality may be found in creatures far below the rank of man. Compare a flock of starlings, or a shoal of herrings, with the solitary spider spinning its web with almost mathematical accuracy, or the beetle burying its loathsome prey in the depths of the forest.

In the first two we see plenty of collective or social, but very little of individual personality. In the latter two, the exact converse is the case. The spider and the beetle, without being actually severed from the collective personality of their kind, appear to have acquired a sort of individual personality, which enables them to live and act for themselves.

Much of what Professor Wundt says on the relation of the social to the individual will is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of the relation of the social, or collective, to the individual personality. But we shall do well to remember, that in neither case is their earliest origin and manifestation to be found in mankind. We must dig far deeper, if we would get to the root of the matter. The fact is we need a comparative psychology just as much as we need a comparative anatomy or physiology ; and no investigation of either subject can be thorough, which loses sight of the comparative aspect—that is, of the unity and solidarity of all forms of life.

The study of Natural History and Comparative Anatomy reveals the fact that, physiologically and structurally, man is allied to the lower orders of the Vertebrate Kingdom ; that he differs from them,

not so much in kind and form, as in degree and organic development. But we seem to have yet to learn that what is true physiologically is also true psychically, and that very much of the content of the human Personality is common also to the lower and less highly developed orders of animal life. As each successive genus or species increases in complexity of organization, so do the psychical functions and activities increase, and there is a corresponding advance to more specialized and individualized forms of personality.

That the earliest and lowest form of personality should be the collective or social is only what we should expect. It is a fact which connotes little more than what we understand by gregariousness. But as we rise higher in the scale of animal life the psychical content increases, and the birth of self-consciousness synchronizes with the appearance of individual personality and egoism. Each member of the community begins to see, not only that he is one of many, and with many, but that he is also a personal unit distinct from the rest, and capable of separate and independent action.

Then follows a higher stage, in which the individual perceives that this distinction and independence does not cut him adrift from the

family of which he is a member, but that his individual personality is something to be used for the welfare and advancement of the whole collective body. And last of all comes that stage of personal development in which the individual awakes to the conscious perception of his relation, not merely to the society with which he is most closely associated by birth and community of interests; not merely to the outward and material world of nature of which he forms a part, but to that Being Who, as Self-conscious Thought, is the Author of Nature, the Well of Life, and of Whose Being the whole Universe is only the glorious Self-manifestation.

Count Leo Tolstoy on Divine Personality.

The writings of Count Leo Tolstoy are now being much read in this country. In his booklet, *Thoughts on God*, he touches on the subject of Divine Personality. It will not therefore be irrelevant, and may be interesting, to ascertain what his views are.

The following is Tolstoy's definition of God :—

"God is that All, that infinite All, of which I am conscious of being a part, and, therefore, all in me is encompassed by God, and I feel Him in everything" (pp. 7, 8).

Again, he says, "God is love," and "Love is God" (pp. 9, 11).

"Somehow, while praying to God, it became clear to me that God is, indeed, in real Being, Love—is that All which I just touch, and which I experience in the form of Love" (p. 8).

But does not this last dictum, "Love is God," savour too much of other abstract conceptions of God; as, for example, the "Pure Thought" of Hegel, the "Supreme Will" of Schopenhauer, the "Deified Humanity" of Comte, the "Persistent Force" of Spencer?

There is truth in them all. But they are all partial and imperfect, and they all take their hue and complexion from the idiosyncrasy of the individual conceiver. And is it possible to entertain these concepts, save as attributes or qualities of Personality? Can we entertain the idea of thought without a Thinker of some kind? Of will without a Willer, and so on? Are we to conclude, that only in man do thought, and will, and force, and love assume a self-conscious personal form? If so, then, there is really no God but man.

I believe Count Tolstoy calls himself a Christian, and, therefore, it is the more surprising that he

should deny the Personality of God. Yet this he distinctly and emphatically does, as is evident from the following passages:—

"It is said that God should be conceived as a personality. This is a great misunderstanding; personality is limitation. Man feels himself a personality only because he is in contact with other personalities. If he were alone, he would not be a person.[1] . . . But how can we say of God that He is a person? Herein lies the root of anthropomorphism."[2]

And yet, while denying the personality of God, we find Tolstoy over and over again speaking of God in terms which necessarily imply His personality, and which are, to my mind at least, unintelligible, except on the supposition of it. Thus, "He is One." He is "the living God," in contrast to the pantheistic God.

"He is One, in the sense that He exists as a Being who can be addressed; that is, that there is a relation between me, a limited personality, and God, unfathomable, but existing."[3]

[1] This seems to me a gratuitous assumption, which is neither proved nor capable of proof. Take the imaginary case of Robinson Crusoe. Because he was cast on a desert island, and cut off from all intercourse with his fellow-man, did he cease to be a person, or to think himself one?

[2] *Thoughts on God*, p. 34. [3] *Ibid.*

Is not Tolstoy here struggling to reconcile ideas or concepts of the Divine Being which are essentially opposed? And this opposition is still further emphasized in his statement on Prayer.

"Prayer is addressed to a personal God, not because He is a person (I even know with certainty that He is not a person, because personality is limitation, and God is unlimited), but because I am a personal being." [1]

Tolstoy has just admitted that God is a Being, Who may be addressed in prayer—and therefore a Person, seeing we cannot address an abstract quality or even a bundle of such,—but now we are told, that we only address God as a person, because we are personal beings. In other words, that God has no objective personal existence, and cannot be addressed as a person except by a formal act of self-deception. And what becomes of prayer after this? What is it more than a psychical illusion; a poor piece of spiritual idolatry!

But Tolstoy is better than his creed. His religious instinct raises an indignant protest against his philosophy. The yearning after a personal God, realized in his own inmost soul, is

[1] *Thoughts on God*, p. 33.

too much for him; and we find him breaking out in impassioned utterance to the very Being whose personality he had just denied.

"But, Lord, I named Thee, and my sufferings ceased. My despair has passed. I feel Thy nearness, feel Thy help when I walk in Thy ways, and Thy pardon, when I stray from them. Lord, pardon the errors of my youth, and help me to bear Thy yoke as joyfully as I accept it."

So said the Psalmist three thousand years ago. "My soul is athirst for God. Yea, even for the Living God."

"Fecisti nos ad Te, Domine, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te."—"O Lord, Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it reposes in Thee." (St. Aug.)

SECTION V.

MATERIALISTIC MONISM AND PERSONALITY.

Monism and Personality—"Matter moving"—Vital Force?—Protoplasm—Professor Dolbear's definition—The problem to be solved—Subject and Object—Two observations—Professor Wundt and human progress—Phenomena and Noumena—St. Paul—Professor Bain's Hypothesis incompatible with Monism.

THE contention of the Materialistic Monist, as is well known, is that "everything that is, is matter moving." Which means, of course, that there is no other or higher form of Being. Such a theory, of course, is fatal to the idea of a Personal Prius. It will be desirable, therefore, to examine this theory and the arguments adduced in its support.

And, in the first place, it is to be noted that our scientists have not yet arrived at any general consensus of opinion, much less any certain knowledge of what matter is. It consists of atoms in motion, we are told. But what are atoms? The latest hypothesis concerning them is that they are

vortex rings, "a particular form of motion of the ether in the ether."[1]

In the second place, ether is very necessary, even to the Materialistic Monist. But I am not aware that ether has yet been proved, or even claimed to be, matter, but only "the primal substance out of which matter is formed."[2] Yet ether is something, and, if it be not matter, then what becomes of the Monist's contention that everything that is, is matter moving? Has he not destroyed his own Prius, and disproved his first proposition?

Vital Force.

It used to be thought that the difference between vital force and other physical forces was qualitative and essential. But our scientists tell us now that no such distinction exists; and that all the phenomena of life are to be explained by means of physical and chemical forces. The term "vital

[1] Professor Dolbear, *Matter, Ether, and Motion*, p. 351: "In like manner one may understand that what constitutes an atom is not so much the substance it is composed of, as the motion involved in it. Such *an atom is a particular form of motion of the ether in the ether*, in the same sense as what is called light is a form of motion of the ether in the ether. The one is an undulation, the other a vortex. . . . Thus one after another of the properties of matter are found to be resolvable into ether motions, ether being the primal substance, and matter only one of its manifestations."

[2] Professor Dolbear, *Matter, Ether and Motion*, pp. 297 and 351.

force" is only to be regarded as a convenient form of expression for "the sum total of the physical and chemical activities of organisms."[1]

Our Biologists, not so long ago, used to be content with tracing all animal life back to the egg. *Omne vivum ab ovo.* Then the cell[2] was substituted for the egg; but now they tell us we must go further back still, and find in a complex chemical substance called protoplasm the one fount and origin of all animal and vegetable life. And what is protoplasm?

[1] Professor E. L. Mark, Harvard University.

See also Professor Dolbear, *Matter, etc.*, p. 279: "That vital force as an entity has no existence, and that all physiological phenomena whatever can be accounted for, without going beyond the bounds of physical and chemical science, has to-day become the general conclusion of all students of vital phenomena; and vital force as an entity has no advocates in the present generation of biologists."

[2] Professor Dolbear's hypothesis respecting cell formation and growth is at least interesting and ingenious. I quote his own words: "In the organic world of living things the phenomenon of growth is manifested by what are called cells, which are symmetrical groups of molecules, as crystals are, only much more complex. Growth consists in the formation of similar cells out of suitable molecular constituents in the neighbourhood. Each different part of a plant or animal has a different cell structure. . . . Such formation is called growth; but the similarity in form and function, when appearing among plants or animals, has been considered as due to heredity, a term which has a definite enough meaning, but which has not been supposed to be due to mechanical, but to some super-physical agency not amenable to purely physical laws and conditions."—*Matter, Ether, and Motion*, p. 250.

Protoplasm.

The question is an important one, and it will be well to hear what Professor Dolbear, as representing the most recent scientific view, has to say about it.

"Protoplasm is a particularly complex chemical substance, out of which all living things, animals and plants are formed. It is entirely structureless, homogeneous, and as indifferentiated as to parts as is a solution of starch, or the albumen of an egg. Minute portions of this elementary life-stuff possess all the distinctive fundamental properties that are to be seen in the largest and most complicated living structures. It has the power of *assimilation*—that is, of organizing dead food into matter like itself—and, consequently, what is called growth. It possesses *contractility*—that is, the ability to move in a visible, mechanical way; and it possesses *sensitivity*—that is, ability to respond to external conditions: and the power of reproduction."

"A small particle of this substance, like a minute bit of jelly, without any parts or organs, possesses its various attributes in equal degree in every part. Any particular portion can lay hold on assimilable material, or digest it, or be used as a means of locomotion; so that what are called tissues of animals and plants represent the fundamental properties of the protoplasm out of which they have been built—thrown into prominence by

a kind of division of labour. The protoplasm organizes itself into cells and tissues in the same sense as atoms organize themselves into molecules, and molecules into crystals of various sorts, having different properties, that depend upon the kind of atoms, their number and arrangement in the molecule."[1]

Such is protoplasm, according to Professor Dolbear. And the difficulty which occurred to me in reading it was, not so much that of believing his description of it to be true, as of believing that such qualities as he attributes to it, *assimilation, contractility, sensitivity, reproduction* can possibly be due merely to the chemical and mechanical forces of matter, however complex its composition. I confess that at present the draft upon my credulity is greater than I am prepared to honour; and I should prefer to hold in suspense a while my opinion, as to whether there is, or is not, such a

[1] *Matter, Ether and Motion*, pp. 280, 281. Professors Quincke and Bütochli have even been attempting the manufacture of an artificial protoplasm, which, they say, exhibits changes in shape, and streaming movements like those of an amœba. But it is entirely void of vital qualities.—*Ibid.*, 368.

Liebig, the great scientist, was once asked, if he believed that a leaf or a flower could be formed, or could grow by chemical forces. His answer was significant. "I would more readily believe that a book on chemistry or botany could grow out of dead matter by chemical processes." No discovery has since been made to alter that opinion.

thing as *vital force*, distinct from chemical and mechanical force.[1] It may be that the cardinal doctrine of the Materialistic Monist, "Everything that is, is matter moving," though we do not admit it to be true, may yet help us to explain many of the phenomena which have hitherto proved insoluble. And the result of the careful and elaborate investigations of Sir William Crookes in this field of inquiry point to the conclusion that we have touched the borderland where matter and force, and consequently motion, merge into one another, and become one.[2]

But, however this may be, I can hardly imagine that even the most thorough-going Monist will contend that the chemical and mechanical forces alone are able to produce thought, and all that is comprehended under the heading of mental activity. And yet these also are realities which do exist, and for whose existence allowance and room must be made in any scheme of Philosophy or

[1] If there be no such thing as *vital force* apart from the chemical and mechanical forces, what is it in the animal organism that is able to control and countervail those forces for its own special purposes; forces which, so soon as life departs, become active in destroying the organism?

[2] See the Lecture delivered by Sir W. Crookes before the Royal Society, February 6, 1902, on "The Stratification of Hydrogen."

Metaphysic which can hope to hold its own in the future, and commend itself to the reason of unbiassed thinkers.

It must be remembered, that we have not only protoplasm, amœbas, hydras, and such-like things to account for, but what we may call Nature's *chef-d'œuvre*, the Personality of man, with all it connotes. And whatever theory be adopted, whether Monist or Dualist, it must be adequate to explain the existence, not only of the lowest, but also of the highest, forms of life of which we have any experience.

Let me borrow an illustration from the art of painting, though any other might do as well. Let us take two specimens of the art—a lower and a higher one—a painted box and a beautifully executed portrait. A description of the art of painting which would suffice, if only the painting of the box were considered, would manifestly be quite inadequate as a description of the art which produced the portrait. The first would require nothing more than the presence of material and mechanical agencies. You want a surface, like that of a box, pigment and a brush, together with such mechanical force as can wield the brush and apply the paint; and the thing is

done. But can the portrait be explained as the result of nothing but the same material and mechanical agencies? Evidently not. You may supply the canvas, the paint, the brushes, and the mechanical force, but all these are insufficient to produce the finished portrait. For this you require in addition the skill, the feeling, and insight of the accomplished artist. It is the highest product of the art, the finished work of the artist, and not merely the rough outline, nor the elementary daubs of a house-painter's apprentice, that have to be accounted for. And is it not so with Nature? It is not the manufacture of atoms into molecules and protoplasm and cells we have to account for, but the most finished work of which we have any actual knowledge and experience, the self-conscious, reasoning soul of man. The former we might, perhaps, conceive to be the product of chemical and mechanical forces, but, that the latter should be so, passes the bounds of reason and probability.

The fact is, that in the problem of life in its highest form we have not only *phenomena*, but *nŏumena* to consider.[1] And I hope the two

[1] "The conception of the phenomenal, of course, has brought with it the conception of a further so-called noumenal reality beyond."—Professor Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 166.

following observations will not be thought irrelevant to the subject before us.

Life and Experience. Subject and Object.

My first observation is this. Whatever may be the origin and first beginnings of life, as we know and experience it in all its forms and gradations, it is the product of two factors, the one subjective and capable of receiving impressions, responding to stimuli, and generally adapting itself to its surroundings ; the other objective, able to make impressions, impart stimuli, and generally to modify and influence every vital organism brought into contact with it. There is no form of life, from the amœba to the man, which is not the product of these two factors, which is not evoked by its environment, and which does not, if it is to continue, correspond to it. And the interaction between the subjective and objective is for each individual form of life represented and expressed by its experience. This view of Life, I am glad to find, is supported by Professor Ward in his book on *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. These are his words—

"To enounce that experience is a whole, or, more precisely, a continuity, that it consists in the

correlation of subject and object as its universal factors, is a statement that seems to tamper with no facts and to involve no hypotheses." [1]

And again—

"Experience as a process may be further defined as a process of self-conservation, and so far justifies us in describing it as life (βίος)." [2]

Let me borrow another illustration of our argument at this point from a pastime with which some of my readers doubtless have been familiar in their boyhood's days, that of making a snow-man. Need I describe it? A handful of snow is pressed into a ball, and then rolled along a snow-covered lawn. As the ball rolls it accumulates the snow beneath it, growing at each revolution bigger and bigger, until it reaches the size required. We see there are three things necessary for the production of our snow-man. First, the initial snow-ball ; second, the snow-covered lawn ; third, the power

[1] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 130.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 136. The following passage, also, is much to the point (vol. ii. p. 255) : "If, as Kant does, we regard experience as starting with such an indefinite manifold as its objective complement, we must hasten to add, that the start is only made when this matter of experience is shaped and informed by the subject conscious of it and interested in it. . . . My contention is that to the subject belongs the lead and initiative throughout, and that, as experience develops, this subject shows an ever-increasing activity and supremacy."

to roll the ball along. Without each and all of these no snow-man will be forthcoming.

And now for the analogy. The initial snow-ball stands for the subjective element of life, with all its potency—call it what you will; the snow-covered lawn represents the objective environment of the Universe; and the revolving power denotes the energy which brings subject and object together, with that interaction between the two which constitutes experience, and out of which by accumulation the vital and psychical involute of the subject is continuously augmented.[1]

Of course, the above illustration is only a rough-and-ready one; but it may help to give a clearer conception of an hypothesis, which seems to the writer best to harmonize the claims of science and physics on the one hand, and of religion and metaphysics on the other. It is to be noted, too, that this hypothesis of Life, as the product of the subjective and objective factors realized in experience, provides indefinitely for the future progress and perfection of mankind.

[1] "We have found that our primary experience invariably implies both subjective and objective factors, and seems to involve these not as separable and independent elements, but as organically co-operant members of one whole."—Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 253.

According to Professor Wundt, the line of human progress is sociological. Man's final moral end is the moral end of humanity, not of the family or state, but of the race. We are to seek satisfaction and supplement the finitude and limitations of actual life in the form of (by) higher objective intellectual values.

"And so we find that our ultimate ends can be nothing but the production of psychical creations . . . whose final object is not the individual himself, but the universal spirit of humanity"[1]

But Professor Wundt is silent as to the means whereby this progress of the human race is to be secured. And, whatever we may think of the worth and adequacy of the moral end proposed, we cannot refrain from asking where are the materials out of which these "psychical creations" and "higher objective intellectual values" to be constructed? Are they to be found elsewhere than in an ever-increasing experience by the self-conscious subject of those activities, whether physical or spiritual, contained in its objective environment? And what is that environment but the Self-manifestation of the Personal Prius, "the fulness of Him that filleth all in all"?

[1] *Ethics*, p. 85.

Only because the snow-ball is rolled along the snow-covered lawn does it become the snow-man. So, only because the objective environment, which forms the raw material out of which experience is accumulated, contains all the elements requisite for vital and psychical development—higher psychical values—is progress in this direction possible. Surely it is in this enlarged and ever-increasing experience, which has the limitless *plenum* of the Infinite to draw upon, where we see the promise and the power of an endless advance towards perfection. And as, on the one hand, we are in no position to place limits on the degree or method of Self-manifestation which the Prius may think fit to adopt, so neither, on the other, can we see any limit to the progress which is ultimately attainable for mankind. That progress is not of the nature of a quantity which cannot be exceeded, or a standard which cannot be excelled; rather is it like a series of geometrical progression which goes on increasing *ad infinitum*.

Such is the view of human life and human progress propounded by the great Christian Metaphysician St. Paul.[1] The *phenomena* declare the

[1] Cp. 2 Cor. iii. 18: "But we all with open face beholding as in a glass (mirror) the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory." And Ephes. iv. 13: "Till we all come unto a perfect man . . . unto the measure of the stature of the fulness (πληρώματος) of Christ."

noumena of the Almighty. All down the ages has the Eternal Prius been manifesting Himself, now in one way, now in another. And if at last this Self-manifestation has reached its climax in the cardinal phenomenon of the Incarnation, should this surprise us? And, because we cannot fathom the mystery, shall we say "Impossible"? However much men may object to the Incarnation because it transcends Nature, and their own power to comprehend it, they cannot deny, that the life of Jesus has done far more than that of any other man to raise the moral concepts of mankind. It has not, indeed, driven sin and wickedness out of the world, for the simple reason that men will not submit themselves to its restraining and constraining influence. But in exact proportion as they have done so, and tried honestly to embody that influence in their own lives, it has raised those lives to a standard of purity and goodness higher than the world has ever seen. That love is the secret of that influence, I need not stop to point out.

Not in Sociology, then, as it seems to me, are

we to find the highest and truest line of human progress, but in that experience which brings us into ever closer union and communion with the Being Who through phenomena and noumena is ever manifesting Himself in fuller measure as the only Source of love and truth and beauty.

Phenomena and Noumena.

My second observation is this. The problem before us is one which involves more than physical phenomena.[1] Were it not so, the Monist, who thinks to find in "matter moving" the universal solution, might not consider his task a hopeless one.

It is not so, however. Noumena, as well as phenomena, must be taken into account; where by noumena we mean those things which are the objects of our understanding, and are dealt with by reason and intellect. They are mental and spiritual concepts, which form the subject-matter of Metaphysic as distinguished from Physics, which professes to deal only with phenomena.

[1] "It follows naturally from the notion of a phenomenon of any sort that something must correspond to it that is not itself phenomenon"—that is, without a percipient nothing can be perceived.—Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernuft*, p. 233.

Perhaps there is no passage which will better serve to illustrate the distinction between the two than that of the great Doctor of Christian Metaphysic, St. Paul, in his letter to the Romans,[1] and which, I trust, I may be pardoned for quoting. The passage in the Revised Version runs thus:—

"For the invisible things (*aorata*) of Him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood (*nooumena*) by the things that are made (*poiēmasi*), even His Eternal Power and Godhead."

Here, it will be observed, we have allusion made to *phenomena* and *noumena*. The former are the *poiēmata*, the things made; the latter are the *aorata*, the invisible things, which are in reality the Eternal Power and Godhead, and become *noumena* to us by means of the phenomena of the created Universe.

Clearly, St. Paul was no Monist. In other words, he recognized the fact that the world of Metaphysic is as real as that of Physics; and that the noumena of the former, though distinct from the phenomena of the latter, refuse equally to

[1] Rom. i. 20. Some of my readers would like to be reminded of the original: Τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθορᾶται, ἥ τε ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης.

be ignored. Nor is this all. He enunciates the cardinal doctrine of Christian Metaphysic, that *phenomena* and *noumena*, though distinct in their essential nature, are still intimately, and as it were organically, connected; and that phenomena are the expression of noumena, and at the same time the vehicle and the sacraments through which they are apprehended by the mind of man. And here, as it seems to me, is the point where Monism utterly and hopelessly breaks down. It fails in the presence of noumena; it fails before the fact of the Personality of man.

Professor Bain's Hypothesis.

Professor Bain, in his book on "Mind and Body," after reviewing the arguments of Monism and Dualism respectively, arrives at the following conclusion :—

"The arguments for the two substances (Material and Immaterial) have, we believe, now entirely lost their validity; they are no longer compatible with ascertained science and clear thinking. The one substance, with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental—*a double-faced Unity*—would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case." [1]

[1] *Mind and Body*, p. 196.

I venture to submit the following observations :—

1. That Professor Bain's hypothesis is incompatible with Monism proper. I do not see how a Monist can postulate a Substance with two sets of properties as his Prius, for the simple reason that it is compounded of two elements, or categories, which, so far as I know, are by universal consent regarded as essentially different and distinct. I take it, therefore, that Professor Bain regards Monism pure and simple as untenable; because, while it might be able to explain and account for physical phenomena, it fails in the presence of mental and spiritual noumena.

2. Professor Bain is in favour of "one Substance with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental — *a double-faced Unity*," which he thinks "would comply with all the exigencies of the case," *i.e.* be able to explain and account both for all phenomena and noumena.

Let us examine this hypothesis: "*One Substance.*" What is *substance?* Evidently, from the etymology of the word, it denotes that which stands under (*sub-stat*), or underlies that which

is evident to the senses. Substance is therefore the substrate of phenomena. It represents the inner reality or essence of things. As such it is synonymous both in derivation and meaning with the Greek hypostasis (ὑπὸ ἱστήμι); and it is almost needless, I suppose, to remind my reader, that not only in Philosophy but in Christian Theology both *substance* and *hypostasis* have acquired a well-recognized meaning.[1] Thus, in the Nicene Creed, so called, the Christian expresses his belief in the Divinity of Jesus Christ, as "being of one Substance with the Father;" and again in the Athanasian Creed, or Exposition, "Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance;"—in both which passages it is evident that "Substance" is used to denote the Essence (Greek *Ousia*) of Deity, or, as it is otherwise termed, "the Godhead."

[1] *Substance* as a theological term denotes that which forms the Divine essence, or being. It is used in this sense in the first of the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion: "And in the Unity of this Godhead there be Three Persons of one substance (*essentia*), power, and eternity."

Hypostasis has not in all ages of the Church had precisely the same meaning. In the first three centuries it was commonly used as the equivalent of the Latin *Persona*, though not universally. By many, however, it was used in the same sense as *Substantia*, that in which the Divine attributes inhere. These differences were reconciled at the Council of Alexandria (A.D. 362), and chiefly through the influence and arguments of St. Athanasius.

Does Professor Bain, then, use the word "Substance" in a sense analogous to that in which it was used by the Christian Fathers? We might almost suppose he does, from his subsequent remark, "We are to deal with this (substance, this *double-faced unity*) as in the language of the Athanasian Creed, 'not confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance.'"

But if so, might I venture to remind him, that mind and "mental properties" are, so far as we know and experience them, the inseparable attributes of Personality?[1] A substance, therefore, endowed with mental properties cannot, it would seem, be other than personal; nor "*a double-faced unity*," which "complies with all the exigencies of the case," less than Divine.

[1] See Sir G. G. Stokes' *Gifford Lectures*, p. 196.

SECTION VI.

PERSONALITY AND THE MECHANICAL THEORY OF NATURALISM.

Psycho-physical Parallelism and Epi-phenomena—Consequences of the Mechanical Theory in regard to Personality, Morality, and Religion.

CLOSELY allied to Materialistic Monism comes the theory that all Nature is but one vast mechanism, and which regards mental and psychical activities as mere Epi-phenomena—manifestations, that is, which accompany the working of the machine, but between which and the physical phenomena no causal connection exists. Psycho-physical Parallelism is the name given to this strange concept—a mere name, which explains nothing, and is nothing, but the last refuge of Agnosticism.

The whole theory has been so exhaustively examined, and its fallacy so convincingly exposed by Professor Ward, that I shall simply refer my

reader to his Treatise,[1] and content myself with offering a few observations to show how Personality fares at the hands of Naturalism.

Even if Nature and the whole Universe were nothing more than one vast piece of machinery, in which all the parts work smoothly and harmoniously together for the production of an infinite number of results useful and beautiful, still it is contrary to all our experience of machines, that they make themselves. And to maintain, that by calling Nature a machine we offer any adequate account of its principles and processes, would be much the same as being taken into a room where spinning and weaving was going on, and told that machinery was the secret of it all. The wool or the flax goes in at one end as raw material, and comes out at the other the flowery damask or the pictured tapestry. "Yes, here is the machinery, sure enough," we should reply, "but where is the machinist, who designed and constructed the machine? Where is the power that started the machine and keeps it going? And where is the artist who drew the designs and pictures so beautifully and accurately reproduced in damask

[1] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. i. pt. i.

and tapestry? Did the machine make them too? If so, it is of a different order to any machine I ever met with."

It is almost needless to point out, that in Naturalism and the Mechanical Theory there is no place for any higher form of Personality than that of man, even if there be room for that. It is the naturalist's boast that he has no need of God; but he does not seem to see, that in his effort to eliminate God as mind and intelligence from Nature, he also expunges man as anything more than a conscious automaton bereft of will and spontaneity.[1]

"We must say," says Professor Ward, "and the Naturalists have had the courage to say it:

[1] Professor Huxley, who was the first to broach the doctrine of conscious automatism as the logical outcome of Naturalism and the Mechanical Theory, thus wrote: "Any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit that its progress has, in all ages, meant, and now more than ever means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant *gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity*."—*Collected Essays*, i. 159.

And again, "If these positions are well based, it follows that the feeling we call volition is not the *cause of a voluntary* act, but the *symbol of that state of the brain* which is the immediate cause of that act."—*Ibid.*, i. 244.

In these two passages we have the result of the Mechanical Theory in its bearing on the Personality of man put before us in its naked simplicity. A creature devoid of spontaneity can in no true sense of the word be called a Person. And if, as Laplace boasted, there is no need for God in the Universe, there is also no room for man.

The physical world is a complete whole in itself, and goes along altogether by itself. We must say: The very same laws fundamentally, that determine the varying motion of the solar system, bring together from the four corners of the earth the molecules that from time to time join in the dance we know as the brain of a Dante, creating immortal verse, or as the brain of a Borgia, teeming with unheard-of crimes."[1]

In Psycho-physical Parallelism we recognize our old friend Physiological Psychology in a slightly altered guise; but to use the term as throwing any new light on the psychological problems is to darken counsel by words without knowledge. That subject and object, and the interaction between the two in the field of experience, is the cause of psychical activity, and development is at least an intelligible view to take of human nature. But to substitute phenomena and epi-phenomena for object and subject is neither logical nor intelligible. It is not logical, for phenomena are not phenomena except to a subject, *i.e.* to the person perceiving them. And it is not intelligible, for to explain mental and psychical activities, such as thought and spontaneity, as examples of psycho-physical parallelism—by-products, that is, which

[1] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 59.

accompany molecular changes in the brain, but neither cause nor are caused by them—is a process which conveys no idea to the mind.[1]

Results of the Mechanical Theory.

It will be well we should take account of what the triumph of Naturalism and the Mechanical Theory would entail.

If, indeed, Nature, which here means the entire Universe, is only a machine, then the naturalists are right in saying there is no such thing as will (in spite of Schopenhauer) in Nature. Nature must go along of itself by necessity, or not at all. And so there can be no Mind to guide or control it. In short, there is no personal God.

Similarly, also, with man. If he is only a machine, he, too, has no free will. But free will—that is, the power to decide on our line of action after reason and deliberation—is inseparable from our notion of Personality. Thus the Mechanical Theory pushed to its logical issue is *fatal to all Personality, whether human or Divine.*

Nor is this all. If there be no such thing as

[1] "Invariable concomitancy means causal connection somewhere, and a fundamental unity of *substance* at bottom. Naturalism is driven to assign the causality to matter, and to treat mental epiphenomena as its collateral product."

spontaneity and free will, but all our so-called acts of choice are only the necessary consequence of circumstances, which we are powerless to alter or resist, then it goes without saying, that all the conditions needful for moral conduct are destroyed. Morality is only possible in the case of free agents.

Again, if there be no free will—by which I mean the power to choose and shape our conduct in accordance with reason—then reason itself becomes a cruel mockery. Nay, we must conclude that, though we think we are guided by reason, it is not really so. Our reason, like our will, is only an epi-phenomenon accompanying some molecular movement of the brain between which and our actual course of conduct there is no causal connection. It has generally been held that will is the executor of reason; but if there be no free will, then reason has no executor. It is a useless gift; for however much we use it, it is powerless to influence our conduct.

With religion gone, and morality gone, and man himself but a machine driven by necessity, it would be difficult to imagine a more gloomy outlook for humanity!

Of course, the consequences of a theory afford no valid argument against the truth of it. But,

if they are such as they appear to be in this case, they constitute a high probability that there is a serious flaw in the reasoning somewhere, which should make us exceedingly cautious how we accept the theory as true.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE ON THE MECHANICAL THEORY.

The moral and psychological tendency of the Mechanical Theory is clearly set forth by Mr. I. F. Nisbet in his book, *The Human Machine*. I call my reader's attention to the following extracts :—

Free-will.—"Free-will! a figment of the imagination only" (p. 41).

Conscience.—"Conscience, like morality, is a habit of mind, created by the circumstances of a people or a race, and varying, therefore, according to circumstances" (p. 237).

Altruism.—"It is the product of the steamboat, the railway, and, above all, the newspaper" (p. 224).

Thought.—"After all, sensation—nay, thought itself—is only a question of molecular action" (p. 169).

Religion.—"God does not make man, but man makes God 'after his own image and likeness.' The reason why Christianity is the dominant form of religious belief in England is to be found in atmospheric influence" (see p. 227).

SECTION VII.

BEAUTY IN RELATION TO PERSONALITY.

What is beauty?—Quantitative and qualitative analysis—Origin of the Æsthetic Faculty—The evidential value and witness of beauty—The functions of beauty—Ideals of beauty—The Christian Ideal—Beauty teleologic.

THAT there is in Nature a power which makes for beauty, and that there are in Nature many forms and kinds of beauty, I imagine, will not be disputed. But there is more in these statements than meets the eye; and as statements of fact they demand careful consideration.

Of course, the great question I have to keep before me, and the only one which can justify me in touching on this subject at all in connection with our present inquiry, is this: "Does beauty bear any witness to Personality? If so, what is it? What is its evidential value, and what are its functions?"

There are, indeed, two other inquiries prior even to these, namely, "What is beauty?" And secondly, "Whence comes the faculty to perceive, admire, and love the beautiful, without which all objective forms of beauty would be lost upon us?"

But these are questions of a somewhat recondite and metaphysical nature, into which neither the time nor space at my disposal will allow me to enter fully. On these points, therefore, I shall content myself with laying down a few propositions, the truth and proof of which I must leave to my reader's judgment and investigation.

What is Beauty?

A hundred years have elapsed since Burke published his Treatise on "The Sublime and Beautiful;" and, though many discoveries in science and art have been made since then, not much additional light has been thrown on the subject. What were difficulties to him remain for the most part difficulties to us. And we are struck with the truth of his observation that—

"The great chain of causes which links them one to another, even to the throne of God

Himself, can never be unravelled by any industry of ours."[1]

And again, as to the efficient cause of sublimity and beauty, "I would not be understood to say that I can come to the ultimate cause."[2] And, indeed, the forms and kinds of beauty are so varied and numerous, according as they are fitted to give pleasure to the bodily or mental faculties, that it seems improbable there should be any one essential element common to them all. But what does seem probable is, that all forms of beauty are divisible into two general classes, the first of which we may call quantitative and the second qualitative.

Analysis of Beauty—Quantitative and Qualitative.

In the first class will be comprised all those forms of beauty which appeal to, and are perceived by the senses. These are material, formal, and to a large extent numerical, because matter, form, and number[3] are more or less involved in them.

[1] Burke on *The Sublime and Beautiful*, p. 255.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 255.
[3] Thus, musical strings of equal thickness and tension will produce harmonious sounds when struck together, if their lengths be in harmonic progression, *i.e.* if their reciprocals are in arithmetical progression. Hence number would seem to lie at the root of beauty in sound. Similarly also with regard to beauty in colour.

In the second division will be comprised all those forms and kinds of beauty which appeal to the intellectual, moral, and spiritual faculties. And in contradistinction to those in the first class they are ideal and spiritual. But we are not to suppose from this analysis that the two classes of beauty—the quantitative and the qualitative—are always separate and distinct. On the contrary, they are frequently found united or intermingled. They seem to act and react on each other, and the material form has frequently the power to call forth a corresponding form of ideal beauty, of which the former is the symbol. Still, apart from these concessions, the two kinds of beauty appear to differ essentially in their character, just as the phenomenal differs from the noumenal, and the senses of the body from the

Difference in colour is well known to depend on the length of the ether waves producing that colour, which, again, is a matter of number. Thus, red light has the longest wave-length, about $\frac{1}{40000}$th of an inch, and violet the shortest, about $\frac{1}{60000}$th; so that both in sight and sound number may be the ultimate and determining element of beauty. And even those forms of beauty of which the other senses are cognisant—such as touch, taste, and smell—may eventually be found to depend on the number and arrangement of the molecules which excite the corresponding sensory nerves. On this point, however, our present knowledge of molecular physics does not enable us to speak with certainty. Harmony, proportion, and symmetry, it will be generally admitted, are important elements in beauty of form, and these, again, are essentially numerical.

faculties of the mind and soul. Thus, for example, we may take up a book, beautifully bound and illustrated, and containing the life and sayings of some good and great man. With the eye we admire the beauty of the binding and illustrations, and with the mind and moral perceptions the beauty of the character portrayed and the sentiments expressed. But no one, I suppose, would regard these two forms of beauty as identical, or imagine that the one could be expressed in terms of the other.

Whether the charm of qualitative forms of beauty is due to any one essential element or quality common to them all, it is at present impossible to say. We are conscious of the beauty of justice, truth, and love; but as they give us pleasure through the exercise of sentiments so different as admiration, reverence, or respect, and affection, it would seem that the beauty of each is, at least, equally distinct.

Origin and Development of the Æsthetic Faculty.

As to the origin and growth of what we may call the æsthetic faculty—that is, the power to perceive and appreciate beauty in its various forms—I do not see that it can be explained in

any other or more consistent manner than that in which I have ventured to suggest the other components of our psychical equipment should be accounted for, namely, through the experience of the vital organism when brought into contact with the Prius, immanent in Nature, and manifested through its environment. If this be so, the æsthetic faculty, and what we call the taste for the beautiful, will be the result of experience accumulated and transmitted by heredity in ever-increasing volume from parent to offspring, from generation to generation, all down the course of time. According to this view, the subjective sense, or instinct, of the beautiful, and beauty in the objective environment, constitute the two necessary factors in the problem. They are counterparts of one united and consistent whole; another example of "the power of adjustment and correspondence," which forms the irreducible minimum, as it is, perhaps, the nearest approach to a true definition of Life.

The Evidential Value and Witness of Beauty.

Having said thus much in answer to our two preliminary inquiries, "What is beauty?" and "What is the origin of the æsthetic faculty?"

let us pass on to consider our two main questions, (1) "What is the significance of beauty, its evidential value and its witness?" (2) "What are the functions of beauty, and what purpose does it serve?"

The countless forms of beauty, both quantitative and qualitative, by which we are surrounded produce within us the irresistible conviction, that there is in Nature and the Universe *a Power which makes for beauty as an end in itself, apart from utility*. What is this Power? To suppose that beauty is the result of chance or necessity is too absurd. The mechanical theory of Nature might conceivably produce what is mechanically useful; but to regard beauty, which has no utility in the working of the machine, as amongst those products involves a draft on our credulity to which few, I imagine, will be equal.

Darwin, in his *Origin of Species*, found the subject of beauty too important to be entirely ignored. But, as might be expected, its main interest for him lay in the influence, which beauty might be supposed to exert in the origin of species through natural or sexual selection. The belief to which he refers, that organic beings have been created beautiful for the delight of man, need not detain

us, for the simple reason that the earliest forms of animal and vegetable life, which existed on the earth long before the appearance of man, are often remarkable for their beauty—for example, the diatoms and volute and cone shells of the Eocene epoch.[1] And the microscope reveals the fact, that the most minute organisms, which cannot be detected by the unaided sight, are often wondrously beautiful.

"Flowers," said Darwin, "rank amongst the most beautiful productions of Nature." But he could see no higher object in their beauty than that they might attract insects, and so become fertilized. Hence he concludes "that, if insects had not been developed on the face of the earth, our plants would not have been decked with beautiful flowers." Let the reader call to mind the countless forms of beauty to be found amongst flowers—their matchless colouring, their graceful shapes, their exquisite perfumes—and then ask himself, "Is it conceivable that all this wealth of beauty should have been massed together merely for the purpose of attracting insects on which the greater portion of it would be entirely thrown away?" Surely only one

[1] *Origin of Species*, pp. 160, 161.

answer is possible to all persons whose judgment is not biassed in favour of a preconceived theory.

Mr. Darwin was willing to admit, indeed, "that a great number of male animals, and a host of magnificently coloured butterflies have been rendered beautiful for beauty's sake," yet this, he contended, had been "effected only through sexual selection; that is, by the more beautiful males having been continually preferred by the females." But Mr. Darwin seems to have overlooked the fact that, before this could happen, even on his theory, there must have previously existed, first, on the part of the females a taste for the beautiful, and secondly, on the part of the males different degrees of beauty, without which there would be no room for preference to show itself by the females. Mr. Darwin makes no attempt to explain these difficulties, though, strange to say, he afterwards makes the admission, that in order to account for the æsthetic faculty "there must be some fundamental cause in the constitution of the nervous system in each species." Exactly so! How strange, then, that he should have suggested such trivial and unsatisfying causes for beauty in the floral and animal world as he

has done! His argument about the flowers is a veritable case of *post hoc propter hoc.*

Of course, we had no right to expect Mr. Darwin to give us an exhaustive treatise on beauty, and what he has said only touches the merest fringe of the subject.

The fact remains, and cannot be contested, that there are countless forms and kinds of beauty, quantitative and qualitative, phenomenal and noumenal, besides those which Darwin refers to. And the question for us at present to consider is, "What is their united significance?"

I venture to submit that a thoughtful unprejudiced attempt to answer this question will bring us to some such conclusions as these:—

1. All forms and kinds of beauty proceed from one common source or origin.

2. As productions of the Power which makes for beauty in the Universe they must bear witness to the nature and attributes of that Power.

3. But beauty is intelligible. Therefore the Power that produces it must be itself intelligent. Many and various as are the forms of beauty, they all unite in bearing consonant and consistent witness to the Being from Whom they proceed.

4. And lastly, if beauty be not the result of

Chance, or Necessity, or impersonal Will, or physical Force of any kind, is there any other conclusion to come to more reasonable than this, namely, that beauty is a mode of manifestation whereby the Personal Prius reveals Himself through Creation, through Immanence, through Incarnation and Inspiration, as the only Source of beauty and the Creator of all things beautiful because He loves them?

The Functions of Beauty.

We now come to ask, in the next place, to what purpose is all this wealth of beauty, and what are its functions in this universe of phenomena and noumena in which we find ourselves placed? One thing is evident at the outset, that beauty possesses great attractive power. This is clearly so in what we call the quantitative and formal kinds of beauty. And the higher we mount in the scale of beauty—that is, the more our moral and spiritual faculties become conscious of qualitative forms of beauty, such as justice, truth, and love—the stronger does the attractive power become.

How far animals below the rank of man are susceptible to the influence of beauty—as, for example, in the selection of their habitats and

companions—it is not possible to say. But, at any rate in our own species, we know that beauty counts for much in both respects. External beauty in woman, whether of form or face, is perhaps the quickest, though not the worthiest, stimulant of the amatory passion.

From this generally attractive power of beauty I think it is possible to form some correct idea of what its functions are. And I would state them briefly as follows:—

(*a*) To give pleasure. To add charm to life, and make it worth the living. "A thing of beauty is a joy for ever."

(*b*) To civilize, educate, and perfect humanity.

Next to nature, there is perhaps nothing which gives greater pleasure, and at the same time exercises a more civilizing influence on mankind, than Art. But what is Art? Is it anything else than the effort to realize and embody the beauty of Nature in a permanent form? Painting, sculpture, and music, these are the commonest forms of artistic beauty, and how greatly do they contribute to the enjoyment and civilization of mankind—the beauty in many instances being not quantitative or formal only, but calling up by association ideas of moral or spiritual beauty!

But it is when we come to those forms of qualitative beauty, which partake of a social, moral, or spiritual character, that we see the educational influence of beauty most clearly displayed.

Ideals of Beauty.

In all ages, and in every country, men have formed their ideals of beauty, and through these have sought to carry men onward to perfection. Great ideals—that is, ideals beautiful in their social, moral, or spiritual character, are the powers that have ruled, and will continue to rule the world. It is the moral ideal which, according to Professor Wundt, is to attract men onwards and upwards, and result, to use his own favourite expression, in ever-increasing "*psychical values*."

But of all ideals of beauty, there is none, perhaps, which has exercised, and, I truly believe, is destined to exercise, a more powerful influence for good than the Christian.

"Speaking of this Ideal," says Dr. Davidson in his *Christian Ethics*,[1] it is one "of the most fascinating kind. . . . It is seen in the life and

[1] *Christian Ethics*, by W. L. Davidson, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen, p. 114.

character of Jesus, as portrayed to us in the Gospels, and interpreted by the New Testament writers—absolute purity, realized under human conditions by Him who was the Perfect Man; filial intercourse and communion with the Father; intense and unremitting never-failing obedience, and unqualified submission to the Divine Will; ungrudging devotion to the highest interests of mankind. And this Ideal, manifested to us by Him, Who is the Head of Humanity, works in those who accept it, by transforming them into the likeness of Christ their Master, and therefore into the likeness of God—for Christ is "the image of God and the revealer of His character."

And again, "Not only is the Ideal attainable, it is all on the lines of righteousness, and of man's highest spiritual progress . . . it is human nature in its highest form, appealing to imperfect human nature and drawing it to itself and, in drawing, purifying it." [1]

Among all the ideals of beauty which have ever captivated mankind, the world may safely be challenged to produce one which in point of purity and loveliness will compare with this. The beauties of Nature and Art add immeasurably to the pleasure of life, and, besides this, conduce to the civilization and refinement of mankind. But the beauty of the Christian Ideal does far more

[1] *Christian Ethics*, pp. 112, 116.

than this. It is the very finger of God, whereby He reforms the sin-stained soul of man into the image of His own perfection.

Surely, then, men will do well to cultivate beauty in one or other of its varied forms, and in as many of them as they can, for it is a thing Divine. Let them surround themselves with the works of beauty in Nature and Art. Let them make their homes beautiful, their gardens beautiful, their places of worship beautiful, and bring beauty, so far as possible, into every department of daily life—the beauty of form, of sound, of colour—in music and painting, in sculpture and architecture. For every one will add some new charm to life, and help to relieve that tedium and monotony which has brought many a man to a suicide's grave. But let us not forget that, while beauty is the robe of God, sin is as surely its cankerworm. And, above all, let us not neglect those far higher forms of beauty which are disclosed to us through the Christian Ideal. All earthly and material forms of beauty will pale on the sight and pall on the taste. But this is the beauty of the God-like character, "the highest thing conceivable by us, and the highest thing desirable. There is nothing greater that the mind can picture, nothing better

that the heart can wish."[1] To those who will yield themselves to its attractive influence, the Christian Ideal will be one of ever-unfolding splendour. They shall find that even life on earth may become the pathway to heaven. And as they journey on they will gain, ever and anon, sweet glimpses of the glories that await them at their journey's end, when they "shall see the King in His beauty, and behold the land of far distances."

NOTE.—It is almost needless to point out that, if the functions of beauty are such as I have ventured to describe them, then beauty itself is in the highest degree teleologic and purposive.

[1] *Christian Ethics*, p. 114.

SECTION VIII.

PERSONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY.

Hegel, Spencer, and Comte—Altruism—The Incarnation, and the Fatherhood of God as the source of human responsibility—The brotherhood of Man—Conclusion.

THE bearing of the foregoing discussion of Personality on Responsibility is, I think, sufficiently obvious. Of my own personality I entertain no doubt. But the question is this: Is my personality related to and conditioned by any other personality higher than my own? If it is not, if there be no other or higher Personality than my own, then in no true sense of the word can I be called a responsible Agent. Responsibility means liability to be called to account for myself and my actions to another Person, who has the right and the power to summon me before his tribunal, and reward or punish me accordingly. Thus, not only does responsibility depend on

Personality, but our view of responsibility will derive its scope and character from that conception of Personality which our Religion and Metaphysic are calculated to produce.

The metaphysical system of Hegel, with its Prius of "pure thought," reaching Personality only in the self-conscious spirit of man, does not present the elements and conditions necessary for responsibility, for the simple reason that a self-conscious agent cannot be responsible to an impersonal "pure thought" or "philosophy." [1]

Neither is there room for responsibility in Mr. Spencer's system, which only postulates an unknown and unknowable Prius of Persistent Force. Such a Prius can never be the object of moral and religious regard. Between it and the self-conscious Personality of man no moral relations, such as are implied in a sense of responsibility, can possibly exist.

The same may be said of Comtism and the ethical system which is legitimately bred from it. It was Comte's avowed aim to set up the Religion

[1] Hegel's attempt to make his "Logic" square with Christian Metaphysic and Religion was a failure, posterity being judge. Much as he would have deprecated such a result, the only goal to which his system legitimately led was a philosophical pantheism.

of Humanity for that of Christ, to put man on the throne of God, and substitute the Social for the Theologic Idea.[1] Here, again, then, there is no room for a Responsibility higher than that which each individual owes to that deified Humanity which is proposed as the only object of worship.

Not that even such a responsibility as this is to be despised—the responsibility of each member of society to produce "higher psychical values," as Professor Wundt expresses it, and so to work for the progress and perfection of Humanity. But it is of such a vague and shadowy nature that its influence on the bulk of mankind, whether as a deterrent or incentive, could never be great. And at any rate this is not the kind of responsibility we are now discussing. Doubtless it is a noble thing in theory to be striving for the realization of the "Social Ideal." But where there is no moral Arbiter, higher than the tentative and

[1] His third course of Lectures on the Positive Polity ended with these remarkable words:—

"The servants of Humanity claim as their due the general direction of this world. Their object is to constitute a real Providence in all departments—moral, intellectual, and material. Consequently they exclude, once for all, from political supremacy, all the different servants of God—Catholic, Protestant, or Deist—as being at once behindhand, and a cause of disturbance."

fluctuating judgment of Society, no tribunal to dispense justice, to punish the evil and reward the good, there is practically nothing to call forth the sense of responsibility in the true sense of the word.

And, again, even this kind of responsibility like Altruism, finds its real source, as also its abiding home, in Christianity. The Christian, as well as the Comtist, is responsible for the production of "higher psychical values." He, too, is bound to live and work for the attainment of a "Social Ideal,"[1] only in this case the Ideal is of a higher and more transcendent character. But if the doctrine of a Personal Prius, such as Christian Metaphysic and Religion consistently teach, be that which on the whole affords the best explanation of the physical and psychical phenomena comprehended in human life and Personality, then responsibility follows as a matter of course. And the nature and extent of the responsibility involved must be gathered from the manifestations of Himself and His Will which the Personal Prius has been pleased to make.[2]

[1] Cp. Ephes. iv. 13.

[2] "This knowledge" of the Will of God, says Count Tolstoy, "is not acquired by study, nor by the efforts of individuals, but through the reception by them of the manifestation of the Infinite Mind, which little by little discloses itself to man."—*Religion and Morality*, p. 20.

That manifestation, we Christians contend, has reached its climax, so far, in the Incarnation. And it is in the Incarnation, or in what flowed from it, we find the nature and extent of human responsibility most clearly defined. Christian apologetics do not fall within the scope of this work, but one observation I may, perhaps, be permitted to make. It is this: that, whatever be the cogency of the arguments for the Incarnation, it has, as a matter of fact, proved the greatest inspiration for good, the most potent factor in the moral progress of mankind, which the world has ever seen. And why so? Because the Ideal of perfection it sets up for our attainment is that of unselfish love. Herein we see the supreme manifestation of the Personal Prius. God is love, and the Incarnation is the actual expression of His love. But this love is not merely an object of æsthetic regard—something to be admired and wondered at. It is itself an incitement of love, an image of beauty to ravish the soul, and to be reproduced in each of the followers of Jesus. As He was, so are we to be in this world. "Each one of you must live My life; or, rather, I must

live My life again in each of you; and each of you in your several stations and according to your several abilities must be a living Christ." And herein, if I mistake not, is to be found the secret of that inspiration which the Incarnation has ever exercised, and still continues to exercise, in the hearts and lives of men.

The Fatherhood of God, from which the Incarnation takes its rise, reveals to us as its logical outcome the brotherhood of man. And the result is a double sense of responsibility. As the personal offspring of the Personal Prius, bearing His image, and reflecting His attributes, I am answerable to Him for my life, and the use I make of it. I may not destroy that which is His gift; or, if I do, I must not cheat myself with the delusion that I shall not be held responsible.

And the brotherhood of man shows me that, after all, I am my brother's keeper; that I must no longer regard myself as an isolated individual at liberty to pursue my own interest, regardless of that of others. I am a member of the great social body of humanity, and whatever makes for the welfare of that body it is both my duty and my privilege to strive for. And if we can teach men the sanctity of human life, and the responsibility

which attaches to it; if we can bring them to feel that inspiration of love which radiates from the Incarnation, we shall perhaps be doing the best that can be done to render their lives at least endurable, if not useful and happy, and so removing some of the chief causes of suicide. It is because I believe the study of Personality in its manifold bearing on human life and character helps us to do all this, that I have gone into the subject at the length I have done. If to some of my readers the discussion has appeared too academic, and not of much practical utility, I would remind them, that the subject is one which, however transcendent in some of its aspects, comes down to, and embraces, in others even the trivial details, trials, and duties of our daily life.

From the cultured gentleman, or the University scholar, who justifies himself in his rash act by Schopenhauer's plausible but indefensible postulate of "*unassailable right*," down to the unhappy being whom sin, or sorrow, or shame has hounded to a self-sought and dishonoured grave, there is not one with whom these arguments should not have weight.

And, indeed, it is this intimate bearing of Personality on the problem of life that imparts

to it its chief importance. It is the golden chain which unites the Eternal Prius, the Uncaused Cause of all things, with the noblest of His creatures, the intelligent self-conscious soul of man. Without it man is an inexplicable enigma to himself, a mere waif and stray on the boundless ocean of being. He comes he knows not whence; he exists he knows not why; he goes he knows not whither. Without it he is severed from the eternal past, and cut off from the eternal future, his whole existence bounded by the limits of a few score years of joy and sorrow, of hope and despair.

But Personality enables us to co-ordinate man in the scale of being, and supplies, not only a rational theory of his origin, but also an intelligible reason and purpose for his existence. If on the one hand it invests his life with a solemn responsibility to himself, to his neighbour and his God, on the other, it sanctifies and ennobles it, and opens out for it the hope of a future of unspeakable dignity and happiness.

Without it Religion, in the true sense of the word, at least as I understand it, is impossible. The impersonal "Thought" of Hegel cannot supply it, nor the "Thelology" of Schopenhauer, nor the deified "Humanity" of Comte, nor the

"persistent Force" of Spencer. To Naturalism and the Mechanical Theory, with its strange concepts of psycho-physical parallelism" and "epiphenomena," we shall look in vain, for they present no foundation on which a religion can be built up. And so it comes to pass, that man is left to drift hither and thither on the sea of uncertainty, the sport of his own ever-changing speculations.

But in Personality, as it emerges from Christian Metaphysic and Religion, we seem to find our feet. Not only does it provide a reasonable theory of the Universe—that is, of the phenomena and noumena which form the objective element in human experience; but the subjective element, the self-conscious Ego, the personal soul of man, is both recognized and co-ordinated in the scale of being, and the lines of its further progress indicated.

"It is a noteworthy fact," says Professor Wundt, "that, despite the undoubted existence of reciprocal relations between religion, art, and science, one of the three, religion, should be regarded as gradually disappearing from the intellectual life. It is held that the stage of intellectual interest, which finds its satisfaction exclusively in the religious activities of the mind, is dying out. Art and science, it is thought, are filling the vacancy thus arising, and will, of course, free themselves

from the manifold relations that now bind them to the religious life." [1]

I would fain hope that such is not the case; for, if it be a fact, it is one of sinister omen for the moral and spiritual progress of mankind, and the production of those "higher psychical values" in which Professor Wundt believes that progress consists. Neither science nor art can reach down to those moral and spiritual activities, which form the very core of human Personality, and of which character and conduct are the outcome.[2]

As faith in the supra-sensible declines, the sense of responsibility grows proportionately weaker, and the unseen world and a future beyond the grave vanish, and cease to be restraining and stimulating influences on life and conduct. The

[1] *The Principles of Morality*, p. 219.

[2] Professor Wundt both indicates the fallacy of the opinion he records, and deprecates the down-grade movement. "The fundamental error is the opinion that religion is a primitive mode of thought destined to be supplanted by science." And again "Ethics, instead of limiting its attention to the merely individual and outward phenomenal forms, must recognize that the most enduring of all moral springs of action, that which determines the direction of all individual and social efforts, is the striving after an ideal, towards which the reality created by moral actions approximates, but to which it can never attain."—*The Principles of Morality*, p. 220.

life of man, instead of being elevated into higher regions of thought and motive and endeavour, tends to sink down to a lower moral and spiritual level, and finds its only sphere of action in a secular and sensuous existence. The very faculties which bespeak his Divine parentage, and at the same time fit him for intercourse and communion with his Divine Parent, become atrophied and paralyzed, for the simple reason that no fitting field for their exercise will remain. "*Corruptio optimi pessima.*" Is this truth destined to find its supreme and tragic illustration in the case of man? If not, it is only the realization of the relation in which the human Personality stands to the Divine that can avert so disastrous an issue.

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